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Summary 
Many philosophers have argued, and continue to argue, that if atheism is true 
- if there is no transcendent creator of the universe or parts of it (most importantly, 
no transcendent creator of life on earth and of human beings) - then there are no 
moral truths. In this essay, I argue for the related but different thesis that atheists 
have reason to accept the claim that all of their moral beliefs are unwarranted (or 
unjustified), a claim I refer to as "moral scepticism". 
After explaining atheism and providing some metaethical preliminaries, I 
consider some empirical findings that might be thought to support the idea that 
everyone should embrace moral scepticism regardless of whether they are atheists; I 
argue that they do not support that idea. Going on to discuss Darwinism and morality, 
I develop what I call the argument for atheistic Darwinian moral scepticism. While 
this argument gives atheists reason to embrace moral scepticism, advocates of theism 
- the most widely defended alternative to atheism - do not have reason to consider 
their moral beliefs unwarranted, or at least not the same reason that atheists do. 
Acknowledging that atheists could avoid the argument for atheistic 
Darwinian moral scepticism if they can maintain an expressivist (or quasi-realist) 
understanding of the function of moral thought and discourse, I nevertheless argue 
that there is good reason to believe that expressivism is false. Lastly, I consider some 
consequences of atheists embracing moral scepticism, arguing against the moral 
jictionalist idea that moral sceptics can simply pretend to have warranted moral 
beliefs and carryon much as before. I also suggest that atheists will not be able to 
endorse two kinds of argument that many of them have wanted to endorse: the 
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Introduction and acknowledgements 
Philosophers have long debated, and continue to debate, the relationship(s) 
between morality and the existence of God. One of the central questions debated is 
whether the existence of God is a necessary condition for the existence of moral truth 
- whether "everything is permitted" if God does not exist. 
That God's existence is necessary for moral truth has been maintained both 
by philosophers who accept theism (the thesis that God exists) and by philosophers 
who reject it. For example, theistic philosopher William Lane Craig maintains that, 
"If God does not exist, then it is difficult to see any reason to think that human 
beings are special or that their morality is objectively true" (1997), and the late 
atheist philosopher lohn Mackie held that, "objectively intrinsically prescriptive 
features, supervening upon natural ones," which he understood our conception of 
moral truth to commit us to, "constitute so odd a cluster of qualities and relations that 
they are most unlikely to have arisen in the ordinary course of events, without an all-
powerful god to create them" (1982, p.lIS). Other philosophers have likewise argued 
that moral truth requires the existence of God in order to be adequately intelligible 
(e.g., Mavrodes 1986; Budziszewski 2002), while some - such as Elizabeth 
Anscombe (1958) - have thought that God's existence is necessary for the correct 
application of some central moral concepts, even if others might have correct 
application in the absence of God's existence. The tight connection some have seen 
between morality and God's existence has motivated moral arguments for God's 
existence (arguments from the existence of moral truth to the existence of God) in 
philosophy past and present (Adams 1979; Copan 2003). 
However, there is considerable disagreement on the matter. While some 
philosophers think that moral truth commits us to the existence of metaphysically 
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strange properties and something resembling a theistic story if those properties are 
not to remain unacceptably anomalous, it is clear that many other philosophers are 
not convinced. Some of these latter philosophers don't think that moral truth requires 
much by way of metaphysics, whereas others among their number think that it does 
but that nevertheless the properties and facts required can exist in a godless universe. 
The debate is alive and well in contemporary philosophy, as evidenced by the recent 
publication of a book on the topic featuring essays solicited from distinguished 
philosophers on both sides (Garcia and King 2009).1 
Surveying the debate, I doubt whether either side will be able to convince the 
other. However, I think that an argument for a different, but related, conclusion 
might be able to secure wider agreement. Rather than arguing that if God does not 
exist, there are no moral truths, my purpose in this essay is to argue that atheists 
should embrace moral scepticism (and to examine some consequences). By this, I 
mean that atheists should hold that all of their moral beliefs are epistemically 
unwarranted (or unjustified). (Note that other philosophers sometimes intend to 
signify different positions by their use of the expression "moral scepticism" than the 
position I will use that expression to denote.) This thesis I argue for is compatible 
with the different thesis that atheists have reason to consider all their moral beliefs to 
befalse (a corollary of the thesis that God's existence is a necessary condition for the 
existence of moral truth), because atheists could have reason to consider their moral 
beliefs to be both unwarranted and false. So in arguing that atheists should embrace 
moral scepticism I am not denying that they may also have reason to consider all 
I Also, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has recently released a book on the topic (Morality without God? 
Oxford University Press, 2009); unfortunately, it was published too late to be considered in this essay. 
7 
their moral beliefs to be false. 2 The thesis that atheists should embrace moral 
scepticism seems to me to be supportable by a convincing argument (though one that 
may require further elaboration and defence), and I hope that it may secure wider 
agreement. 
The essay proceeds as follows: 
In chapter 1, I explain what thesis I understand atheism to be, and I argue that 
atheists are committed to unguided Darwinism. I also discuss how moral thought and 
discourse are to be characterised, and I briefly rule out some metaethical positions as 
untenable. 
In chapter 2, I consider some representative and influential challenges to 
moral belief which might be thought to render the moral beliefs of everyone (whether 
atheists or not) unwarranted; I argue that there is no reason to think they have that 
consequence. 
In chapter 3, I argue that in virtue of their commitment to unguided 
Darwinism, atheists should embrace moral scepticism, on the assumption that moral 
belief is in the business of trying to track independent moral properties and facts. I 
develop the argument for atheistic Darwinian moral scepticism. 
Chapter 4 considers a possible way atheists might avoid the argument 
developed in chapter 3 - by rejecting the assumption that moral belief is in the 
business of trying to track independent moral facts and instead adopting an 
expressivist (or quasi-realist) understanding of moral thought and discourse. I argue 
that such an understanding is mistaken. 
2 Similarly, Richard Joyce has argued for "error theory" - that all moral beliefs are false (2001) - yet 
has more recently argued for (what I call) moral scepticism (2006); in his recent work, he states: "I 
have not changed my mind; I am simply bracketing off those [previous] arguments here" (p.244, n.17). 
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The final chapter, chapter 5, considers the consequences of atheists accepting 
moral scepticism. If I am right, the consequences are significant: atheists will have to 
give up moral thought and discourse and there is reason to think that they will not be 
able to endorse some important arguments that many atheists have wanted to endorse 
and which are often included among their objections to theism (the argument from 
evil and "Unholy Scripture" arguments against purported divine revelations). 
Although I think that the argument of the essay is correct - I think that if I 
accepted atheism, whether as a firm belief or a working hypothesis, I would be a 
moral sceptic for the reasons given - I acknowledge that in presenting it I need to rely 
on assumptions that I am unable to defend at length. For example, at the end of 
chapter 1 I reject some metaethical views with a dismissal that I am aware some 
might think too swift. Unfortunately, I lack the space to provide a detailed discussion, 
and, as I point out, the rest of the essay should be understood as being directed only 
toward atheists who accept that those metaethical views are not viable. My desire to 
produce a coherent and plausible case for an interesting metaethical conclusion (and, 
furthermore, to discuss its consequences) means that the essay covers a lot of ground 
and I am aware that at a number of points questions and objections could perhaps be 
raised which I have not been able to discuss or provide responses to (though I hope 
to have discussed and responded to a sufficient number). If the reader does consider 
the argument too swift in places, I would suggest that, as Peter van Inwagen has said 
with regard to some of his work, this essay is perhaps best viewed - at any rate, when 
it comes to the parts where I have offered less detailed discussion - as an "opening 
move ... rather than a finished product" (1988, p.389). 
9 
A discussion of the relationship between atheism and metaethics will 
undoubtedly lead some to think of the Euthyphro dilemma for metaethical views that 
understand morality as depending upon God (e.g., on His will or commands): does 
God will or command what He does because of its moral status, or does it have its 
moral status because God wills or commands it? Many consider both horns of the 
dilemma unacceptable and appeal to it to dismiss the possibility of theistic 
metaethics (e.g., Brink 2007). The relevance of the dilemma to this essay doesn't 
appear great, since I am not arguing that theism rather than atheism is required in 
order for the possibility of moral truth; the challenge to atheism that figures in this 
essay is epistemological, not metaphysical. That said, at the end of chapter 3 I 
mention some possibilities for theists, and include the possibility of some kind of 
theistic metaethics, so I should point out that theistic responses to the Euthyphro 
dilemma can be found in the work of (among others) Robert Adams (1999), William 
Alston (2002) and William Lane Craig (see his contributions to Garcia and King 
2009). Indeed, Mackie (1977, pp.229-232) noted long ago that theists can avoid the 
dilemma by understanding some values to be determined by God's will or commands 
but others to be determined by something else, e.g., His nature. So I will assume that 
theistic metaethics is not crippled by the Euthyphro dilemma, and I will not have 
anything more to say about it in this essay. 
I was able to write this essay because of funding by the Arts and Humanities 
Research Council (AHRC), to whom I am grateful. I thank my PhD supervisor James 
Lenman and my secondary supervisor Yonatan Shemmer for their help, advice and 
support; I also offer general thanks to the staff and graduate students at Sheffield for 
encouragement and aiding me in my philosophical development. 
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I wish to thank Springer Science + Business Media (the publishers) for kind 
permission to include in this essay material from my paper "On Sinnott-Armstrong's 
Case Against Moral Intuitionism", forthcoming in the journal Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice; it has been incorporated in a modified form into chapter 2. I wish to 
thank James Lenman and two anonymous referees for the journal for their helpful 
comments and suggestions on the paper, and I also thank a graduate audience at 
Sheffield. 
Above all, I thank my wife Jo for her love and support throughout the PhD. 
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Chapter 1 - Atheism, theism, and preliminaries on moral thought 
and discourse 
As I stated in the introduction, my purpose in this essay is to argue that 
atheists should accept moral scepticism - the thesis that all of their moral beliefs are 
unwarranted - and to examine some consequences of this fact. It will be apt, at the 
beginning of the essay, to be clear on what I mean by "atheism". I also need to 
provide a preliminary discussion of moral thought and discourse and to explain that I 
am going to assume that a family of metaethical views are unviable. Being clear on 
these issues, then, is the purpose of this first chapter. I will begin by explaining what 
thesis I take atheism to be, and I will explain why atheists are committed to an 
unguided Darwinian understanding of the development of life on earth (a point that 
will be important for chapter 3). After some brief but important comments on theism 
and Darwinism - which will also be relevant for what is said in later chapters - I will 
tum to consider how moral thOUght and discourse should be characterised, and I will 
briefly explain my assumption, operative for later chapters, that metaethical views 
that have no room for stance-independence are unviable. 
1. Atheism 
"Atheism" suggests a denial of a god or gods. It is sometimes intended to 
refer to the denial of only some gods. For example, the charge of atheism originated 
in ancient Greece to refer to the rejection of the particular gods of Greek myth and 
religion without implying the rejection of all gods - Socrates was famously executed 
for teaching atheism and corrupting the Athenian youth, but he didn't reject the 
existence of all gods. (Similarly, the early Christians were called atheists by the 
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Romans on account of the Christians' rejection of the Roman pantheon and their 
refusal to worship the emperor, even though the Christians clearly believed in a god.} 
However, the word "atheism" is more often used, both within philosophy and outside 
of it, to refer to a thesis about all gods; and although it is sometimes suggested that 
the word should be used to denote simply a lack of belief in any god (e.g., Smith 
1989), the word is more typically used to denote the positive thesis (or the belief) 
that no god exists. I 
Naturally, understanding atheism to be equivalent to the denial that any god 
exists only makes its content as clear as is one's understanding of what qualifies an 
entity (real or imagined) as a "god". If atheism is the denial of the existence of gods, 
what are gods? The first thing to notice is that atheism cannot be understood as the 
denial that everything that has been classified as a "god", or called a "god", exists. 
For according to some ancient religious systems, human beings could be or become 
gods (e.g., Roman emperors), and idols and images could sometimes be called 
"gods" even by those - such as the Hebrew prophets - who rejected the idea that 
they were identical with or indwelt by living beings. While such entities have been 
called "gods", contemporary philosophers and others who claim to be atheists don't 
deny the existence of Roman emperors or religious objects of worship; being called a 
god isn't the same as being a god. Indeed, we would expect an ancient Roman who 
thought the emperor was no different from other men to deny that he was really a 
god; in the same way, while sometimes referring to idols as "gods", the Hebrew 
prophets could nevertheless say in the very same context that their god is the only 
god and that the "gods" are not gods.2 
I For a history and appraisal of atheism primarily understood as an influential movement, see McGrath 
(2004). 
2 E.g., Isaiah 45, especially v.20-22. 
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So what is needed is a conception of what it is to be a god, rather than simply 
a list of the entities that have been called "gods". Here, the historical record bears 
witness to decidedly distinct conceptions. At one end of the spectrum are the gods of 
the polytheistic pantheons of the ancient Near East or the epics of Homer, who 
appear as human beings "writ large" - powerful agents with special abilities, yet 
limited in many ways just as humans are.3 At the other end is the decidedly different 
God (and a capital "G" is appropriate) affinned in ancient Jewish belief4 and 
subsequent Jewish, Christian and Muslim tradition (the God of classical theism) who 
is understood to be all-powerful, to not engage in daily human routines or be subject 
to human-like limitations, and who is believed to have brought the whole universe 
into being and to sustain it in existence. Lying somewhere in the middle of these 
conceptions are the demiurges and partially limited gods of philosophers like Plato 
and John Stuart Mill, of belief systems such as Gnosticism, and many others. 
Despite the variation, we see some shared features in these ideas of gods. At a 
minimum, it seems, a god must be an agent, a being with intelligence, and one that 
has greater powers and abilities than human beings acquire in the natural course of 
events. This minimum is almost enough for the Oxford English Dictionary, which 
defines a "god" as "a superhuman person who is worshipped as having power over 
nature and the fortunes of mankind; a deity."s However, adopting this as a definition 
would raise interesting questions. For example, if we were able to genetically alter 
some humans so that they were much stronger than the rest of humanity, having 
''unnatural'' strength, and they came to be worshipped, would those who had been 
3 "In pagan religion, gods are born and suckled, grow to maturity, contest for satisfaction of appetites 
and emotions, battle for prestige and power and mastery, indulge in sex, and are subject to failure, 
defeat, and death" (Walton 2006, p.l02, quoting H. C. Brichto, The Names of God (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), p.57). 
4 "Israelites had to be constantly reminded by the prophets [in the Hebrew scriptures] that [their God] 
is not like a human and not like the other gods" (Walton 2006, p.11 0). 
S www.oed.com 
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enhanced then qualify as gods? Would an extraterrestrial alien with powers beyond 
those of human beings (perhaps such as ET in the Spielberg film, who can move 
objects with his mind and magically heal injuries) count as a god? If Superman 
existed and was worshipped by the residents of Metropolis, would he be a god? In 
addition, we might call into question the dictionary definition because it seems to 
imply that it is necessary for an agent to qualify as a god that he is recognised and 
worshipped. Couldn't there be gods that human beings are unaware of or who they 
simply fail to worship? 
I suspect that, given the diverse ways in which humans have characterised the 
agents that they have viewed as gods, trying to get clearer on necessary and sufficient 
conditions for an entity to qualify as a god will not prove particularly fruitful. A 
better approach, I suggest, is to consider what contemporary avowals of "atheism" 
are intended to signify. For even if it is difficult to come up with an adequate 
dictionary definition of "god", we can perhaps see what a contemporary claimant of 
the label "atheist" most often intends to connote and communicate to others by their 
adoption of that label. And while a definition perhaps has to cover all the different 
conceptions of gods, from ancient times up to the present day, focusing on what 
contemporary claimants of the label "atheist" intend to signal their rejection of may 
leave us with a smaller subset of those entities. Indeed, I think we can identify a 
paradigm example of the kind of entity that they wish to signal rejection of: the main 
point of claiming to be an "atheist" or in arguing for "atheism" in philosophy has 
often been (and, with the decline of belief in the gods affirmed by ancient Egyptian, 
Mesopotamian, Greek and Roman religion, has been with increasing frequency as 
one moves through history toward the present day) to signal rejection of the 
existence of God (with a capital "G") - an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly 
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good creator and sustainer of the universe - or any entity significantly similar to God; 
in other words, the understanding of God shared by Jewish, Christian and Islamic 
tradition (the God of classical theism) and any entity that significantly resembles 
God. Although philosophers have differed in how they understand God's attributes 
(Taliaferro 2003), it is this god whose existence has been affirmed, and argued for, 
by many philosophers down the ages; and it is this god whose existence is still 
affirmed, and argued for, by many philosophers today. Whereas any contemporary 
philosophers who believe in Zeus, Mars or Diana appear to be keeping quiet about it, 
prominent philosophers have written about their belief in God - both how they came 
to such belief and the role it plays in their lives and their philosophical work (Clark 
1993; Morris 1994).6 Furthermore, both those who affirm and those who deny God's 
existence have written about the resurgence or "resurrection" of belief in God among 
philosophers in recent years, though they understandably differ over whether they 
assess this as something to be celebrated (Craig 1991) or regretted (Smith 2001). The 
non-existence of the gods that graced the ancient pantheons, and the 
unreasonableness of believing in them, has become uncontroversial - at least among 
western philosophers - whereas it is not uncontroversial whether believing in the 
existence of God or an entity significantly like Him is similarly unreasonable. 7 In 
short, it is typically taken for granted that the members of the ancient pantheons are 
rejected; claims to atheism are made in order to signal rejection of God and any 
6 For similar essays but explaining other philosophers' atheism and how that affects their lives, see the 
essays collected by Antony (2007). 
7 As Jack Smart says, "The tribal gods .. . are of little or no philosophical interest. They were 
essentially finite beings, and the god of one tribe or collection of tribes was regarded as good in that it 
enabled victory in war against tribes with less powerful gods. Similarly the Greek and Roman gods 
were more like mythical heroes and heroines than like the omnipotent, omniscient and good God 
postulated in medieval and modern philosophy" (2009, my italics). James Lenman has pointed out to 
me that the claim that the gods of the ancient pantheons are no longer believed in needs to be qualified 
so as to apply only to western culture and philosophy (in order to avoid the false impression that 
Hinduism is no longer accepted). While this is true, I believe Smart's comments about lack of 
philosophical interest may apply to the various gods of the Hindu pantheon as well, at least if they are 
understood as really being distinct gods. 
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entities significantly like Him. By "entities significantly like Him", I have in mind 
intelligent transcendent creators of the universe or of significant parts of it (most 
crucially, life on earth). There are contemporary philosophers and theologians who 
believe in - and argue for - a transcendent creator but who don't believe that the 
creator has the attributes of the God of classical theism, and I think that in claiming 
to be an "atheist" one signals their rejection of those creators too. 
At any rate, it seems to me that this is what contemporary - and especially 
philosophical - claims to atheism are intended to connote, and therefore this is what I 
will take atheism to be. I will understand atheism to be the denial of the existence of 
God as understood by classical theism and also of any being significantly like God in 
that it would be a transcendent creator of the universe or parts of it. 
I acknowledge that different philosophers may sometimes use terminology 
differently, but it seems to me that the term "God" is typically used in philosophy to 
denote the God of classical theism and that the thesis that God exists is typically 
called "theism" (e.g., Copan and Moser 2003) and that is how I will use those terms. 
I will understand a god to be a transcendent creator, and atheism to be the thesis that 
there is no God or gods. I realise that some might take issue with this. For example, 
advocates of views like process theism which differ from classical theism might still 
claim to believe in "God" and to endorse a version of "theism". However, I suggest 
that unless the advocates of such views clarify and explain how their views differ 
from classical theism, they are heard as being classical theists because - like it or not 
- unless clarification is provided, the terms "God" and "theism" suggest classical 
theism. Process theists are indeed theists in one sense, but then so are polytheists; the 
word "theist" on its own suggests one who believes in the God of classical theism (or 
"theism"). 
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With the above understandings in play, atheism and theism are contraries but 
not contradictories; that is, they are incompatible and cannot both be true, but the 
falsity of one does not entail the truth of the other. Atheism as I understand it is false 
if theism is true, but it would also be false ifthere is a transcendent creator other than 
God. Nevertheless, because theism is the most common (and most widely defended) 
alternative to atheism, I may sometimes write in such a way that I give the 
appearance that atheism and theism are contradictories and not simply contraries. It 
should also be noted that I will assume in this essay that we can confidently reject the 
idea that life on earth has been created by an intelligent being that has arisen in the 
course of the universe's history (a non-transcendent creator). So far as I know, the 
idea that we have been created by an alien or aliens is not a popular one among 
atheists, and it faces grave problems. 8 
Atheism is certainly not a minority view within contemporary philosophy. 
Although philosophers working outside the philosophy of religion may not have 
much occasion in their work to announce that they are atheists, they often signal this 
commitment (along with some others) by announcing that they are naturalists. 
Naturalism is an extremely popular philosophical position, stance, or project, which 
has been described as academic orthodoxy, in philosophy departments and in 
universities as a whole (Rea 2002, p.l). Indeed, it has been said that the label 
"naturalism" is like the label "World Peace" in that they are both slogans that almost 
everyone wants to march under (Stroud 1996, p.22). And despite disagreement over 
what exactly naturalism is, it appears that by all accounts it is not consistent with 
8 For example, since such aliens would be denizens of the universe, they would themselves need to 
somehow come to exist within the time constraints set by the universe's history, and they would have 
less time to evolve than us. Furthennore, they would have to evolve at a time when the universe was 
less hospitable to life. Added to that, they would need to be able to travel through space (with fast 
travel increasing the probability of serious damage to their spaceships caused by collisions with space 
debris) or somehow develop the ability to affect how things go on our planet. See Ross (2008, chA). 
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belief in the existence of God or a transcendent creator.9 Indeed, many naturalists are 
clear that naturalism rules out appeal to the existence of God in principle and not 
simply at present. As Simon Blackburn puts it, "we nearly all want to be naturalists," 
and being a naturalist "is above all to refuse any appeal to a supernatural order" 
(1998, p.48), an order which God would clearly belong to; and as others have noticed 
in analysing and assessing naturalism, it "is especially ... the rejection of theism ... that 
unites naturalists" (Goetz and Taliaferro 2008, p.8). Indeed, I know of no 
philosopher who welcomes the label "naturalist" and also claims to be a theist or to 
believe in a transcendent creator of any stripe. 
So to the extent that naturalism is popular in contemporary philosophy (and it 
is very popular) it would appear that atheism is also popular. Indeed, one can 
sometimes get the impression that atheism isn't simply a commitment of naturalism 
but is rather its organising principle; one can get the impression that naturalism is a 
position or stance that is primarily atheistic and that the project of "naturalising" 
some given phenomenon chiefly consists in the attempt to provide a plausible, 
consistently atheistic account of the phenomenon in question, explaining away by 
elimination or reduction anything that might suggest activity or design by a 
superhuman mind. Indeed, I am sometimes inclined to suspect that one of the main 
9 I think Michael Rea (2002) has provided the best account of what naturalism is: an approach to 
inquiry that limits the sources of warranted belief to the sciences and their methods and other sources 
of belief ratified by the sciences and their methods. However, I must demur when Rea claims that 
naturalism does not rule out belief in God or supernatural beings like God in principle, and that 
naturalists qua naturalists only insist that if God is to be believed in, His existence must be ratified by 
science. For it seems to me that many naturalists understand science to be unable in principle to 
provide evidence for the existence of God. For example, Mark Timmons allows that future science 
could provide support for the existence of immaterial Cartesian egos, which naturalists would then 
have to affirm, but he is sure that naturalism excludes (it is clear he means in future, not just at present) 
"supernatural, occult entities, facts and events, as well as the instantiation of any supernatural, occult 
properties" (1999, p.13). It seems clear that God or any transcendent creator would fall under this 
heading. 
In fact, this essay began life as an essay on the metaethical consequences of naturalism, but 
has reached its current form in part because atheism seems a core commitment of naturalism and 
because it is the atheism that provides the interesting metaethical implications (moral scepticism) that 
I think naturalism also has. 
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reasons the label "naturalism" (rather than "atheism") has such contemporary 
currency is that many atheistic philosophers share the sentiments of John Searle 
when he writes, "For us, the educated members of society, the world has become 
demystified ... The result of this demystification is that we have gone beyond atheism 
to a point where the issue no longer matters in the way it did to earlier generations.,,1Q 
(It could also perhaps be due in part to the fact that "atheism" is a negative word, 
parasitic on "theism", whereas "naturalism" sounds more positive and connotes an 
interest in the natural world.) Now Searle is wrong in suggesting that all educated 
members of society have "gone beyond" the question of atheism and theism, for - as 
I have already mentioned - many contemporary philosophers are theists. In addition, 
the question of whether there is good evidence for theism is a live one in philosophy: 
recent years have witnessed theistic philosophers putting forward sophisticated 
arguments for God's existence (e.g., Copan and Moser 2003; Swinburne 2004) and 
engaging in high-profile debates with atheistic philosophers on the subject (Smart 
and Haldane 2003; Plantinga and Tooley 2008). There has also been one highly 
publicised conversion from atheism to belief in a god - that of Antony Flew, possibly 
the most famous philosophical defender of atheism in the twentieth century, who has 
come to belief in a transcendent creator (of a purely philosophical stripe; he doesn't 
believe in divine revelation or an afterlife) and who attributes his philosophical 
conversion to evidence and reason (2007). So Searle is wrong; the philosophical 
debate over atheism is in fact a live one among "educated members of society" and in 
particular among philosophers. Nevertheless, Searle is right that many philosophers 
take atheism for granted in such a way that they can be said to have gone "beyond" it. 
And the fact that Searle can hope to get away with suggesting that all educated 
10 The quote is from his book Mind. Language. and Society (Basic Books, 1998), pp.34-35; quoted by 
Feser (2008, p.18). 
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people have done so is surely testimony to how widespread atheism is in philosophy 
- Searle can make such a claim because even though there are many philosophers 
who are theists, nevertheless significantly more are atheists and many are so 
confident of atheism that they do indeed take it for granted. II If atheists should 
indeed accept moral scepticism - as I will argue - then this will have significance for 
many. 
2. Atheism and Darwinism 
If atheism is true, then life on earth has not been created by a transcendent 
being. Furthermore, as I have mentioned, I am assuming that a non-transcendent 
creator is not a live possibility. It seems to me that atheists are therefore committed 
to an unguided Darwinian understanding of the development of life on earth. I sayan 
unguided Darwinian understanding because the word "Darwinism" is often used 
ambiguously. It is sometimes used to refer to an understanding of the development of 
life on earth that simply does not, or need not, make reference to the guidance of an 
intelligent agent. But at other times it is used to refer to an understanding of the 
development of life on earth that positively excludes the idea that there was guidance 
by an intelligent agent. Both understandings include the claim that life on earth has 
developed by way of small random heritable changes (mutations) in the replication 
of living creatures, and that these changes were preserved via their conferring an 
advantage on their possessors in their struggle for existence against other creatures 
and the non-living environment, accumulating via natural selection, which is what 1 
will mean by "Darwinism". 12 The latter understanding also includes the claim that no 
II As I mentioned in a previous footnote, essays on "atheism and the secular life" by (mainly, at least) 
atheistic and secular philosophers have recently been collected and edited by Louise Antony (2007). 
12 For a modem account of Darwinism, patterned after Darwin's Origin a/Species, see Jones (1999). 
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intelligent agent has been in any way guiding this process, or supervising it so as to 
produce certain intended effects. (It may appear that Darwinism is equivalent to 
unguided Darwinism, but it will be seen that it isn't in due course.) Atheists are 
committed to Darwinism; also, and importantly for this essay, atheists are committed 
to unguided Darwinism. Note: I will sometimes use expressions like "atheistic 
Darwinist" to draw attention to someone's acceptance of both atheism and (unguided) 
Darwinism. I should also be clear on the fact that I will use the word "evolution" 
with a broader range than Darwinism, let alone unguided Darwinism. As I use it, 
"evolution" refers to the idea that life on earth has come about via a process of 
development. This process can be appropriately called an "evolutionary" one 
whether it was gradual in nature or proceeded by way of large steps, and whether it 
was guided by an intelligent being or not. This breadth of use of the word 
"evolution" seems to me to be in line with standard usage both within and outside of 
biology; for example, we can talk about the evolution of manned aircraft or of the 
motor car, even though aircraft and cars are designed by intelligent beings. 
I take it that it is clear why atheists will be committed to unguided Darwinism 
if they are committed to Darwinism. But why do 1 think that atheists are committed 
to Darwinism? I think that one can only be warranted in accepting atheism if one also 
accepts Darwinism. 13 The reason why is simply that life on earth exhibits such 
overwhelming apparent design 14 that unless one endorses an explanation for it that 
needn't appeal to an intelligent agent, it is difficult to see how one could be 
13 This claim should not be confused with the claim that one can only be warranted in accepting 
Darwinism if one also accepts atheism, or understood to suggest that theism and Darwinism are 
incompatible. 
14 Some speak of "design" in nature without implying that there was an actual intelligent designer, and 
in the same vein there is a long tradition in the history of philosophy of calling the teleological 
argument "the argument/rom design" (rather than "the argument to design"). However, I use the word 
"design" to refer to actual design and distinguish this from apparent design which mayor may not be 
the product of intelligence. 
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warranted in believing that the apparent design isn't actual design, and it is 
exceedingly difficult to think of a plausible explanation meeting this desideratum 
other than Darwinism. This is why Darwinism has played the important role in the 
history of thought that it has. As Thomas Nagel says, "Darwin enabled modem 
secular culture to heave a great collective sigh of relief, by apparently providing a 
way to eliminate purpose, meaning and design as fundamental features of the world" 
(1997, p.131), and such is the overwhelming appearance of design in nature that as 
Richard Dawkins sees it, atheism was only really tenable after Darwin: "[A]lthough 
atheism might have been logically tenable before Darwin, Darwin made it possible to 
be an intellectually fulfilled atheist" (1986, p.7). There has not been another remotely 
plausible account of the apparent design in living things that doesn't invoke an 
. 11' t 15 mte Igent agen . 
I don't mean to suggest that atheists are committed to the truth of every detail 
that those claiming the label "Darwinist" currently hold with respect to the 
emergence and development of life on earth; after all, there is disagreement about a 
large number of details - e.g., whether birds evolved from dinosaurs. Furthermore, 
Darwinism has undergone updating because of discoveries involving genetics and 
other factors (the neo-Darwinian synthesis). But I think that atheists are committed to 
the central, and most important, tenets of what Darwinists believe - and, as I have 
said, I take these to be that life on earth has developed by way of small random 
heritable changes (mutations) in the replication of living creatures, and that these 
changes were preserved via their conferring an advantage on their possessors in their 
15 There have been other suggestions, such as the speculations that arise in the course of discussion 
among the protagonists of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Hume 1993), but some of 
them do not explain the apparent design (e.g. speculations that the universe and its contents have been 
generated from a previous one - see part VII of the Dialogues) and others are too vague or 
incompatible with our knowledge of the world. I assume that an appeal to simple "chance" - which 
isn't much of an explanation - is insufficient. Note also that unless one actually believes one of these 
other suggestions, one has no grounds for denying that the apparent design in the world is real design. 
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struggle for existence against other creatures and the non-living environment, 
accumulating via natural selection. I stress that Darwinism involves the idea that life 
has developed by way of small changes. It is important that the changes at each 
generational stage of living organisms are small and therefore their occurrence at the 
time and place at which they occur do not bespeak orchestration by an intelligent 
agent. This is particularly important to unguided Darwinism which excludes an 
intelligent designer but is also important in order that Darwinism not be understood 
as requiring appeal to such an agent. For example, a theory that posited that complex 
organs arose in a single step or that (e.g.) flight evolved by a wingless and featherless 
creature giving birth to offspring that had complete, feathered and aerodynamically 
efficient wings (which gave the offspring an advantage over its rivals) would not be 
Darwinian. Given the overwhelming apparent design of aerodynamic functional 
wings, such an occurrence would surely suggest that an intelligent being was guiding 
the organisms' evolution. If there is no intelligent guidance behind evolutionary 
change, one should expect large changes, such as those that affect the whole of a 
limb, to be harmful to the organism rather than beneficial. To be naturalistically 
respectable, as Darwinism has all along been intended to be, evolution will have to 
proceed in small steps which are accumulated. 
While details about exactly how the fortuitous changes occur, or the precise 
history of evolution, might be understood differently in the future, there is good 
reason to think that one who wants to understand the history of life on earth without 
recourse to the actions of a powerful and intelligent agent - such as God - will be 
committed to a Darwinian evolutionary story (and, as the sum of their commitments, 
an unguided Darwinian evolutionary story). As Alvin Plantinga puts it, if you accept 
naturalism (which he takes to entail atheism), the Darwinian evolutionary story "is 
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the only game in town, the only visible answer to the question: Where did all this 
enormous variety of flora and fauna come from? How did it all get here" (1997)? As 
I have said, nobody has thought of a plausible alternative that doesn't appeal to an 
intelligent agent. And it is difficult to see how there could be a plausible no-design 
account of the apparent design of living things that didn't appeal to the idea of 
changes that don't suggest intelligent orchestration and a mechanism like natural 
selection for preserving them so that they can accumulate. It is therefore perhaps not 
all that surprising that among ancient thinkers who eschewed appeal to God or the 
gods in explaining the existence of the universe and its features we find Darwinian 
ideas in embryo (see Lucretius' De Rerum Natura book 5).16 
It might be wondered why I have argued that atheists must accept Darwinism 
(and therefore unguided Darwinism) when the fact of the matter is that many (all?) 
atheists in fact do accept Darwinism. If the conjunction of atheism and Darwinism is 
a conjunction that most or all atheists actually sign up to, why not simply see what 
follows from it rather than claiming that atheists are committed to Darwinism? The 
reason why I think it is important to note that atheists are committed to Darwinism is 
that it is possible in future that scientific evidence which is widely held to support 
Darwinism may be found by atheists to be problematic, reducing the amount of 
evidential support they consider Darwinism to enjoy. If so, then atheists could reject 
Darwinism and the main argument of this essay (especially the argument of chapter 3) 
unless. qua atheists. they are committed to Darwinism for more than purely scientific 
16 James Lenman has suggested to me that perhaps atheists could be warranted in holding that 
apparent design in nature isn't real design without accepting Darwinism because so much of the rest 
of the world has been found amenable to naturalistic explanation. I disagree: we can indeed explain 
processes such as the motion of the tides or the falling of objects toward the centre of the earth 
without invoking design, but these regularities do not have the overwhelming appearance of design 
that living organisms do. To infer that the striking apparent design in organisms is merely apparent 
because natural processes and entities that do not strikingly appear designed have been explained 
naturalistically is surely not a good inference. 
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evidential reasons. So the fact that atheists are committed to Darwinism ensures that 
the main argument of this essay will remain relevant to atheists in future (or at least, 
for as long as there remains reason to view the idea that we were created by aliens as 
problematic).17 
3. Theism and Darwinism 
I mentioned above that one might think that Darwinism is equivalent to 
unguided Darwinism, and I have already pointed out that some in fact use the word 
"Darwinism" to denote the latter position. However, the two should be distinguished. 
Darwinism does not entail unguided Darwinism, at least if Darwinism is understood 
to be a scientific thesis. On the contrary, Darwinism is quite compatible with belief in 
a transcendent creator such as God and with the idea that God guided the course of 
evolution. 
Now, it isn't difficult to see why one might get the impression that 
Darwinism and unguided Darwinism are equivalent, for according to Darwinism the 
mutations that are preserved by natural selection (and therefore the path that 
evolution takes) are random, or they occur by chance, and it might be thought that 
these notions rule out the possibility that an intelligent being orchestrates the 
sequence of those mutations. However, as Peter van Inwagen explains, that is not so. 
It is worth quoting him at length: 
"Let us consider mutations, the most important class of events to which 
Darwinists apply the word "chance." It is of the essence of Darwinism to 
insist that mutations do not occur in response to changes in the environmental 
perils or opportunities that confront individuals or species. There is -
17 Even if atheists did think creation by aliens a live possibility, moral scepticism might perhaps 
follow. For if atheists thought it most likely that such aliens would themselves exist via unguided 
Darwinism, the considerations to be discussed later in chapter 3 might make it a very live possibility 
that, even if the aliens tried to create us to have true moral beliefs, they failed because they have 
evolved to have moral beliefs that are false. 
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Darwinists insist - simply no correlation whatsoever between the 
"usefulness" to a particular species of a possible mutation and the likelihood 
that it will occur ... It is, however, consistent with the thesis that all mutations 
(and, more generally, all events of evolutionary significance) are due to 
chance in this Aristotelian sense that God has been guiding evolution - by 
deliberately causing certain mutations (and other events of evolutionary 
significance). If God has been doing this, it does not follow that the history of 
terrestrial life would reveal anything inconsistent with the Darwinian thesis 
that all mutations are due to chance" (2003, pp.360-361). 
As a scientific theory, Darwinism does not make statements about whether a 
supernatural, transcendent intelligent agent could be guiding the course of evolution. 
The notions of chance or randomness that are invoked are empirical and are to be 
understood with reference to the needs or functioning of the organism, not with 
reference to the idea of intelligent guidance and orchestration. As Plantinga puts it, 
"According to Darwin (or at any rate the neo-Darwinian synthesis), the sense in 
which variation is random is this: it is not called for by the design plan of the creature 
to which it accrues, and it does not occur because it is beneficial for that 
organism ... the needs of the organism to which it accrues plays no part in its 
causation. But clearly a mutation could be both random in this sense and also 
intended and indeed caused by God" (2006, p.206). 18 Darwinism as a scientific 
theory does not rule out the idea of intelligent guidance and orchestration as 
unguided Darwinism does. Therefore Darwinism does not imply unguided 
Darwinism and the two should be distinguished. Theists may not accept unguided 
Darwinism, but they can nevertheless accept Darwinism and they can hold that God 
plays an active role in determining the outcome of the Darwinian process. 
18 For an excellent discussion of the different ways in which God or an intelligent being could design 
organisms via a process of Darwinian evolution, see Ratzsch (1998). One of Ratzsch's interesting 
proposals involves God standing ready to alter the course of evolution but in fact not needing to since 
evolution naturally unfolds in a way that He finds acceptable. On the compatibility of Darwinism and 
theistic explanation, also see van Woudenberg (2004). 
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So, theists can embrace Darwinism as describing God's method of creation. 
However, theists do not have the same need to endorse Darwinism as atheists have, 
since theists are not in need of an account that needn't make reference to the 
guidance of an intelligent agent. Furthermore, I suggest that it is not clear that theists 
have strong empirical reason to embrace Darwinism. For even if there is good 
evidence that the history of life on earth is characterised by some kind of 
evolutionary development (and I take it that there is good evidence of that), it is by 
no means clear that theists should accept the Darwinian claim that this development 
has proceeded by way of small steps, by way of the accumulation of small changes 
between the generations. It is nowadays generally admitted by palaeontologists 
(including those who are Darwinists) that the fossil record does not furnish evidence 
of a general pattern of gradual transformations of living forms involving many steps 
during which the accumulation of small changes occurs. This fact about the nature of 
the fossil record has been widely admitted since palaeontologists Stephen Jay Gould 
and Niles Eldredge brought it to light in the 1970s.19 Gould (1990, p.151) drew 
attention to two features of "the history of most fossil species" which didn't tally 
with the expectations one might bring to the fossil record if one believed that 
evolution proceeded gradually by way of the accumulation of small changes: 
"1. Stasis. Most species exhibit no directional change during their tenure on 
earth. They appear in the fossil record looking pretty much the same as when 
they disappear; morphological change is usually limited and directionless. 
2. Sudden appearance. In any local area, a species does not arise gradually by 
the steady transformation of it ancestors; it appears all at once and "fully 
formed". " 
19 It was not well known at the time; Gould said that the "extreme rarity of transitional fonns in the 
fossil record [persisted] as the trade secret of palaeontology" (my italics) and that, "the evolutionary 
trees that adorn our textbooks have data only at the tips and nodes of their branches; the rest is 
inference, however reasonable, not the evidence of fossils"( 1990, pp.150-151). 
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As Eldredge put it, "[t]here is probably little wrong with the notion of natural 
selection as a means of modifying the genetics of a species through time, although it 
is difficult to put it to the test. But the predicted gradual accumulation of change 
within species is seldom (if ever) encountered in our practical experience with the 
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Darwinists, believing that the evolution of life on earth has proceeded by way 
of the accumulation of small changes, have ways of accommodating such facts about 
the fossil record. For example, they can perhaps accept Gould and Eldredge's idea of 
"punctuated equilibrium", according to which evolutionary change often occurs in 
isolated communities where it is unlikely to be preserved in fossil sequences. 
However, such a strategy involves reconciling Darwinism and the fossil record, not 
finding support in the fossils for Darwinism's proposed accumulations of small 
mutations. Given this lack of evidence for Darwinism (as opposed to some kind of 
non-Darwinian evolutionary development), I think that the belief that life has 
evolved as Darwinism states - by the accumulation of small random changes - is not 
rationally mandated for theists. Note that I am not claiming that the evidence of 
biology or palaeontology is against Darwinism, or that theists (or atheists, for that 
matter) have good reason to believe that life has not evolved by way of the 
accumulation of small random changes.21 My point is simply that empirical evidence 
20 The quote is from his 1980 paper "An Extravagance of Species" in Natural History (American 
Museum of Natural History) 89, no.7, p.50. Quoted as part of a long quote by Hunter (2001, p.78). 
Note that the claim - which I make - that it is generally accepted that the fossil record does not 
provide evidence of a general pattern of gradual change should not be understood as a denial of the 
fact that many Darwinists point to particular fossil sequences as providing examples of evolutionary 
change that is more gradual than the fossil record as a whole reveals. 
21 As is weJl known, others do make that argument. For criticisms of the claim that there is good 
evidence for the various elements of Darwinism, andlor arguments that Darwinism is false, see 
Denton (1986), Johnson (1993), Wells (2000), Berlinski (2004; 2008), van Inwagen (1993), and the 
essays edited by Dembski (2004). Cornelius Hunter argues that much of the "evidence" for 
Darwinism consists in deductions from dubious theological propositions about what God would or 
would not create (2001; 2007). For recent defences of Darwinism, see Ruse (2006) and Kitcher (2007). 
A vital detailed history of the recent debate is provided by Woodward (2006). 
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that it did is lacking and that therefore theists are free to refrain from believing that it 
did. Atheists, on the other hand, need to believe that evolution proceeded as 
Darwinism states in order to have an explanation for the apparent design inherent in 
living organisms that need not appeal to an intelligent agent. 
I suppose that one could respond to this line of thinking by suggesting that 
the idea that God created life via an evolutionary process without the evolutionary 
process involving the accumulation of small random changes is an ad hoc idea and 
suggests an objectionable divine "interference" in the evolutionary process that even 
theists should reject. However, it is not clear to me that such an objection has any 
weight. While many theists have found the general idea of a Darwinian unfolding of 
life to be one that exhibits a certain genius or harmony in its simplicity, and therefore 
to be something that God might well bring about,22 it seems to me that an 
evolutionary process able to lead to a great diversity of life, or to intelligent beings 
like ourselves, might - for all we know - require large changes at various stages. As I 
see it, God wouldn't be at fault if the requisite transformations involve a required 
amount of orchestration - whether by divine "intervention" or, perhaps, by some sort 
of "pre-programming" of organisms' DNA. It has also been suggested that God 
might well create a universe that He wants to be involved with, more like a musical 
instrument to play than like a machine that runs perfectly efficiently on its own 
(Wiker and Witt 2006). 
In summary, while atheists are committed to Darwinism (and unguided 
Darwinism), it seems to me that theists have little reason to believe that the 
development of life on earth has proceeded by way of the accumulation of small 
changes as Darwinism claims. On the other hand, if theists disagree they can accept 
22 I register my agreement with van lnwagen who, although he believes Darwinism to be false, 
nevertheless says of "the widespread opinion that there is something about natural selection that unfits 
it for use as a divine instrument" that he has "never been able to see this" (2003, p.353). 
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Darwinism and understand God to have guided the course of evolution. If a theist 
judges that the evidence for Darwinism is strong, she can accept Darwinism without 
having to take the further step of accepting unguided Darwinism. 
This will be important for the argument of later chapters, as will be made 
clear in chapter 3. As I will argue, atheists have reason to embrace moral scepticism 
because they are committed to unguided Darwinism. By accepting Darwinism but 
holding that God guided the sequence of mutations, or by accepting that the history 
of life is characterised by an evolutionary process but failing to accept a Darwinian 
account of that process, theists can avoid being in the same boat as atheists, for 
theists' commitments will not lead them to moral scepticism (at least not for the 
same reasons). This asymmetry between the position of theists and that of atheists 
will be important when I come to consider the significance of the fact that atheists 
should embrace moral scepticism in chapter 5. 
4. Moral thought and discourse and some preliminaries 
In arguing that atheists have reason to embrace moral scepticism, I am 
arguing that their atheism has implications for their moral thought and discourse and 
the practices that depend upon them. So it is important at the beginning of this essay 
to be clear about what moral thought and discourse are. 
Notoriously, there is substantial disagreement among philosophers as to how 
moral thought and discourse should be characterised. For example, philosophers 
disagree over what kind of psychological state one is in when one has a moral 
opinion; some philosophers hold that the psychological state is belief, whereas other 
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philosophers hold that the psychological state is more akin to desire. 23 (The latter say 
that we call them "beliefs" and I will in general write of "moral belief' and "moral 
judgement" in a way that is intended to be neutral with respect to these positions.) 
However, we can provide a characterisation of moral thought and discourse that is 
minimal and non-controversial, and which cuts across such disagreements. Moral 
thought and discourse can be identified by reference to moral sentences (with which 
we are familiar): moral discourse consists in the uttering of moral sentences and 
moral thoughts are the psychological states that are expressed by the utterance of 
such sentences. As I am thinking of moral sentences, they are sentences that contain 
(1) thin moral predicates such as "good", "bad", "right", or "wrong", or (2) a moral 
"ought" or a moral "should" (or moral "ought not", or moral "should not", etc). 
However, I think that my argument in this essay will also apply to judgements that 
involve sentences containing thick moral predicates such as "courageous" or "cruel", 
which express both moral and non-moral (sometimes called "descriptive") content. 
When I mention moral thought and discourse, I will generally have in mind 
declarative moral sentences (e.g., "stealing is wrong", "pain is bad") and the 
thoughts those sentences express rather than moral sentences in other moods; after all, 
I am going to argue that atheists should accept moral scepticism, according to which 
all of their moral judgements are epistemically unwarranted (or unjustified), and it is 
the psychological states that are expressed by declarative sentences which are the 
kind of psychological states that can be epistemically warranted or unwarranted. 
By identifying moral thought by way of moral sentences (moral thoughts are 
the psychological items - whatever they may be - that are expressed by moral 
2J This issue will be discussed in chapter 4. It should be noted that I wi\l assume that there is one true 
account of the nature of all moral thought and discourse, an assumption which has been denied 
(Macintyre (981) but which is generally assumed by philosophers working in metaethics and seems 
justified by the fact that when we have moral discussions and disagreements we do not appear to be 
talking past each other but really agreeing or disagreeing. 
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sentences), controversy is avoided. However, the argument of later chapters will 
depend upon some metaethical assumptions that are not uncontroversial. I will 
assume that when it comes to moral thought and discourse we are committed to the 
idea that the correctness of moral sentences (or we might more naturally say, what 
the moral facts are) is subject to an important mind-independence, similar to what 
Russ Shafer-Landau has termed "stance-independence" (2003, p.IS). 24 He 
understands "the stance-independence of morality" as the view that "there are moral 
truths that obtain independently of any preferred perspective, in the sense that the 
moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their 
ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective" (p.IS). I think 
that we should understand our moral thought and discourse to be committed to this 
claim (with a nuance I mention below), at least so long as the perspectives in 
question are understood to be human ones. 
Shafer-Landau understands the affirmation of stance-independence to be the 
affirmation of moral realism, construing moral facts realistically as entities that exist 
and are what they are independently of what we think they are. He intends it to 
contradict all "anti-realist" views which construe moral facts along objectionable 
stance-dependent ways, making the correctness of moral claims depend too strongly 
on the opinions endorsed from actual or hypothetical perspectives. However, as will 
become clear in chapter 4, there are some sophisticated anti-realist metaethical views 
that Shafer-Landau would characterise as contravening the thesis of stance-
independence but which nevertheless try to leave space for us to say things which 
appear identical to the affirmation of stance-independence.2s Here is not the place to 
24 He attributes the phrase to Ron Milo. 
25 The metaethical position is expressivismlquasi-realism. and the most famous discussion of mind-
independence from such a perspective is Simon Blackburn's discussion of whether it would be right to 
kick dogs if we had different moral sentiments (1984. pp.2l7-220). 
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explain such metaethical views, but it is important that I mention that I want to 
endorse the idea that our moral thought and discourse is committed to an idea like 
stance-independence without ruling those metaethical views out in a way that seems 
to me too quick. So I will use the expression "stance-independence" without the 
implication that they are excluded. As I see it, our moral thought and discourse 
involves a commitment like that which is cashed out in terms of stance-independence; 
it is a further question whether that commitment can be plausibly explained and 
justified on a foundation that actually turns out to be mind-dependent. In addition, I 
will assume that it is the independence from hypothetical human perspectives that 
stance-independence is concerned with. 
Unfortunately, space precludes a detailed discussion of the reasons why we 
should hold that our moral thought and discourse is committed to stance-
independence. (For that reason, the rest of this essay should be understood as only 
addressing the moral beliefs of those atheists who agree that it does.) However, a few 
brief comments are in order. 
I don't think it is difficult to see, as many philosophers have seen, that the 
idea that the standards that fix the moral facts are made true by their ratification from 
one or more given actual human perspective(s) is problematic. For one thing, it 
raises the problem of whose perspective. People disagree in their moral beliefs. Does 
one human being get to fix the moral facts for everyone? Does a group of people? 
Which person or group? Sometimes appeal is made to the idea that individuals or 
individual groups have their own moral truths that pertain to them and these are fixed 
by what each of them individually takes the moral facts to be. But the idea that the 
moral facts are different for different individuals and depend upon what individuals 
take them to be fits badly with how we think about morality and the ways in which 
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we think we acquire moral knowledge: we don't think we need to investigate a 
person's particular set of valuations in order to judge a particular action of theirs 
right or wrong?6 An account of moral truth that doesn't fit with how we think we 
gain knowledge of the moral truth is not a good one. And when it comes to the 
suggestion that the standards that fix the moral facts are made true by their 
ratification by the group we belong to, there is also the problem of identifying the 
relevant group, for we all belong to many groups and it isn't clear which membership 
would determine what the moral facts are for us and why (Oderberg 2000, p.22). 
Importantly, we simply don't think in these ways - theoretically-motivated 
protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. We think that it is possible that all 
human beings could be completely out of touch with moral truth. Furthermore, the 
idea that the standards that fix the moral facts are correct simply because some 
individual humans happen to endorse them strikes us as rendering morality arbitrary, 
for they might have endorsed something different - what is so special about their 
perspective? (If appeal is made, in circular fashion, to the perspectives of people who 
are morally good or good judges of morality nothing is gained because for such 
notions to be intelligible we need to appeal to moral standards that are not fixed by 
actual perspectives.) In short, we believe that there are true moral claims and their 
truth does not depend on what actual human beings happen to think they are or what 
actual human beings happen to endorse or disapprove of (Shafer-Landau 2003, p.4I). 
26 In a recent paper, Sharon Street (2008) puts forward a metaethical "constructivist" theory according 
to which the moral reasons we each individually have (in fact, what reasons of any stripe we have for 
action, belief, etc) depend upon what reasons we each individually believe ourselves to have. Our 
valuing (which includes judging, say, our actions to be right or wrong) can be correct or incorrect, but 
its being so is solely determined from the perspectives of other values we hold - "[t]he standards of 
correctness determining what reasons a person has are understood to be set by that person's set of 
judgements about her reasons" (p.224). But this does not fit at all well with our picture of the moral 
knowledge we have. We judge that it is wrong for somebody to commit murder or rape or child abuse 
or all manner of things (and that other things are right for them to do) without needing to be aware of 
what reasons they take themselves to have. (This problem with Street's view was pointed out by 
Matthew Chrisman at a conference on constructivism at the University of Sheffield in March 2009.) 
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How about appealing to the perspectives of idealised hypothetical people 
(given, say, full non-moral information, perfect means-end reasoning capabilities and 
impartiality)? I think that they are likewise insufficient for fixing the standards that 
fix the moral truths. Again, there is a problem with moral epistemology. We believe 
that we know or are warranted in believing that some actions are right and some 
wrong without having to know whether they would be endorsed from an idealised 
perspective. When we take idealisation seriously (really seriously), it seems difficult 
to be confident about what an idealised person would actually approve and 
disapprove of - why think that their preferences would fortuitously dovetail with our 
confidently-held moral beliefs that are formed without reference to idealised 
perspectives (Shafer-Landau 2003, p.42)? What grounds are there for that? (Maybe a 
theist or one who believes we have been created by an intelligent being could have 
such grounds, but what can atheists base such a happy coincidence on?) Of course, if 
we characterise the idealised perspective morally - the perspective of the hypothetical 
person is itself informed by awareness of moral facts - we might have such grounds, 
but we would need to appeal to moral facts not rendered such by their ratification 
from the idealised agent's perspective, in which case appeal to idealised agents' 
perspectives is otiose (Shafer-Landau 2003, p.42; Joyce 2008, p.l8). 
For these sorts of reasons, then, I will assume that metaethical views that 
reject stance-independence (in the sense of "stance-independence" that is compatible 
with the sort of anti-realist metaethical positions to be discussed in chapter 4) are not 
on the table.27 These reasons are by no means original to me, and it is clear that a 
sizeable number of philosophers agree that they are strong reasons. However, as I 
have already stated, my comments have been very brief and so the rest of this essay 
27 For a fuller case and some more objections to views that reject stance-independence, see, e.g., 
Shafer-Landau (2003, p.41-43) and Joyce (2008, pp.254-265). 
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should be understood to only be directed toward the atheism of atheists who agree 
that views that reject stance-independence are untenable. 
5. Looking back and looking ahead 
In this chapter, I have explained what thesis I take atheism to be - the claim 
that neither the universe nor parts of it (most importantly, life on earth) have been 
created by a transcendent creator - and I have pointed out that even though theism is 
not the contradictory of atheism, it is the most popular alternative among 
philosophers. I have argued that atheists are committed to an unguided Darwinian 
understanding of the development of life on earth, and that theists can accept a 
Darwinian account (and hold that God guided the course of evolution) but need not. 
This will be important when we tum to chapter 3. I then provided a minimal account 
of moral thought and discourse and ruled out some metaethical positions that 
construe the moral facts as depending upon what we - or idealised versions of us -
take them to be. (That those understandings are ruled out will also be important for 
the argument of chapter 3.) 
In chapter 3, I will argue that an unguided Darwinian understanding of our 
origins gives atheists reason to embrace moral scepticism - a reason for moral 
scepticism that theists do not share. However, before doing so, it will be important to 
consider some reasons that might be thought to support moral scepticism regardless 
of whether one is an atheist. For if moral scepticism can be supported by such 
reasons, then the argument of chapter 3 may be redundant; in addition, there will - or 
at least might - be reason for atheists and theists to embrace moral scepticism. So I 
will tum to consider some reasons that might be thought to support moral scepticism 
- reasons that are independent of atheism - in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2 - On some potential empirical support for moral 
ti . 1 scep clsm 
My purpose in this essay is to argue that atheists have reason to accept moral 
scepticism and consider their moral beliefs to be unwarranted (and to examine some 
consequences). However, before I argue that atheists have such reason, it will be apt 
to consider some recent empirical challenges to moral belief that might be taken to 
support moral scepticism quite apart from the question of whether one accepts 
atheism or not. There are two main reasons why this is important. Firstly, if these 
challenges do support moral scepticism then the main argument of this thesis - that 
atheists should embrace moral scepticism - may be redundant. Secondly, it would 
apparently follow that theists should embrace moral scepticism, or at least give up 
many of their moral beliefs as unwarranted.2 And if it can be shown that theists and 
atheists both have reason to embrace moral scepticism, then some of the 
consequences for atheists that I discuss later (in chapter 5) will not follow. 
In this chapter, then, I will examine some empirically-based challenges to the 
warrant of moral belief. In particular, I will focus on empirical considerations raised 
by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and the duo Jonathan Haidt and Fredrik Bjorklund. I 
will argue that the considerations fail to adequately support moral scepticism. 
I A fair amount of the material in this chapter features in my paper on Sinnott-Annstrong's case 
against moral intuitionism (Smith forthcoming). 
2 Some theists consider themselves to have good reason to believe they have a divine revelation that 
includes some moral truths, and their moral beliefs gleaned from it might potential\y be untouched by 
the chal\enges to be considered in this chapter. However, the challenges would still have the potential 
to support scepticism about their moral beliefs that do not figure in purported divine revelation. 
It should be noted that the arguments that are typically put forward for error theory - the 
view that al1 of our moral beliefs are false - tend not to provide great problems for theists. For 
example, John Mackie argued that moral facts are too "queer" to exist in a non-theistic universe, but 
he acknowledged that if theism were true then such facts could exist (1977, ch.IO). As 1 see it, 
arguments for moral scepticism pose a greater potential threat to theists' moral beliefs than arguments 
for error theory do. 
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The empirical study of moral judgement is something of a rapidly developing 
field, and I acknowledge that the considerations covered in this chapter do not 
exhaust the sorts of challenges to moral thought and discourse (or elements thereof) 
that have been raised. 3 To cover all such challenges would require a book-length 
treatment, or even several book-length treatments. Nevertheless, there are two good 
reasons to focus on the particular challenges that I discuss. The first reason is that the 
work of both Sinnott-Armstrong and Haidt (including work produced by Haidt in 
collaboration with various colleagues, such as Bjorklund) has become well-known 
and influential4 and the considerations they raise therefore deserve critical attention. 
Secondly, although the failure of these empirical challenges to undermine moral 
belief does not show that all similar challenges - either now or in the future - must 
likewise fail, an examination of these challenges will nevertheless make clear the 
sorts of problems facing empirical arguments for moral scepticism that are directed 
at the moral beliefs of atheists and non-atheists (such as theists) alike. 
The chapter will proceed as follows. Firstly, since Sinnott-Armstrong directs 
his challenge at moral intuitionism, I will consider why it might be thOUght that his 
case's success would support moral scepticism and not simply the falsity of the 
position he explicitly targets; I will then tum to discuss the considerations he raises 
and criticise his views. Afterwards, I will tum to briefly consider Haidt and 
Bjorklund's work, arguing that it likewise provides no reason to consider our moral 
beliefs to be unwarranted. 
3 Another influential challenge to some common elements of moral thought and discourse - in 
particular, to those elements which involve the ascription of moral character traits - has been widely 
advocated in recent years (Doris 1995; Harman 1999). There have also been many criticisms of the 
empirical basis of the challenge and the reasoning based upon it (e.g., Kristjansson 200S). 
4 For example, Richard Joyce believes that Sinnott-Armstrong has succeeded in pointing out 
considerations that render moral beliefs unwarranted (Joyce 2006, p.21S). Michael Huemer (200S) 
holds that the considerations raised by Sinnott-Armstrong (and others) call into question many of the 
moral beliefs that we might think are most clearly true and only leave viable a revolutionary moral 
theory. 
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1. Moral intuitionism and moral scepticism 
As I have mentioned, the empirical challenges to moral judgement that 
Sinnott-Annstrong presents are put forward in the course of criticising moral 
intuitionism; he understands this to be the claim "that some people are adequately 
epistemically justified in holding some moral beliefs independently of whether those 
people are able to infer those moral beliefs from any other beliefs" (2006a, p.341). 5 
Some philosophers use the expression "moral intuitionism" to denote a metaphysical 
thesis, but Sinnott-Ann strong uses it to denote a purely epistemological thesis: some 
of our beliefs are properly basic or foundational, warranted (or "justified" - Sinnott-
Annstrong's preferred tenn) without being inferred from other beliefs, moral or non-
moral. Thus understood, it is a minimal thesis, compatible with a range of broader 
views about the epistemology of morality.6 One could just as easily use the label 
"moral foundationalism" instead of "moral intuitionism", since foundationalism 
about the structure of warranted belief in general (and/or knowledge in general) 
envisages a structure of warranted beliefs as consisting of (l) beliefs at the 
foundation that can be warranted without needing to be supported by further beliefs, 
and (2) beliefs above the foundation whose warrant traces back to the foundations 
either immediately or via other beliefs. According to foundationalists, if we ask how 
it is that a particular belief has come to have the status of being warranted, the 
answer is that the belief is either itself one of the basic or foundational beliefs, or else 
it is a member of a chain of beliefs which enjoy relations of inferential support and 
5 Unless stated otherwise, references will be to the presentation in his initial paper (2006a); the same 
considerations feature in chapter 9 of his book of the same year (2006b). In section 6 his more recent 
development of his work will be considered. 
6 Robert Audi, one of the leading defenders of moral intuitionism, also understands it to be an 
epistemological thesis and is explicit that although he prefers what he calls a "rationalist intuitionism", 
there are other "versions"; for example, "an empiricist account of the relevant kind of non-inferential 
justification and knowledge can also be given (one on which such knowledge is either empirical or 
analytic)" (2008, p.483). 
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whose warrant can be traced back to the basic, foundational beliefs. The 
foundational beliefs themselves stand in no need of support. (Foundationalists 
typically say that the fact that they seem to us to be true may be grounds enough for 
our being warranted in holding them.) It is this position with respect to the structure 
of warranted moral belief that Sinnott-Armstrong sets out to criticise. (I view the 
work of Haidt and Bjorklund to be a potential threat to the warrant of moral belief in 
the same way as Sinnott-Armstrong's.) 
The way Sinnott-Armstrong seeks to refute moral intuitionism is by 
providing epistemic de/eaters for the moral beliefs that moral intuitionists think are 
at the foundation (our warranted "moral intuitions"), the beliefs they consider to be 
warranted without requiring inference or support from other beliefs. Roughly, an 
epistemic defeater for a subject S and a belief B that S holds is another belief 0, such 
that S comes to believe D and S's doing so means that S can no longer reasonably 
continue to believe B. For example, someone I make small chat with tells me about 
their exciting holiday in the Alps and I form the belief that they had such-and-such a 
holiday (belief B). However, I later discover that that particular person has been 
known to have made up very convincing stories about their holidays more than once 
in the past. Given this new belief I acquire - that they have made up convincing 
holiday stories in the past (belief D, the defeater) - I can no longer reasonably 
believe that the person had the holiday they told me about (belief B). I don't have 
reason to believe they didn't have such-and-such a holiday, but I do have reason to 
give up my belief that they did. Similarly, Sinnott-Armstrong's challenge to moral 
intuitionism proceeds by way of presenting information which will provide us with 
new beliefs that will defeat our allegedly foundational moral beliefs - not information 
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that suggests that those beliefs arefalse, but information that calls them into question 
and renders us unreasonable in continuing to hold them. 
If the considerations raised by Sinnott-Armstrong (or Haidt and Bjorklund) 
do render us unwarranted in endorsing our allegedly foundational moral beliefs, and 
if afoundationalist construal of the structure required for there to be warranted moral 
belief is correct - as moral intuitionists think - then it seems that all of our moral 
beliefs become unwarranted and we end up with a conclusion of moral scepticism. 
(Similarly, if one removes the foundations of a house, all of the floors that had rested 
upon those foundations - either immediately or by being supported by other, 
intermediate floors - will have nothing to hold them up, and the whole house will 
collapse.) However, foundationalism is not the only potential structure for warranted 
beliefs. Its most prominent alternative is coherentism, according to which warrant is 
holistic and every warranted belief is warranted solely in virtue of its relations to 
other beliefs in the structure of beliefs that it occurs in. According to coherentism, no 
belief is warranted in virtue of being in a privileged class of basic or foundational 
beliefs. Coherentism has been defended by epistemologists as stating the correct 
structure of warrant (and/or knowledge) for beliefs in general, and has been defended 
with regard to moral belief (Brink 1989, pp.122-143). Coherentism has also been 
argued to be mistaken with regard to belief in general (Plantinga 1993, pp.178-182), 
and has been argued to provide an incorrect account when it comes to moral beliefs 
(for discussion of some objections, see Sinnott-Armstrong 2006b, pp.237-2S0). 
While space precludes a discussion of the merits of coherentism and foundational ism 
with respect to moral belief, since foundationalism is accepted by many atheists and 
many non-atheists (such as theists), an argument for moral scepticism that depends 





account of how a structure of moral beliefs acquires warrant will be an argument that 
many philosophers will find threatens their moral beliefs. Furthermore, it is possible 
that the considerations raised by Sinnott-Armstrong (and Haidt and Bjorklund) could 
potentially support moral scepticism even if coherentism is true of moral belief. For 
it seems to me that the considerations that Sinnott-Armstrong appeals to (which wilJ 
be treated shortly) - that our moral beliefs are subject to partiality, disagreement, 
distorting emotion, illusion and that they might have dubious origins - are 
considerations that could potentially be applied to all of our moral beliefs and not 
simply the ones Sinnott-Annstrong targets (those that moral intuitionists hold to be 
foundational). Indeed, this may be all the more so if the various considerations are 
considered collectively. So even if we have a coherent system of moral beliefs which 
mutualJy support each other, and even if the initial warrant of the system is due 
solely to that coherence, it might nevertheless be the case that the considerations 
raised by Sinnott-Annstrong render that system of beliefs as a whole unwarranted. 
That said, in what follows I will treat the considerations raised as problems posed for 
moral intuitionism, the position Sinnott-Ann strong explicitly seeks to refute. 
In seeking to undennine moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Ann strong does not 
explicitly argue that moral scepticism follows from the considerations he raises; he 
instead claims that the moral beliefs moral intuitionists hold to be foundational 
require confirmation, which mayor may not be forthcoming. Nevertheless, there is 
reason to think that ifhis case against moral intuitionism succeeds, such confinnation 
is not possible and so moral scepticism does follow. For it seems that any 
confinnation for the moral beliefs in question would have to come at least in part via 
other moral beliefs, for non-moral statements on their own do not support moral 
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statements.7 But if all of our moral beliefs are in doubt because the foundational ones 
are, then we have no warranted moral beliefs we can appeal to in order to confirm or 
support others. Unless we were mistaken about the considerations that we thought 
rendered them unwarranted, we will be unable to have warranted moral beliefs.s 
In short, it is highly plausible that the success of Sinnott-Armstrong's 
challenge would imply not simply that we require confirmation for our moral beliefs 
that moral intuitionists think are foundational, but that all of them are (and will 
remain) unwarranted. If so, then we will have reason to embrace moral scepticism. 
2. Sinnott-Armstrong's challenge in outline 
According to Sinnott-Armstrong, many of our moral beliefs arc formed and 
held in dubious circumstances where either (1) we are partial, (2) others disagree 
with us and there is no reason to prefer our moral judgement to theirs, (3) we are 
emotional in a way that clouds our judgement, (4) the circumstances are conducive to 
illusion, or (5) the source of our moral beliefs is unreliable or disreputable. Because 
of this, we cannot be justified in holding any moral beliefs simply on the basis of 
their seeming to us to be true rather than on the basis of their being supported by 
other beliefs; the allegedly foundational beliefs that moral intuitionists aver require 
7 Sinnott-Armstrong points out that when people seem to reason acceptably from a non-moral premise 
to a moral conclusion. what is really happening is that they are endorsing a suppressed moral premise; 
such premises would clearly be in doubt if all of our moral beliefs are in doubt (2006b. pp.135-151). 
8 There is the possible exception of moral beliefs based on testimony - from the premises that (I) 
Frank told you that it is morally wrong to perform action A, and (2) information from Frank is usually 
reliable. it follows that you have evidence for (3) it is morally wrong to perform action A. But if the 
considerations Sinnott-Armstrong raises render your moral beliefs dubious. they will also render 
Frank's dubious, and your trust in his testimony on moral issues will no longer be warranted (see 
Sinnott-Armstrong 2006b, pp.145-151). 
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no support from other beliefs do in fact require such support, because (I) to (5) 
remove any non-inferential justification that they might otherwise have enjoyed.9 
In the discussions involving (1) to (5), Sinnott-Armstrong argues from 
analogies involving non-moral beliefs. Scenarios are provided in which non-moral 
beliefs are formed or held in dubious circumstances and it is judged that they are 
unjustified and require confirmation in order to be justifiably held. Epistemic 
principles governing justification and the need for confirmation for beliefs in general 
(moral and non-moral) in such circumstances are then inferred and applied to moral 
beliefs. As will be seen, I believe that Sinnott-Armstrong's challenge to our moral 
beliefs goes wrong in various ways. I will discuss each of (I) to (5) in turn. 
3. Sinnott-Armstrong's appeal to partiality 
In the case of Sinnott-Armstrong's first contention - that partiality renders 
our moral beliefs unjustified - he chiefly appeals to the non-moral example (which I 
will call "Piano") of his being partial when judging his daughter's performance in a 
piano-playing competition where he forms the judgement that his daughter played 
excellently and her rival was mediocre. By saying that he is "partial", Sinnott-
Armstrong means that the truth or falsity of his judgement has a bearing on his self-
interest, not that he in fact judges unfairly. He is partial because he has a stake in the 
outcome of his judgement. Sinnott-Armstrong asks whether he is justified in 
maintaining the judgement that he makes; his answer: 
"" .not if all I can say is, 'Her performance sounded better to me.' I am too 
biased for such immediate reactions alone to count as evidence. I still might 
9 Although I prefer the tenn "warrant" to "justification", I will generally use the latter when assessing 
Sinnott-Armstrong's arguments, since it is his preferred tenn and appears in the quotations from his 
work. 
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be justified, if I am able to specify laudable features of her performance, or if 
I know that others agree, but some confirmation seems needed" (p.343). 
From Piano, Sinnott-Armstrong infers the following epistemic principle: 
confirmation is required for a believer to be justified when the believer is partial. 
This lesson learned from Piano is then applied to the moral case. We have a huge 
stake in morality; the truth or falsity of the various moral judgements we make has an 
immense bearing on our self-interest. Ifwe judge that some moral claims are true, we 
will face potentially large costs (e.g., if we form the judgement that we have a duty to 
give considerable amounts to the poor, it may cost us materially); if others, we will 
reap benefits. Since we are partial, we require confirmation for our moral beliefs, 
including those that moral intuitionists think properly basic or foundational - those 
that we hold to be true solely on the basis of their seeming to us to be true, in the 
same way that Sinnott-Armstrong's judgement in Piano is based solely on his 
daughter's performance sounding better than her rival's. Moral intuitionism is false. 
I agree with Sinnott-Armstrong that he is unjustified in believing that his 
daughter played excellently and her rival was mediocre in Piano as it is described. 
However, I think the example is flawed. The first thing to note is that it is very 
plausible that what inclines us to view Sinnott-Armstrong's judgement as unjustified 
is the fact that we think a good judge of piano playing performances should be able 
to provide further reasons for their judgement, and not necessarily his partiality. 
Sinnott-Armstrong perhaps hints at this when he states that his judgement might be 
justified if he "could specify laudable features of her performance" (p.343). I think 
that if Piano is modified so that Sinnott-Armstrong was judging the performances of 
two children both of whom were unrelated to him and judged one to be excellent and 
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the other mediocre - without being able to provide reasons for his judgement other 
than that one "sounded better" to him - we might still consider his judgement to be 
unjustified, even though there would be no partiality. I think we would suspect that 
he wasn't listening properly, or that he doesn't know what a good piano performance 
consists in, etc - we expect a good judge of a piano playing competition to be able to 
provide more reasons for their verdict than, "It sounded better to me." So it really 
isn't clear that partiality is doing the work in the example. 
Secondly, Sinnott-Armstrong's judgement in Piano is clearly intended to be 
analogous to the moral judgements that moral intuitionists hold to be foundational. 
However, Piano doesn't seem to be a good example to provide a lesson about 
allegedly foundational moral beliefs, since a piano performance is a somewhat 
complex event which has many parts and that explains why - as I have suggested -
we think one should be able to provide reasons for their assessment of it, reasons that 
make reference to the different parts and how they related (perhaps that the 
performer played too quickly, etc). However, moral intuitionists typically hold that 
the foundational moral beliefs are not judgements about camp/ex events or states of 
affairs. For example, some moral intuitionists hold the foundational moral beliefs to 
involve the recognition of prima facie duties such as the duty not to steal or the duty 
not to harm or the duty to keep one's promises (Audi 1996, pp.34-35; 2008, p.476). 
The use of Piano as an example suggests that moral intuitionists aver that we can be 
justified in holding foundational moral beliefs about complex events or states of 
affairs (in their totality), but that is not something that prominent moral intuitionists 
accept, nor does moral intuitionism entail it. An example more in keeping with what 
moral intuitionists believe might involve Sinnott-Armstrong's daughter and a rival 
each producing a single note on the piano in an attempt to reproduce a third note, and 
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Sinnott-Annstrong judging that his daughter's note was closer to the target note 
because, "It sounded more like it to me." However, unlike the judgement in Piano, it 
isn't clear that the judgement in this case would be unjustified. 
So, it is very plausibly the fact that Sinnott-Armstrong's judgement in Piano 
fails to be backed up by the sort of reasons we think a comparative judgement about 
piano-playing performances should be (reasons which, as moral intuitionists see it, 
make the example dissimilar to the case of foundational moral belief), rather than his 
partiality, that inclines us to render the verdict that his judgement is unjustified. This 
should lead us to be cautious about inferring the broad epistemic principle that 
Sinnott-Armstrong infers. 
Furthermore, I think we can be confident that the principle Sinnott-Armstrong 
infers is too broad, for there are cases where a believer is partial with respect to the 
formation or maintenance of a foundational belief (or one that is very plausibly 
foundational) but nevertheless they are surely justified in holding it. Consider 
memory and perceptual beliefs with non-moral content, which many moral 
intuitionists will also take to be foundational. 10 In the same way that I might be 
justified in believing that the last (unsuccessful) invasion of Britain occurred in 1797 
simply because I remember the date, surely a parent might be justified in believing 
that they heard their child's teacher say that the child's performance in the school 
play was excellent on the basis of their remembering that such was the teacher's 
verdict, even though they were partial and would very much like it to be the case that 
the teacher rated their child's performance as excellent. Or a parent might observe 
their child being first across the finishing line in a race and be justified in believing 
that their child was first across, simply on the basis of perceiving it, even though they 
10 Plantinga (1993) defends foundationalism for a range of different kinds of belief, including memory 
beliefs. 
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wanted it to be the case - even desperately wanted it to be the case - that their child 
would finish first. There is partiality, but nevertheless confinnation doesn't seem 
required. Examples could be multiplied. Now, it seems that Sinnott-Annstrong 
would disagree; he claims that direct perceptual judgements are also unjustified when 
there is partiality and that this "partly explains why we prefer umpires, referees, and 
judges not to be parents of competitors" (p.344). However, that is wrong. We might 
worry that partiality will lead to incorrect judgements in some cases - for example, 
where it all happens so fast, or the judge's view is obscured, or when there was 
barely a gap between the first and second child to cross the finishing line. But there 
nevertheless are cases that are by no means close calls; in some cases, it really is 
obvious that a particular child finished first, the judge has a clear view, and it doesn't 
all happen too fast. Maybe a parent can't be justified in believing their child won the 
race when the gap between their offspring and the child supposedly in second place 
was barely perceptible; but surely a parent is justified in so believing when the child 
in second place is a good number of seconds behind. 
This shows that the principle Sinnott-Ann strong draws - that partiality 
creates a need for confinnation if one is to be justified in holding a belief - is too 
broad. In some cases, partiality might create such a requirement. But in other cases, it 
doesn't. Sinnott-Armstrong hasn't shown that partiality always creates a need for 
justification in the case of those moral beliefs that moral intuitionists hold to be 
foundational, for those moral beHefs might he more similar to the perceptual clear 
cases than the less clear ones. Indeed, people certainly sometimes report some 
actions, etc, as clearly having a certain moral status (e.g., clearly being wrong). 
Even in cases where we are partial and might be somewhat less confident 
about our moral judgement, much more needs to be done to show that our beliefs are 
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unjustified. We might well be susceptible to being led astray in our moral 
judgements by our stake in what we consider the moral truths to be, but the mere fact 
that this is a danger does not render our beliefs unjustified. We can try hard to screen 
out self-interest in morality; for example, by considering the morality of an act 
undertaken by, and affecting, nobody we particularly care for, or by trying to 
understand the situation from all perspectives. Overcoming self-interest might 
sometimes be very difficult, but we can try to judge fairly and accurately and there is 
good reason to think that sometimes we can succeed (recall the case of judging 
which child won the race). At any rate, the important thing to note is that Sinnott-
Annstrong has not given good reason to think that the moral judgements moral 
intuitionists construe as foundational are unjustified due to our being partial. 
4. Sinnott-Armstrong's appeal to disagreement I I 
On the subject of disagreement, the chief non-moral example Sinnott-
Annstrong draws attention to involves you and me adding a column of figures and 
arriving at a different total (call the example "Column"). He says: 
"Maybe I would be justified in believing that I am right if you were my child 
and I was helping you with your homework. However, if you are just as good 
at arithmetic as I am, then when we get different answers, we need to check 
again to find out who made a mistake before either of us can be justified in 
believing that his or her answer is the correct one. We owe each other that 
much epistemic respect" (p.344). 
A second example offered has us disagreeing whether a person we see on the 
pavement looks like Tom Cruise or not. These examples are offered as support for 
II Some philosophers argue from the phenomenon of moral disagreement to an error theory - that all 
our moral beliefs are false - or some other anti-realist metaethics. However, my focus is on moral 
scepticism and not error theory, and I cannot consider such arguments here. I find Brink's (1989, 
pp.197ff) criticism of such arguments persuasive. 
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the principle that confinnation is required for a believer to be justified when people 
disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other. 
Sinnott-Ann strong admits that the extent of genuine moral disagreement 
(moral disagreement that doesn't derive from disagreement over the non-moral facts) 
is not obvious (p.348).12 Nevertheless, he maintains that there definitely is genuine 
moral disagreement, too; some moral disagreement would persist in the face of 
agreement on all of the non-moral facts. He provides the example of disagreement 
between his students on the morality of sometimes deliberately killing someone in 
order to save others. When we become aware of this sort of moral disagreement, 
Sinnott-Annstrong argues, we require confinnation for our beliefs if we are to be 
justified in retaining them because there is no reason to prefer the moral belief of one 
student over that of the other. 
I agree with Sinnott-Annstrong's verdict about Column. Sinnott-Annstrong is 
surely correct in saying that if I have no prior reason to view you as being 
mathematically inferior to me, I will not be justified in believing that my sum is 
correct rather than yours. The thing to do in that situation would indeed be for both 
of us to recalculate and see what totals we obtain on a second attempt. 13 However, 
the example is not a good one for making a point about beliefs claimed to be 
12 As Andy Elga (2007, pp.493-497) points out, much actual moral disagreement involves participants 
who believe that they are not epistemic peers (that is, not antecedently as likely to be correct on the 
issue at hand) because they know that they disagree on other non-moral and moral issues. However, in 
cases where one judges their interlocutor not to be an epistemic peer because of other moral 
disagreement, Sinnott-Armstrong might push the challenge back and argue that the belief that one is 
right in that other moral disagreement (and therefore that one is better than one's interlocutor at 
r:erceiving the moral facts) is itself unjustified. 
3 In this connection, see Elga (2007, p.491) and Christensen (2007. p.193). Both discuss an example 
of two-person disagreement over the calculation of a restaurant bill where each of the participants in 
the disagreement holds the antecedent view that they are both as good at arithmetic and therefore 
equally likely to make a mistake. Elga and Christensen agree that the thing to do is suspend judgement 
and recalculate, at least when it isn't the case that one of the participants' totals is clearly wrong - for 
example, by being significantly above the amount that one would expect a restaurant bill to come to. 
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foundational, because when I have added a column of figures, my belief that the sum 
is such-and-such has been arrived at on the basis of inference. Adding a column of 
figures doesn't produce a foundational belief; rather, the belief is the output of 
several stages of addition and the result - the sum - is inferred, not accepted solely 
on the basis of the number seeming to be correct. One doesn't simply look at the 
column and see that a proposed sum is correct; rather, one has to go through a 
reasoning process which may be very quick for some people (depending upon the 
length of the column) but is a process nevertheless. 
The moral beliefs that moral intuitionists claim are foundational are not like 
the belief that the sum of a column of figures is such-and-such; we are supposed to 
be able to see that they are correct solely upon (carefully, attentively) considering 
them. A more accurate analogy, therefore, would involve disagreement in very 
simple mathematical beliefs, mathematical beliefs that foundationalists typically 
construe as foundational - ones that one can see are true without having to go 
through steps of reasoning. So suppose we alter the example accordingly. I have 
reason to believe, or to suppose, that you are an epistemic peer when it comes to 
mathematics. However, one day you disagree with me when I am engaged in an 
arithmetical exercise. You take issue with "3 + 4 = 7" which is written on the pad in 
front of me (I have decided to make clear every step, however elementary, on the pad 
in front of me), and you instead claim that three added to four makes eight. Suppose, 
furthermore, that we cannot resolve this disagreement; I am utterly convinced that 
the sum of three and four is seven, while you maintain that it is eight. Call this 
example "Elementary". 
What are we to make of such a case? It would he an extremely bizarre 
occurrence, and I might well think that you don't mean what you are saying. Let us 
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suppose, however, that you are able to convince me that you are not pretending - you 
really believe your utterance "3 + 4 = 8" - and that you don't mean something 
different to me by "3", "+", "4", "=" or "8". We have a case of genuine disagreement. 
It seems to me that in such a case I would have no reason at all to consider my belief 
unjustified. For I can see that 3 + 4 = 7; and I can see that your belief is simply 
wrong. I have no need for further confirmation of my belief in order to be justified in 
holding it. Furthermore, even though before our disagreement I had reason to believe 
or suppose you to be an epistemic peer as far as mathematics is concerned, I seem to 
have now acquired a reason to think that you are not; our disagreement has itself 
yielded such a reason. 14 
If in Elementary one acquires a reason not to view the other as an epistemic 
peer when it comes to mathematics, might it not be the case that even if I have no 
prior reason to think that I am better at perceiving the moral facts than you are, I 
could acquire such a reason as a result of our disagreement? Sinnott-Armstrong has 
provided no reason to think that such isn't the case. Furthermore, it seems very 
plausible; if I believe that it is prima facie wrong to inflict pain on someone, and 
believe this confidently on the basis that it seems to me to be clearly so, and then 
discover that you claim either to see that inflicting pain is not prima facie wrong or to 
at least fail to see that it is, I will very probably conclude that you and I are not on a 
. .. h I ~ IS par when It comes to percelvmg t e mora ,acts. 
Indeed, it seems to me that Elementary and the example of moral 
disagreement I have just described are on all fours, and therefore moral disagreement 
when one has no prior reason to prefer one participant's view to the other's does not 
14 For what it's worth, Elga agrees: "When a friend disagrees about whether 1 + I = 2, one may well 
not count her as a peer. For one's views on such a simple problem are closely linked to one's basic 
reasoning" (2007, p.500). 
15 Audi (2008, p.490) agrees that another's disbelieving what appears to one as self-evident provides 
reason not to consider them an epistemic peer. 
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rob one's moral belief of justification when the belief is foundational and confidently 
held. Furthermore, quite apart from the Elementary analogy, there arc good reasons 
why one can be justified in trusting a moral intuition in the face of disagreement with 
others whom one has no other reason (other than the fact of this particular 
disagreement) to think is less than an epistemic peer. As Audi states, "we are better 
positioned to make a critical appraisal of our own evidence and of our responses to it 
than of anyone else's evidence or responses to that evidence" (2008, p.490). We 
cannot be as well positioned to know that others have or haven't experienced 
propositions as seeming true and their responses to such intuitive "seemings" (e.g. 
rejecting them as illusory). It is hard to have evidence that others are in as good an 
epistemic situation as we are with respect to the belief we disagree about. So it can 
be reasonable to maintain our foundational belief, and to believe that we are right, 
when others disagree. 
In Column, disagreement does render one's belief unjustified, but that fact 
seems to depend upon the belief not being foundational, as comparison with 
Elementary reveals. I think that the reason the belief in Column seems more 
susceptible to becoming unjustified might well lie in the fact that non-foundational 
beliefs involve a derivation or inference; there are more places to go wrong in 
arriving at one's belief. Adding up a column of figures involves reliance upon 
memory and the performance of calculations, whereas such are not relied upon in 
recognising the truth of simple mathematical statements. When I add up a long list of 
numbers, the sum I end up with does not seem to be clearly the correct total in the 
way that simple mathematical propositions strike me as clearly being true, and I am 
aware that I could have made a mistake at several places. The opposite holds with a 
foundational belief: no reasoning was involved, so error couldn't have entered by 
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such means, and furthermore the proposition really does seem to be true when one 
considers it. 
So we can allow that in the moral case, too, peer disagreement might often be 
quite successful in rendering one's non-foundational moral beliefs unjustified. One 
might then have to go back to one's foundational moral beliefs and try to carefully 
reason again from the foundational moral beliefs and non-moral information, to see if 
a mistake was made; nevertheless, this is fully consistent with moral intuitionism -
one may still have foundational moral beliefs that require no inferential support. 16 
5. Sinnott-Armstrong's appeal to emotion 
People's emotions can lead them to make errors of judgement; as Sinnott-
Armstrong points out, "[ w ]hen people get very angry ... they tend to overlook 
relevant facts. They often do not notice excuses or apologies by the person who made 
them angry," and, "this explains why jurors are dismissed from a case that would 
make them too emotional" (p.344). The principle that is inferred is that confirmation 
is required for a believer to be justified when the believer is emotional in a way that 
clouds judgement. 
Is there reason to think that emotion clouds our judgement in the moral case, 
and especially in the case of moral beliefs that moral intuitionists hold to be 
foundational? Sinnott-Armstrong thinks so. He briefly mentions psychological and 
neurological research that suggests emotions playa very large role in the production 
of our moral judgements; according to some studies, parts of the brain associated 
with emotions show greater activity when the experimental subject considers 
16 I have omitted discussion of the example involving the purported Tom Cruise lookalike. since it 
seems to me to be badly underspecified. For example. did ) get a good look at the man? And how 
great do I judge the likeness to be? ) find it hard to believe that if I had a sufficient look at the man 
and judged that he looked virtually identical to Tom Cruise this belief would nevertheless be 
undermined by your disagreeing. 
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sentences with moral content than they do when the subject considers sentences with 
non-moral content (p.351). He also provides "additional evidence" from some 
experiments performed with hypnotised subjects, which will be discussed below. 
An immediate problem with Sinnott-Armstrong's argument arises, for while 
emotions can cloud judgement, including moral judgement (consider anger, for 
example), it is a bit of a stretch to conclude on that basis that any emotion that 
figures in moral judgement, or which causes it, clouds it. That is highly controversial. 
As Sinnott-Armstrong himself notes, the extent to which moral judgements (in 
particular, accurate moral judgements) are based on reason or emotion has been the 
subject of philosophical disagreement for a long time (p.350). A large number of 
philosophers, while not denying that some emotions cloud moral judgement, 
nevertheless hold that other emotions enable and facilitate accurate moral judgement 
(e.g., Little 1995; Zagzebski 2003). (I might add that not a few non-philosophers 
would also agree with this thesis.) For example, feelings of compassion may lead one 
to assess a situation in such a way that one pays proper attention to all relevant 
features of the situation. If these philosophers and non-philosophers are correct, then 
the discovery that sections of the brain associated with emotions are active when one 
is engaged in moral consideration will be neither surprising nor disturbing. 17 Before 
coming to the empirical research, many already believe both that some (it isn't even 
clear that most) emotions cloud moral judgement and that some emotions facilitate 
moral judgement. Other emotions may neither cloud nor facilitate. Unless we have 
reason to believe that all or most emotions cloud moral judgement, we have no 
reason to think that an emotion occurring at the time a moral judgement was made 
17 As James Lenman has pointed out to me, Sinnott-Armstrong would presumably not want to say that 
the judge of a piano-playing competition makes unjustified judgements about performances if we 
discover that he has areas of his brain associated with emotions activated when he makes his 
judgements; after all, being a good judge of music will involve emotional responses to it. Why can't it 
be similar in the moral case? 
56 
will have clouded it. So the empirical research Sinnott-Armstrong points us to is 
interesting but poses no clear threat to moral belief. 
Nevertheless, even if a general correlation between moral judgements and 
brain states associated with emotions is insufficient to render our moral beliefs 
unjustified, Sinnott-Armstrong provides other evidence. He discusses psychological 
research involving subjects considering the famous "trolley cases". Trolley cases 
involve situations where there is a runaway trolley on some tracks, heading toward a 
group of people (who it will kill if it hits them), and you have to form a decision 
about how to act. In the "side trolley case", you can divert the trolley onto another 
track, where it will still hit and kill people, but it will hit and kill fewer people (e.g. 
one person) than it will do if you fail to act and the trolley remains on the original 
track. In the "fat man trolley case", you do not have the option of diverting the 
trolley onto another track, but you can push a fat man off a platform into the path of 
the trolley, knowing that this will kill the fat man but stop the trolley, thus sparing 
the people who would otherwise have had the trolley hit and kill them. Sinnott-
Armstrong cites research suggesting emotions figure differently when people 
consider one kind of trolley case than when they consider the other. In the fat man 
trolley case (and not in the side trolley case), "subjects showed significant activation 
in brain areas associated with emotion and under-activation (below the resting 
baseline) in areas associated with working memory" (p.351). Sinnott-Armstrong goes 
on to say: 
"It is not obvious what to make of these results. Brain scientists do not know 
how to interpret under-activation in general. Nonetheless, one natural 
speculation is this: When asked about pushing the fat man, subjects react, 
'That's so horrible that I can't even think about it.' Emotions stop subjects 
from considering the many factors in these examples. If this interpretation is 
correct, then many pervasive and fundamental moral beliefs result from 
emotions that cloud judgement" (p.351). 
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The idea is that because acting in the fat man trolley case involves directly 
causing hann to somebody (unlike the side trolley case which involves deflecting an 
already existing threat onto others), it jars more with our emotions, resulting in our 
failure to carefully assess all the factors operative in the scenario. Despite admitting 
that his interpretation of the data is "speculation" (p.351), and despite acknowledging 
that the results of the experiments need to be "replicated and interpreted much more 
carefully," Sinnott-Ann strong concludes that, "such brain studies seem to provide 
some evidence that many moral judgements result from emotions that cloud 
judgement" (p.352). That conclusion seems to me to be completely unwarranted on 
such an admittedly speculative basis. 
There are other possible, and I think reasonable, interpretations of the data. 
Sinnott-Annstrong himself anticipates an objection based on another. One might 
suggest that in the fat man trolley case one's emotions prevent one from carefully 
considering (note: not necessarily from considering at all) or dwelling on all the 
various factors the case involves, but nevertheless it doesn't follow that this will lead 
to one's moral judgement being clouded and unreliable. Rather, there is no need to 
dwell on factors in addition to the pushing of the fat man; one should be able to tell 
that it is morally wrong to push the fat man without having to carefully consider the 
other factors. Indeed, it is plausible (I think significantly so) that too much 
considering of the other factors, such as the different number of deaths if one pushes 
the fat man - "But all those lives would be saved ... " - might lead one away from the 
correct moral judgement by diverting one's attention away from what is 
detenninative of the morality of one's action. If we find all of this plausible, we 
might also suggest that the subjects' responses may have been more along the lines 
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of, "That's so obviously immoral that the case is closed; there's no need for further 
consideration," rather than Sinnott-Armstrong's construal of their responses - "That's 
so horrible that I can't even think about it" (p.351). There would be less activation in 
certain areas of the brain, such as those associated with working memory, because it 
isn't difficult to work out what one should or shouldn't do. 
Sinnott-Armstrong dismisses this sort of reply, because he believes it "begs 
the question". He asserts that, "when asking whether a moral belief is justified, we 
should not assume that the only relevant factors are those that would be relevant if 
the belief were true" (p.352). In other words, we cannot appeal to the correctness of 
the judgement - assume it is wrong to push the fat man - in order to show that failing 
to dwell on other aspects of the situation will not result in one's judgement going 
astray. 
However, one need not actually confidently assert that the explanation of the 
data suggested above in response to Sinnott-Armstrong's explanation is the correct 
one in order to rebut his challenge. So long as we do not tacitly assume that moral 
judgements such as the judgement that it would be wrong to push the fat man cannot 
be justifiably held in the foundational way, or cannot have much justification (which 
would beg the question, since moral intuitionists hold that such beliefs can), Sinnott-
Armstrong's admittedly speculative interpretation of the empirical data has no bite. 
Why? Well, suppose we begin with the assumption that the moral belief enjoys 
prima facie justification in the foundational way, and then tum to the empirical 
evidence and find that it can be interpreted (a) in a way that renders the moral belief 
dubious, but also (b) in a way that renders it not so; suppose, furthermore, that 
neither interpretation is better supported by the evidence. In that case, I think we 
should conclude that the moral belief remains justified. For consider a perceptual 
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belief that you are very confident about and therefore consider to be justified. Then 
suppose that you are infonned that sketchy data from brain studies might be 
interpretable (a) in a way that would suggest distorting influences on the fonnation of 
your belief, but that it can also be interpreted (b) in such a way that would not 
suggest distorting influences, and that at the moment there is no reason from the 
experimental data alone to prefer one interpretation over the other. It doesn't seem 
that you should consider this to undennine the justification of your perceptual belief. 
I suggest that if one considers Sinnott-Annstrong's speculative interpretation enough 
to render a moral belief unjustified, one is tacitly treating that belief as lacking any or 
much justification to begin with (that is, even before the belief is challenged). One is 
tacitly treating that belief as having much less justification than perceptual beliefs. 
But that appears to beg the question against moral intuitionists. 
Sinnott-Ann strong also considers the "additional evidence" of experiments 
involving hypnotised subjects who had it suggested to them - while under hypnosis -
that they would feel disgust when they saw the words "take" and "often" (words 
which do not, for non-hypnotised subjects, connote anything moral). The subjects 
were then asked to make moral assessments of characters and actions in stories that 
included those morally neutral words. The results showed that subjects were more 
likely to express stronger moral condemnation of acts in the stories if the story 
contained "take" and "often", even if those acts were acts that subjects would - when 
not under the influence of hypnosis - take to be completely morally neutral (see 
Wheatley and Haidt 2005). Sinnott-Ann strong concludes that emotions clouded their 
judgement and that, "because independently caused emotions can distort moral 
beliefs in such ways, moral believers need confinnation in order to be justified in 
holding their moral beliefs" (p.352). 
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What problem exactly does this pose for our moral judgements? The idea 
might be that moral judgements are dubious because accurate moral judgements 
would not be based on disgust. Disgust is a non-moral feeling, and discovering that 
moral judgements are triggered by it would undermine those judgements. However, I 
am not convinced. For the word "disgust" is ambiguous; although we sometimes/eel 
disgust or are disgusted without us in any sense issuing a moral verdict (e.g., I might 
be disgusted by the slime trail left behind by a slug), we sometimes say that we are 
disgusted by someone's behaviour and do render a moral verdict. For example, I 
might say I am disgusted by your rude attitude or behaviour, or even that your 
cruelty is "sickening", by which I express that I find your actions to be morally 
wrong. Since "disgust" has this ambiguity, it would be a mistake to assume that by 
hypnotising subjects to experience "disgust" at certain words the experimenters have 
hypnotised those subjects to form feelings typically unrelated to moral evaluation. 
Rather, subjects may have understood the command to feel "disgust" as the 
command to respond a certain way morally. If so, the fact that when they heard the 
words "take" and "often" they made moral evaluations should not be surprising. 
Now, it might be argued that this isn't a very plausible reading of the data, for the 
experimenters report participant responses such as, "When 'often' appeared I felt 
confused in my head, yet there was turmoil in my stomach. It was as if there was a 
problem with the story yet I didn't know why" (Wheatley and Haidt 2005, p.783). It 
might be argued that turmoil in the stomach indicates that the subjects. under 
hypnosis, understood "disgust" to refer to non-moral disgust. However, from the 
evidence I have seen, it seems to me that other possibilities can accommodate such 
responses: hypnotised subjects may have understood "disgust" under hypnosis to be 
ambiguous, and they may have understood it as a command to form both kinds of 
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disgust, or they may have simply been confused and had inclinations towards both. 
There seems to me to be no reason to think that these experiments show moral 
judgements to be unjustified because they result from non-moral disgust. 
In addition, the understanding I am opposing is possibly in tension with 
something else Sinnott-Armstrong also reports, from another set of experiments by 
different researchers, which is that "brain tissue associated with emotions becomes 
more activated when subjects think about simple sentences with moral content (e.g. 
'They hung an innocent') than when they think about similar sentences without 
moral content (e.g. 'Stones are made of water') .. . or disgusting non-moral sentences 
(e.g. 'He licked the dirty toilet')" (p.351, my italics). If our moral judgements rest 
upon non-moral disgust, then we might expect that the emotions thought to correlate 
with moral judgement (and the activity of the relevant parts of the brain) would also 
correlate with considering the sentences which elicit non-moral disgust. But that isn't 
what is reported. So it seems to me that no great conclusions should be drawn about 
non-moral disgust greatly influencing moral judgements (which Sinnott-Armstrong 
implicitly acknowledges by pointing out how much more work needs to be done). 
But perhaps these experiments are thought to pose another problem for our 
moral judgements. As Sinnott-Armstrong says, "moral judgements were ... affected 
by elements of the story that could not determine the accuracy or acceptability of 
those moral judgements" (p.352). Here the concern seems to be not so much with the 
idea that moral judgement rests upon disgust, but rather that it was elicited by 
elements of the story that were irrelevant to the morality of what was described - the 
presence of the words "take" and "often". However, it is difficult to see why this is 
significant. It is indeed the case that subjects as a result of hypnosis formed moral 
judgements in response to irrelevant elements of the story, but that is what they were 
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primed to do. Unless the suggestion is made that this provides reason to consider our 
moral judgements not formed as a result of hypnosis unjustified, it is difficult to see 
what the significance is. And if that suggestion is made, then things are no better, 
because the suggestion is implausible. For what would the worry be? That because 
people can be primed to form particular moral judgements concerning an action on 
the basis of the action being described with the words "take" or "often", then my 
moral judgement that, for example, someone acted wrongly in robbing a shop (the 
account of which I read in the newspaper) might perhaps result from the presence of 
the word "shop" rather than "retail outlet" instead of the fact that it is an example of 
theft? Such sceptical scenarios are extremely implausible and it is difficult to see 
why the evidence from hypnosis would increase their plausibility. The fact that the 
formation of beliefs can be manipulated so that they result from evidentially 
irrelevant factors in certain circumstances (importantly, perhaps only where we 
willingly agree to hypnotism and manipulation) provides no reason to worry that our 
beliefsformed outside of those circumstances might likewise result from evidentially 
irrelevant factors. Indeed, it has been found that undergoing hypnosis tends to 
increase the likelihood of forming false memories (Kihlstrom 2003). Yet this fact 
clearly doesn't render less justified the trust in our memories that we who have not 
been hypnotised have; it in no way suggests that a memory formed by someone who 
has not been hypnotised is more likely to be false than we would otherwise have 
thought. 
Given all of this, it seems to me that the experimental data Sinnott-Armstrong 
takes to have such great significance actually have very little. The fact that people 
might be triggered under hypnosis to form certain beliefs is insufficient to render 
unjustified our beliefs not formed under hypnosis, whether moral or non-moral. None 
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of the experimental research Sinnott-Armstrong cites provides reason to think that 
many of our moral judgements - and especially those that moral intuitionists hold to 
be foundational - are formed in circumstances where we are emotional in a way that 
clouds judgement. 
6. Sinnott-ArMstrong's appeal to illusion 
According to Sinnott-Armstrong's fourth principle, "confirmation is needed 
for a believer to be justified when the circumstances arc conducive to illusion" 
(p.345). As non-moral examples to support the principle, Sinnott-Armstrong 
mentions illusions due to context, illusions due to generalisations, and illusions due 
to heuristics. As an example of the first, he gives the fact that objects look larger 
when they are placed next to smaller objects and vice versa. As an example of the 
second, he gives the example of an oval that is shaded on top looking concave, 
whereas an oval that is shaded on the bottom looks convex. As an example of the 
third, he gives the example of people being asked to estimate how many seven-letter 
words in a passage of one thousand will have the form " __ ing" and how many will 
have the form " __ in_"; most people estimate that there will be more words of the 
former sort, though on reflection this is clearly false (pp.344-345). Turning to the 
moral case, Sinnott-Armstrong's main example is of "framing effects" from a study 
by Kahneman and Tversky in 1979. They asked a group of subjects the following 
question: 
"Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for an outbreak of an unusual Asian 
disease which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to 
fight the disease, A and B, have been proposed. Assume that the exact 
scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: If 
program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If program B is adopted, 
there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and a 2/3 probability 
that no people will be saved. Which program would you choose?" 
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They gave another group of subjects the choice between programs C and D: 
"If program C is adopted, 400 people will die. If program D is adopted, there 
is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die and a 2/3 probability that 600 will 
die." 
Among those in the first group, most chose A as the program to be implemented. In 
the second group, most chose D, despite the fact that, "it should be obvious that 
programs A and C are equivalent, as are programs Band D" (p.344). It is concluded 
that subjects were risk averse when choices were framed in ways that are positive -
such as "lives saved" - and were more willing to take risks when the choices were 
framed in ways that are negative - such as "people will die". Sinnott-Armstrong 
says: 
"[T]he subjects had different moral beliefs about programs A and C and 
about programs Band D. The only difference within each pair is how the 
programs are framed or described. Thus, descriptions seem to affect moral 
beliefs. Descriptions cannot affect what is really morally right or wrong. 
Hence, these results suggest that such moral beliefs are unreliable" (p.354). 
In a more recent publication, Sinnott-Armstrong has provided further 
evidence of framing effects on moral judgement, extending his argument and urging 
that the fact that varying the description of a situation can lead to variances in our 
moral judgement about it (when the situation itself is unchanged) renders the beliefs 
that moral intuitionists consider to be foundational unjustified; once we are aware of 
our proneness to being led astray by verbal descriptions of situations (as well as 
some other factors such as which order we consider the situations in, and which 
position each situation occupies in that ordering), we need confirmation for our 
moral beliefs if we are to be justified in holding them. We need evidence for them in 
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order to overcome the possibility that our moral judgement is unduly influenced by 
the way in which the situation was framed. 
It has been argued by some that the sorts of experiments claimed by Sinnott-
Armstrong and others to demonstrate problematic framing effects actually do not 
(Kamm 1998); however, examining this line of criticism would require a very long 
treatment, much too long to be undertaken here. Instead, I will grant for the sake of 
argument that distortion due to framing effects has indeed occurred in the 
experiments Sinnott-Armstrong cites and explains. Even granting this, it seems to me 
that his appeal to framing effects and illusions fails to undermine moral intuitionism. 
Firstly, as with Sinnott-Armstrong's appeal to studies involving hypnotised subjects 
that I considered in the previous section, there is the problem that the circumstances 
in which the experimental subjects were affected may be circumstances in which we 
hardly ever find ourselves. 18 As Shafer-Landau points out, the experiments "are all 
conducted in one basic kind of circumstance - that of a controlled experiment 
situated in someone's lab. There may be difficulties with extrapolating from 
questionnaires administered in such situations" (2008, p.87). If we only know that 
framing effects distort moral judgement in laboratory conditions, or when filling out 
questionnaires, and not in the circumstances we tend to find ourselves in, it is hard to 
see why that should undermine the justification of our foundational moral beliefs in 
general rather than just those formed in laboratory conditions, etc. In the same way, 
the fact that we are in some circumstances subject to visual illusions surely doesn't 
imply that our visual beliefs formed outside those circumstances are unjustified. 
18 We hardly ever - for most of us, we never - find ourselves in a situation where we have been 
hypnotised and primed to respond to certain words. 
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Sinnott-Armstrong has very briefly replied to Shafer-Landau on this score; he 
says that, "there is no reason to think that we should not extrapolate from lab to real 
world here just as we successfully do in other areas of psychology" (2008b, p.l 03) -
we should assume that framing effects occur outside of the laboratory, too. However, 
I am not convinced. For one thing, Sinnott-Armstrong himself admits that, "[m]any 
subjects do not think carefully about scenarios in experimental conditions. They just 
want to get it over with, and they do not have much at stake" (2008a, p.70). Of 
course, it is possible that many people do not think carefully about morality as they 
go about their lives, and if so then such people's moral beliefs formed outside the 
laboratory may well be pertinently similar to the beliefs formed in the laboratory. On 
the other hand, while people have little at stake when answering questionnaires in 
laboratory conditions, recall that, as Sinnott-Armstrong stressed in his appeal to 
partiality, we have a high stake in morality due to its effects on our lives. So maybe 
many people are more careful and reflective outside of laboratory conditions. At any 
rate, we have reason to think that at least some people are more careful and reflective, 
taking time to form their moral views. Sinnott-Armstrong realises that moral 
intuitionists may hold that one has to be careful and reflective in order to be justified 
in holding their foundational moral beliefs, and it may be the case (whether or not is 
currently debated, with empirical studies claimed to support both sides) that taking 
more time and care to form one's moral beliefs reduces the effects of framing (2008a, 
p.70). Sinnott-Armstrong believes that this fails to help moral intuitionism, since, 
"then the question just shifts to whether I have reason to believe that I have reflected 
adequately in a particular case" (2008b, p.l 04). However, Sinnott-Armstrong doesn't 
elaborate on why this is supposed to be a problem for moral intuitionism, and it 
seems to me that it isn't a problem. It seems that one could be justified in believing 
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that they have reflected carefully enough, or taken a sufficient amount of time, in 
coming to their moral judgement. In the same way, I can go wrong in performing a 
mathematical calculation by performing it too quickly, but surely I can be justified in 
believing that I have spent enough time performing a calculation and can be justified 
in believing the result I obtain. Or I know that if I try to see how many items are 
placed on a table by glancing at the table for only an instant, my glance may well 
have been too quick for me to be justified in believing that I saw just what I think I 
did; however, surely I can be justified in believing that I have looked at a table long 
enough to see what is on it. So there seems to me to be nothing absurd or problematic 
about the notion that one can have reason to believe that they have reflected 
adequately on a particular case when making a moral judgement about it. We can 
reflect carefully enough and for long enough to be justified in being confident that 
more reflection is unlikely to lead to a change in our moral judgement. 
As I have stated, Sinnott-Armstrong does not elaborate on why he thinks that 
raising the question of whether we have reason to believe that we have reflected 
adequately in a particular case is problematic for moral intuitionism. However, in 
several places he makes the mistake - clearly pointed out by Tolhurst (2008, pp.81-
82) - of confusing reasoning that undermines a potential defeater for a belief with 
reasoning that supports that belief, and that confusion may be lurking in the 
background here also. Indeed, earlier comments by Sinnott-Armstrong suggest that 
he has at least this problem in mind. 19 Sinnott-Armstrong thinks that if one has the 
belief that they have reflected carefully on the matter at hand, then that is a belief that 
provides an inference to the correctness of their moral judgement, which is not in 
19 He clearly seems to have more in mind. since he says the question shifts to. "whether I have reason 
to believe I have reflected adequately in a particular case" (2008b. p.l 04). not simply to whether 
drawing upon such a reason is consistent with the claims of moral intuitionism. 
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keeping with moral intuitionism's claim that people can be justified in holding some 
moral beliefs without needing to infer them from other beliefs. Similarly, in response 
to the idea that we might discover that some people are not subject to distortion due 
to framing effects, Sinnott-Armstrong says: 
"[S]uppose we do figure out which people are not subject to moral framing 
effects. Moral intuitionism still faces a dilemma: If we can tell that we are in 
the group whose moral intuitions are reliable, then we can get inferential 
confirmation [of our moral belief]; if we cannot tell whether we are in the 
group whose moral intuitions are reliable, then we are not justified. Either 
way, we cannot be justified independently of inferential justification" (2008a, 
pp.70-71 ). 
As Tolhurst points out, Sinnott-Armstrong is wrong to think that the belief 
that one is not subject to framing effects is a belief that provides support for one's 
moral belief. Rather, as moral intuitionists see things, (I) the moral belief is justified 
without inference, (2) the considerations about framing effects form a potential 
defeater for our moral beliefs, and (3) knowing that one is not subject to framing 
effects prevents the potential defeater from doing its work (the knowledge is a 
defeater-defeater), so that the potential defeater cannot rob the moral belief of its 
initial justification. The defeater-defeater doesn't provide the basis for an inference 
to one's moral belief (Tolhurst 2008, p.82). Sinnott-Armstrong is wrong in thinking 
that it is inconsistent with moral intuitionism to accept that we may only be justified 
in holding to our moral beliefs given good reason to believe that we have been 
adequately careful and reflective; a moral intuitionist can happily accept that claim. 
Now, as I have stated, at present the research into whether careful reflection 
and taking time to make moral judgements helps with accuracy is reported as being 
inconclusive. So this might pose a problem for the idea that one could know from the 
fact that they have reflected carefully that their moral judgement is not subject to 
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distortion from framing effects. Nevertheless, we might have other reasons why we 
can reasonably believe that our moral judgements are not subject to framing effects. 
For example, it seems to me that we have a fairly good understanding of the sorts of 
cases in which framing effects arise. We can understand how they might be more 
likely to cause distortion when hurriedly filling in a questionnaire, and we can 
readily see why people may be led astray by examples such as Kahneman and 
Tversky's Asian disease example, since such examples involve numbers and 
probabilities and we know that people are prone to err about such things when not 
being particularly careful - and quite apart from forming moral judgements. Perhaps 
we can understand the framing effects in moral cases like the Asian disease example 
as following the pattern of distorting effects in non-moral cases. And it isn't clear 
that many of our moral beliefs (especially those that moral intuitionists hold to be 
foundational) are judgements formed hurriedly or judgements about situations 
described via probabilities (or both). For example, Shafer-Landau urges that many of 
our foundational moral beliefs concern prima facie duties (see also Audi 1996, 
pp.34-35; 2008, p.476), and he claims that such beliefs are not subject to framing 
effects and so are not in any way called into question by the research Sinnott-
Armstrong cites and explains. Shafer-Landau also appeals to entirely uncontroversial 
moral beliefs, such as the belief that it is wrong to torture a child for fun; these are 
beliefs that are not affected by the different ways in which the action or situation 
might be (accurately) described. (In addition, as Tolhurst points out, in many cases 
the experiments that reveal framing effects were designed to elicit them (2008, p.80), 
and we have no reason to believe that the world outside the experiments is likewise 
conspiring to present the facts in such a way as to evoke distorted moral judgements.) 
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In response to Shafer-landau's point, Sinnott-Annstrong argues that such 
beliefs are also unjustified, since they fonn part of a class which contains a large 
percentage of falsehoods (the class of everyone's moral beliefs, or everyone's moral 
intuitions) and so are called into question along with the class as a whole (2008b, 
p.104). However, even if the class of everyone's moral beliefs contains a lot of 
falsehoods, it isn't clear why an individual should be concerned with that class rather 
than the class of their own beliefs. And the class of their own beliefs (or the narrower 
class of their own moral beliefs) may not contain a large percentage of falsehoods; or 
at any rate, they may have no reason to think that it does. Sinnott-Armstrong goes on 
to make comments about this sort of reply being an appeal to an inference to support 
one's moral belief - and thus incompatible with moral intuitionism - but, as I have 
pointed out, he is mistaken about that. 
These points are quite general, and I am wary of giving the impression that I 
think that the evidence of framing effects isn't important. However, at the same time, 
it seems to me that Sinnott-Armstrong overstates their consequences for our moral 
beliefs. It isn't clear that framing effects distort our moral beliefs in many 
circumstances, especially those of everyday life (as opposed to when answering 
questionnaires). Reflection and taking one's time may reduce the prevalence of 
distortion due to framing effects, and it seems one may be justified in knowing that 
they have adequately reflected on the matter in hand. Furthennore, moral intuitionists 
can hold (and many do hold) that the foundational moral beliefs are ones that - in 
fact - are not subject to framing effects, at least for many people. Sinnott-
Annstrong's replies to these sorts of considerations mistakenly take evidence that 
removes an epistemic defeater for a belief to be evidence that confirms the belief. 
Furthennore, although he himself appears to think that the probability that our beliefs 
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are in error need not be very large in order to render our beliefs unjustified, it isn't 
clear that that is the case. In this connection, it should be noted that although Sinnott-
Armstrong's non-moral analogies involve visual illusions and his principle is that 
"confirmation is needed for a believer to be justified when the circumstances are 
conducive to illusion" (2006a, p.345), he doesn't say that the phenomenon of visual 
illusions means that we can have no foundational visual beliefs. When mentioning 
visual illusions, he restricts the "circumstances conducive to illusion" to those in 
which we have good reason to believe that the illusions tend to be prevalent, rather 
than all circumstances in which we are forming visual beliefs; when we tum to the 
moral case, however, Sinnott-Armstrong seems to take "circumstances conducive to 
illusion" to cover every situation in which we form a moral belief, and not simply 
those in which we have discovered we are subject to framing effects. But this 
difference in treatment seems unmotivated, and I believe it shows that Sinnott-
Armstrong is too eager to consider our moral beliefs unjustified. If the phenomenon 
of visual illusions doesn't spell disaster for foundationalism about visual beliefs and 
call into question visual beliefs formed outside the circumstances that we have found 
illusion occurs in, then why should the phenomenon of moral illusions spell disaster 
for foundationalism about moral belief and call into question our moral beliefs 
formed outside the circumstances that we have found illusion occurs in? As I said in 
the previous section, it seems to me that behind Sinnott-Armstrong's challenge may 
lie the tacit assumption that moral beliefs have comparatively little justification to 
begin with and so it isn't hard for them to be rendered unjustified; it is much easier 
than with non-moral perceptual beliefs. But Sinnott-Armstrong has provided no 
reason to think that this is the case. So it seems to me that his appeal to illusion fails 
to call moral intuitionism into question. 
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7. Sinnott-Armstrong's appeal to unreliable or disreputable sources 
Lastly, we have the principle that confinnation is needed for a believer to be 
justified when their belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. The non-
moral example Sinnott-Annstrong presents is your believing that George 
Washington never told a lie. This belief results from accepting a legend that was 
spread by Washington's allies in order for them to gain power. According to Sinnott-
Annstrong, although it might in fact be the case that the belief is true, the fact that it 
was spread for such-and-such a reason renders it unjustified. Turning to the moral 
case, Sinnott-Annstrong brings up some different ideas about the origins of our 
moral beliefs, such as Nietzsche's speculations concerning the origins of Christian 
morality, Michel Foucault's view that moral beliefs express or result from power 
relations, and Gilbert Hannan's speculation that the common belief that hanning is 
much worse than failing to help may have come from societal agreement between 
people with unequal quantities of wealth. The truth of any of these accounts would 
mean that our moral judgements, or a sizeable or significant number of them, have 
dubious origins. Nevertheless, each of these accounts is somewhat speculative, as 
Sinnott-Annstrong notes, saying: 
"These speculations about the origins of moral beliefs are mere annchair 
psychology. Perhaps more support could be obtained from the literature on 
socio-biology or evolutionary psychology. Still, these explanations are likely 
to remain very controversial. Luckily, I don't need to prove them here. I 
claim only that these undennining accounts are live possibilities. They seem 
plausible to many people and have not been refuted" (2006a, p.357). 
Despite the fact that these "speculations" are "annchair psychology", Sinnott-
Annstrong considers them to undennine the justification of our moral beliefs because 
they are "live possibilities". I find this wholly unconvincing. According to the 
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principle Sinnott-Ann strong puts forward (and the George Washington example), 
lack of justification occurs when the beliefs source is unreliable or disreputable.2o 
But all of a sudden Sinnott-Annstrong is claiming that the possibility of a beliefs 
source being unreliable or disreputable is enough to undennine its justification. That 
is neither stated by the principle nor supported by the example the principle is 
inferred from. 
Sinnott-Annstrong states that the undennining accounts are "live 
possibilities" which seem "plausible" to many people. But while a genuine live 
possibility is a cause for concern, something has to be added to a mere possibility to 
make it a live one. After all, the accounts each have a non-zero probability, but the 
story according to which I am a disembodied brain in a vat being stimulated by 
scientists to fonn the perceptual beliefs I do likewise has a non-zero probability; if 
the latter fact doesn't rob all my foundational perceptual beliefs of justification, it is 
hard to see why the fonner fact should rob all of my foundational moral beliefs of 
justification. So a live possibility must be significantly more than a mere possibility. 
Sinnott-Annstrong seems to cash out the idea of a live possibility as a possibility that 
seems plausible to many people and has not been refuted. However, that seems 
insufficient for a possibility to count as live. It is hard to see why the fact that "many 
people" find such accounts to be plausible should undermine the justification of my 
moral beliefs. Maybe if somebody judges such explanations to be plausible or 
probable then their moral beliefs are unjustified; however, I don't see why their 
assessment should result in my beliefs being unjustified. It might do so if I have 
reason to think that such people are in a particularly good place to assess the 
probability of the explanations (perhaps because they are privy to evidence that I am 
20 Depending on how one thinks of justification, one might prefer to say that lack of justification 
occurs when one believes or discovers the source of the belief in question to be unreliable or 
disreputable. This doesn't affect the points made in the text. 
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not), but I might well lack such a reason. Indeed, I know (as Sinnott-Armstrong 
himself says) that the explanations are armchair speculations. And I might think that 
armchair speculation is a method that is unlikely to yield correct explanations; I 
might consider it unlikely that one would hit upon the true explanation by such 
means. In addition, I might not consider others' judgements about plausibility to 
carry much weight because I might well suspect that their finding various debunking 
explanations of moral belief plausible results from their first embracing the view that 
morality has some sort of debunking explanation, or that they very much want some 
sort of debunking explanation to be true. 
The central problem is that Sinnott-Armstrong assumes that it is very easy to 
rob moral beliefs of their justification, even if we hold them very confidently and 
they playa highly important role in our cognitive economy; but as I have pointed out, 
the actual epistemic principle he advances doesn't state that a beliefs justification is 
undermined simply by the possibility or plausibility in others' eyes that it has an 
unreliable or disreputable source. As I suggested was the case with Sinnott-
Armstrong's appeals to emotion and to illusion, it seems to me that the argument 
here may rest upon the tacit assumption that moral beliefs have little justification 
even before they are challenged. For one thing, the belief figuring in Sinnott-
Armstrong's example - that George Washington never told a lie - is a belief that, 
due to our knowledge of ourselves and of human nature in general, we could never 
be justified in believing, or which could at most only have little justification; I doubt 
moral intuitionists will consider it a fair analogy for our moral intuitions. 
Furthermore, suppose that many others came to find plausible the thesis that many 
conscious human beings (including me) are connected disembodied brains in vats, 
being stimulated to form various perceptual beliefs, like in the film The Matrix. 
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Suppose further that I lack any reason to think that those who find the thesis 
plausible are privy to more relevant information than me, or that they are better at 
reasoning than I am. Clearly the thesis that I am a disembodied brain in a vat is not 
one that I can refute in the sense of providing evidence inconsistent with it. So it 
would be a belief that seems plausible to many people and has not been refuted. 
Nevertheless, surely others' coming to find the brain in vats thesis plausible in such a 
case would not rob all of my perceptual beliefs of justification. But if so, then the 
idea that others' finding plausible a certain dubious origin of my moral beliefs robs 
them of justification seems to rest upon thinking that moral beliefs, including those 
moral intuitionists hold to be foundational, have considerably less justification than 
perceptual beliefs before being challenged. But Sinnott-Armstrong has provided no 
reason for us to think that that is the case. Therefore, Sinnott-Armstrong has failed to 
provide reason to think that the origin of our moral beliefs (and especially those 
plausibly thought to be foundational) robs those beliefs of justification. Appeal to 
possible origins is not enough to undermine our moral beliefs. 21 
So Sinnott-Armstrong's empirical challenge to moral intuitionism fails; 
philosophers who accept moral intuitionism and think that the correct structure for 
warranted moral belief is a foundationalist one have not been given good reason to 
reject moral intuitionism. Furthermore, and most importantly for my concerns in this 
chapter, Sinnott-Armstrong's challenge has not provided reason for such 
philosophers to consider their moral beliefs unwarranted and embrace moral 
scepticism. And I think that the sorts of criticisms I have provided will also provide 
21 However, in fairness to Sinnott-Armstrong, he does mention that evolutionary psychology might 
provide reason to think that moral beliefs have a dubious origin, and this - an appeal to believed 
origins rather than possible origins - may give him what he is after. Whether that is the case or not 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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reason to think that the considerations Sinnott-Armstrong raises are insufficient to 
support moral scepticism if a coherentist account of the structure of warranted moral 
belief is correct. 
8. The challenge from Social Intuitionism 
1 tum now to consider more briefly the challenge posed to moral thought and 
discourse by experimental research conducted by Jonathan Haidt and Fredrik 
Bjorklund. Haidt's experimental work - produced with various collaborators 
including Bjorklund - has led him to develop a model of how moral judgement takes 
place that he terms "social intuitionism" (Haidt 2001; Haidt and Bjorklund 2008). 
Unlike the position dubbed "moral intuitionism" just considered in this chapter, 
social intuitionism is a purely descriptive model that simply concerns how we form 
moral beliefs, not a thesis about the warrant of moral beliefs. There are a number of 
claims that go into the model- called the Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) - and I will 
only focus on those that are relevant to my purposes here. According to the model, 
"moral judgement is a product of quick and automatic intuitions that then give rise to 
slow, conscious moral reasoning" (Haidt and Bjorklund 2008, p.18l), and this moral 
reasoning is presented (and takes place) in a social setting, with an aim to persuade 
others. What is significant about the model, as far as the possibility of undermining 
moral belief goes, is its claim that many moral beliefs are accepted on the basis of 
intuition and not reasoning but, once a moral belief has been accepted via intuition, 
our brains go to the effort of looking for reasons in support of the belief; we then 
present these reasons to others as our reason why we hold the belief and - if I 
understand the model correctly - we really think (wrongly) that they are the reasons 
why we hold the belief. According to the SIM, "moral reasoning is an effortful 
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process (as opposed to an automatic process), usually engaged in after a moral 
judgement is made, in which a person searches for arguments that will support an 
already-made judgement" (Haidt and Bjorklund 2008, p.189). Although Haidt and 
Bjorklund acknowledge that people can in fact sometimes reason honestly about 
morality, they hold that most people's moral reasoning consists in a biased search for 
reasons in support of the judgement that they have already made. It might be thought 
that this poses a problem for our moral beliefs similar to the considerations advanced 
by Sinnott-Armstrong that have been covered in this chapter. For although, as I say, 
Haidt and Bjorklund acknowledge that sometimes people can engage in "open-
minded, not-post hoc moral reasoning" (p.193), nevertheless if such open-
mindedness in trying to reason about morality is very rare then this may provide us 
with reason to doubt that our moral reasoning has really been performed in an open-
minded search for the truth. But if we have reason to think that our moral views have 
not been formed as the result of an honest search for the truth, then surely we must 
consider them to be unwarranted. Furthermore, it might be thought that a problem is 
posed by the idea that we come to believe that we accept a given moral judgement 
for such-and-such reasons when in fact, unbeknownst to us, the moral judgement is 
really an intuition and we haven't accepted it for the reasons that we come to think 
we have. This sort of discovery may have the potential to provide us with a defeater 
of our moral beliefs. At any rate, it would seem to provide us with a reason to doubt 
our beliefs about why we believe as we do, with all of the ramifications this could 
have for moral discourse (if we cannot be warranted in believing that we in fact hold 
the belief for such-and-such reasons, then we cannot honestly communicate to others 
that we do). 
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Haidt and Bjorklund offer three lines of evidence for the SIM. I think that the 
most significant, and the most likely to offer support for their view, is evidence from 
interviews and the phenomenon that they call "moral dumbfounding". (The other 
evidence they cite comes from neurological studies and studies of subjects under 
hypnosis such as were briefly discussed in section 5 of this chapter (on Sinnott-
Armstrong's appeal to emotion).) In experiments, subjects were asked to give their 
moral views about a number of behaviours which did not involve issues of harm or 
fairness, such as a family eating its pet dog after the dog was hit and killed by a car, a 
woman using a flag to clean a toilet and a man using a chicken carcass for 
masturbation and afterwards cooking and eating the carcass. They explain: 
"Most subjects gave their initial evaluations almost instantly, but then some 
struggled to find a supporting reason. For example, a subject might say, 
hesitantly, "It's wrong to eat your dog because ... you might get sick." When 
the interviewer pointed out that the dog meat was fully cooked and so posed 
no more risk of illness than any other meat, subjects rarely changed their 
minds. Rather, they searched harder for additional reasons, sometimes 
laughing and confessing that they could not explain themselves" (p.197). 
They report of further experiments: 
"[T]he experimenter presented ... and then played devil's advocate, arguing 
against anything the subject said. The key question was whether subjects 
would behave like (idealised) scientists, looking for the truth and using 
reasoning to reach their judgements, or whether they would behave like 
lawyers, committed from the start to one side and then searching only for 
evidence to support that side, as the SIM suggests" (p.198). 
When examples involved harm or fairness, subjects could appeal to the harm 
or fairness as the reasons why they made the decisions they did, and the 
experimenters would not be able to "dumbfound" the subjects. However, when 
examples discussed did not involve issues of harm or fairness: 
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"Very quick judgement was followed by a search for supporting reasons only; 
when these reasons were stripped away by the experimenter, few subjects 
changed their minds, even though many confessed that they could not explain 
the reasons for their decisions" (p.198). 
What are we to make of these results? The first thing to note is that the fact 
that many people perhaps do not engage in an honest, open-minded search for moral 
reasons does not show that nobody does. Indeed, the results suggest that some people 
(Haidt and Bjorklund mention "a few") were willing to have their minds changed. So 
it would be wrong to conclude that everybody is in the situation of not being honest 
in their moral reasoning. And if someone is in a position to know that their search for 
the moral truth has in fact been an honest and open-minded one, then even if others 
face a defeater for their moral beliefs, such a person may not. However, as I have 
mentioned, if such honesty is very rare then that might put pressure on one's moral 
beliefs. It depends upon how reasonably confident someone can be that they are, and 
have been, honest when it comes to forming their moral beliefs. 
Rather than pursuing that issue, however, I think it best to point out that it 
isn't clear that the experimental results actually show that many people are mistaken 
about the reasons why they hold the moral beliefs they do, or that when they engage 
in moral reasoning they in fact only engage in a one-sided search for considerations 
in support of their moral intuitions. It seems plausible to me that the experimental 
subjects provide the explanations for their moral beliefs that they do solely because 
of pressure supplied by the experimenters. The experiments are reported to be 
understood as proceeding as follows. (1) Subjects form their beliefs on the basis of 
intuition, not reasoning. Then (2) the experimenters demand a reason for the belief, 
(3) the subjects offer a reason, (4) the experimenters "play devil's advocate" and 
criticise the reason offered, and (5) the subjects are dumbfounded and cannot provide 
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another reason, but (mostly) do not retract their original moral claim. As I see it, it is 
very significant that after having made a moral judgement, subjects are placed under 
pressure by the experimenters to justify that judgement to the experimenters; they are 
placed under pressure to make their moral judgement appear reasonable to others. 
Because of this fact, I submit, we can offer a different, plausible, understanding of 
the data. 
The first thing to note is that when it comes to justifying one's belief to others, 
people don't always appeal to the reasons why they hold the belief themselves. For 
example, someone who accepts a moral view on the basis of grounds that others 
don't accept (e.g., a believed divine revelation) might, if asked for a public 
justification of the moral view, appeal to reasons other than those grounds. This is a 
strategy that makes sense because it may be the best way for others to come to see 
your belief as reasonable. So, the subjects may not be putting forward what they 
think are the reasons why they hold the belief. Turning to the experiments with this 
in mind, note that if the moral judgement in question is one that the subject thinks 
they can see is true ("Can't you just see that it's wrong to eat your pet dog?") the 
subject might well expect others to be able to just see that, too. In such a 
circumstance, a demand for an additional reason to believe that the action has the 
moral status in question would plausibly lead the subject to search for reasons other 
than the reason that was actually responsible for the subject's moral belief, since the 
experimenter may be considered to be disallowing simple appeal to the action's 
clearly having the believed moral status; that is, by demanding reasons and playing 
"devil's advocate", the experimenter may easily be understood as expecting a more 
sophisticated, or more impressive, justification of the subject's moral judgement, not 
simply an appeal to the idea that the action in question seems to be wrong. If so, we 
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would expect subjects to look for such justifications and offer candidates. The fact 
that their reasoning is one-way and involves only looking for support for their 
judgements would not be surprising, since they have understood the situation to be 
one where it is precisely considerations in support of their belief that have been 
demanded. There would be nothing dishonest about such a search. By the end of the 
experiment, grounds that are considered acceptable by the experimenter have not 
been found, but subjects could still be reasonable in retaining their moral opinion, 
since it seems to them to be true. Some subjects might change their minds; perhaps 
they are led to believe that the experimenters are experts on morality and that if a 
reason is not accepted by them (and that the behaviour just clearly has such a moral 
status seems to be a reason that the experimenter will not accept) then it cannot be 
much of a reason. Or perhaps they just report that they have changed their mind 
because they don't want the experimenter to think that they hold moral beliefs on 
grounds that the experimenter seems to think are inadequate. 
So it seems to me that the data can be explained in a different way, one in 
which there is no dishonest search for support for one's moral views and which gives 
us no reason to think that people are mistaken about the reasons why they hold the 
moral beliefs they do. Now, it might be worried that the sort of explanation I have 
offered just seeks to explain away the data, but I think such a worry is misplaced. 
The explanation I have offered draws upon an awareness of how we respond to the 
charge to provide justifications acceptable to other people in other circumstances and, 
I submit, is plausible for that reason. As far as I can tell, Haidt and Bjorklund have 
not performed their experiments in such a way that this explanation is shown to be 
implausible. But until that is done, I don't think that much confidence should be 
placed in their model of how moral judgement takes place. The experimental results 
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seem to me inadequate grounds for holding that the moral reasoning of most people 
consists of mistaken views about why they hold the moral opinions they do or a 
dishonest and biased attempt to prop up those moral opinions. 
I conclude, therefore, that Haidt and Bjorklund's work, unless extended and 
modified to rule out the sort of explanation I have provided above, does not reveal 
that we are massively mistaken about the reasons why we hold the moral beliefs we 
do and does not offer adequate support for moral scepticism (and/or for scepticism 
about why we hold the moral beliefs we do). 
9. Conclusion 
As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, the field of empirical 
investigation into morality is a rapidly developing one and future work in the area 
will no doubt be employed in support of the claim that moral belief in general is 
unwarranted or undermined in some way. Indeed, the challenges that I have been 
able to consider in this chapter are only a sample of the empirical challenges 
currently being raised, although they are prominent ones in the literature. 
Nevertheless, revealing why these challenges possess less bite than some have 
thought, and showing the ways in which sceptical lessons drawn from them are 
mistaken, reveals the difficulty in using empirical studies as a basis for arguing for 
moral scepticism. For the sorts of responses I have given may well be applicable to 
other challenges.22 For example, descriptive claims about how most or many people 
are unreflective or biased in various ways when they make moral judgements leaves 
open the possibility that some people can be subject to less bias and be more 
22 Michael Huemer has recently briefly criticised a host of experimental results that various 
philosophers draw upon in claiming that our moral beliefs are clearly unreliable and distorted by many 
factors and which some philosophers take to support moral scepticism (2009, pp.13-15). 
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reflective; after all, the belief that in order to make correct moral judgements we 
might need to be unbiased and carefully attend fully to the matter at hand is surely 
one that we held before the advent of recent empirical research, and one might well 
expect that some people will have taken it on board. Furthermore, Sinnott-
Armstrong's challenge to moral intuitionism draws upon a range of considerations 
and so in showing - as I hope to have done - that disagreement, emotion, illusion, etc. 
do not clearly pose large problems for moral belief, more has really been done in the 
reply to Sinnott-Armstrong than refuting one challenge. 
In the next chapter, however, I will argue that a different kind of challenge 
does support moral scepticism insofar as it reveals that atheists should accept moral 
scepticism. Although I have argued in this chapter (in section 7) that Sinnott-
Armstrong is wrong to think that appeal to a merely possible dubious origin of moral 
belief is sufficient to render our moral beliefs unwarranted, in the next chapter I will 
argue that accepting atheism and unguided Darwinism as an actual account of our 
origins does render one's moral beliefs unwarranted. 
Chapter 3: Unguided Darwinism and atheistic Darwinian moral 
scepticism 
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In chapter 1, I explained that I am taking atheism to be the thesis that there is 
no transcendent creator of the universe or of parts of it - no God or gods - and I 
argued that atheists are committed to Darwinism and, furthermore, to unguided 
Darwinism. In this chapter, I will discuss the metaethical implications of atheists' 
embrace of unguided Darwinism and develop an argument for the conclusion that 
atheists should embrace moral scepticism. (I will call the argument for this the 
argument for atheistic Darwinian moral scepticism.) 
Before proceeding, some important comments about the nature of moral 
thought and discourse are in order. At the end of chapter 1, I explained my 
assumption, operative throughout this essay, that viable metaethical views must 
accommodate stance-independence: the idea that, in Shafer-landau's words, "there 
are moral truths that obtain independently of any preferred perspective, in the sense 
that the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their 
ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective II (2003, p. 15). 1 
understand our moral thought and discourse to be committed to stance-independence, 
at least when the perspectives in question are (idealised or non-idealised) human 
ones. I also pointed out that there are some sophisticated metaethical views that try to 
explain and justify the commitment to stance-independence on an anti-realist (we 
might say, ultimately stance-dependent) foundation. Such views will be the subject 
of the next chapter, but in this chapter, I will assume that the commitment to stance-
independence should be understood as moral realists understand it: when we form 
moral beliefs and make moral claims, we aim to track and report on moral facts that 
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are real independent features of the world - that are what they are independently of 
what humans take them to be. Moral beliefs are beliefs in the existence of 
independent moral properties and moral facts, and moral practice typically involves 
(not only, but centrally) an attempt to get one's beliefs about the existence and 
distribution of moral properties and facts in line with how those properties and facts 
really are distributed. Talk of "truth" and "falsity" in moral discourse is used to 
signal the success or failure of such an endeavour. 
Atheistic moral realists, who believe that there are independent moral 
properties and facts that answer to (at least some of) our moral beliefs fall into two 
camps: naturalistic moral realists and non-naturalistic moral realists. The important 
differences for the purpose of this chapter are as follows: naturalistic moral realists 
believe that moral properties and facts are similar to the properties and facts that 
figure in the natural or social sciences (or even that they are identical to, or 
constituted by, some such properties and facts) in that they are causally productive 
and make things happen in the world (Boyd 1989; Brink 1989; Sturgeon 2006). Non-
naturalistic moral realists (or "non-naturalists") by contrast believe that moral 
properties and facts are not similar to the properties and facts that figure in the 
natural or social sciences and that they are not causally productive (Shafer-Landau 
2003; 2006; FitzPatrick 2008). Some philosophers build in different nuances and 
intend to signify considerably more when they use the labels "naturalist" and "non-
naturalist" (e.g., they mean to signal concerns about the ontological reduction of 
normativity), but these brief characterisations are in line with widespread usage and 
will suffice for my purposes here. I will argue that, mainly due to commitment to 
unguided Darwinism, atheists cannot reasonably believe in the existence of natural 
or non-natural moral properties and facts. 
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The chapter will proceed as follows. After situating the discussion of 
Darwinism and moral belief in a wider context of philosophical thought about 
Darwinism and belief, I will tum to consider Sharon Street's recent "Darwinian 
dilemma" argument against moral realism and raise some criticisms of her argument. 
I will then tum to a recent Darwinian argument for moral scepticism advanced by 
Richard Joyce. I will modify and extend Joyce's argument to provide the argument 
for atheistic Darwinian moral scepticism. I will also point out how theists can avoid 
being victims of these Darwinian arguments, which will be important for the 
discussion in chapter 5. 
1. Unguided Darwinism and true belief 
In recent years, a number of philosophers have voiced the thought that a 
Darwinian or an unguided Darwinian account of human origins (sometimes it is 
called "Darwinian" but reflection reveals that the philosopher actually has unguided 
Darwinism in mind) is in tension with the notion that we have beliefs that are mostly 
true. Sometimes the worry is with beliefs across the board, although more commonly 
worries concern certain domains of putative knowledge. As will be seen, one such 
thought that a number of philosophers have endorsed is the thought that unguided 
Darwinism renders problematic the idea that our moral beliefs are mostly true. 
The general thrust behind worries that Darwinism or unguided Darwinism 
sits uneasily with the idea of us being accurate truth-trackers is the observation that 
natural selection - the engine of Darwinian evolution - can be expected to select for 
beliefs that are connected to organisms' behaviours that are adaptive (behaviours 
which increase the probability that the organisms exhibiting them will leave 
offspring). but the beliefs that lead to adaptive behaviour may not be beliefs that are 
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true. As Stephen Stich voices the problem, "natural selection does not care about 
truth; it cares only about reproductive success" (quoted in Plantinga 1993, p.222). Or 
in the words of Patricia Churchland: 
"Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed 
in the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principle 
chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in 
order that the organism may survive ... Improvements in sensorimotor control 
confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is 
advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and 
enhances the organism's chances of survival. Truth, whatever that IS, 
definitely takes the hindmost" (1987, p.548, Churchland's emphasis). 
Stich should perhaps have said that natural selection might care about truth, 
depending upon whether truth is linked to adaptive behaviour and reproductive 
success. But the worry is that it isn't clear that truth always will be linked to such 
behaviour and reproductive success. To accept unguided Darwinism is to accept that 
human beings and other organisms have been cobbled together by a process that 
ultimately "cares about" producing creatures that survive. False beliefs - in 
combination with appropriate desires - might be just as capable of leading to 
behaviour that will help their possessor to survive. So natural selection might well 
provide and preserve false beliefs instead of true ones. 
Some philosophers have taken the lesson of these considerations to be that 
unguided Darwinism renders all of our beliefs unwarranted (or renders our beliefs 
unwarranted if we accept unguided Darwinism). For example, in his much-discussed 
evolutionary argument against naturalism, Alvin Plantinga has argued that on the 
assumption of unguided Darwinism, the probability of an organism's having mainly 
true beliefs (in any domain of belief) is not high, and that therefore all of the atheistic 
Darwinist's beliefs are defeated and unwarranted (see chapter 2, section t for a brief 
explanation of defeaters), including her beliefs in atheism and Darwinism. Thus, 
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according to Plantinga, atheism (which he calls "naturalism") is self-refuting and 
cannot rationally be accepted; the one who accepts it thereby obtains reason to give it 
I 
up. 
Other philosophers have thought that a Darwinian process (implicitly 
unguided) is likely to yield creatures with mainly true beliefs in some domains, if not 
in others. They have thought that Darwinian evolution will probably yield creatures 
with mainly true beliefs about everyday objects and their spatial relations and causal 
powers (the sorts of beliefs that playa crucial role in giving rise to one's behaviour), 
even if perhaps not about more abstract and metaphysical issues. For example, when 
it comes to our inductive beliefs (both those about everyday objects and those that 
figure in science), Quine held that natural selection would lead to organisms that are 
reliable, since, "Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but 
praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind" (1969, p.126). On the 
other hand, Thomas Nagel seems less sanguine than Quine about the likelihood that 
Darwinism will produce organisms that engage in accurate scientific reasoning; he 
registers his belief that, "[w]ithout something more, the idea that our rational 
capacity was the product of natural selection would render reasoning far less 
trustworthy ... beyond its original "coping functions". There would be no reason to 
trust its results in mathematics and science, for example" ( 1997, p.13 5). 
Philosophers working in metaethics have also draw upon Darwinism (again, 
it seems, implicitly unguided Darwinism) and argued that the idea that humans have 
evolved to reliably track objective, independent moral facts is problematic. A little 
I See Plantinga (1993, ch.12), the essays collected by Beilby (2002), and Plantinga's debate with 
Michael Tooley (Plantinga and Tooley 2008). That atheists have reason to embrace moral scepticism 
is a trivial consequence of the conclusion of Plantinga's argument, since his conclusion is that atheists 
have reason to be sceptics about all their beliefs. However, Plantinga's controversial argument wiJJ 
not be assessed here; I provide a different argument for the conclusion that atheists should embrace 
moral scepticism. 
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over twenty years ago, Michael Ruse urged other philosophers to "take Darwin 
seriously" and realise the consequences Darwinian evolutionary theory has for 
metaethics (among other philosophical areas and topics). Ruse argued that 
Darwinism supports moral error theory - that all of our moral beliefs are false - since 
in the light of Darwinism, the best explanation of our moral practices is that, 
"morality is a collective illusion foisted upon us by our genes" (1986, p.253; also see 
Sommers and Rosenberg 2003). While not necessarily agreeing with Ruse that 
Darwinism supports moral error theory, a sizeable number of philosophers working 
in metaethics have nevertheless heeded, and are heeding, his advice to take Darwin 
seriously. A prominent recent example is provided by Allan Gibbard, who voices his 
concern that Darwinism appears to offer no "deep vindication" of our capacity for 
making moral judgements: while science provides the resources for us to tell a 
Darwinian story about why perception (say) might be reliable - organisms that have a 
great preponderance of true perceptual beliefs over false ones may be more likely to 
find food, find mates, avoid predators, etc - it doesn't provide the resources to tell a 
Darwinian story about why organisms like us would do well to make true moral 
judgements (2003, p.265). As a result, Gibbard counsels, we must simply have a kind 
of trust, or "faith" that we are good at making true moral judgements (or as he puts it, 
"judging what is the thing to do") even though we cannot see how or why we would 
have evolved to be reliable when it comes to forming beliefs in the moral domain. 
Other philosophers have made appeals to Darwinian considerations in the course of 
commending or making plausible their metaethical views.2 Indeed, there appears to 
be something of a growing consensus that Darwinism (or unguided Darwinism) does 
not sit too comfortably with the notion that we are reliable at tracking objective, 
2 For example, see Blackburn's essay "How to Be an Ethical Anti-Realist" (in Blackburn 1993, 
pp.166-181), and Joyce (2001). 
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independent moral facts. The sorts of considerations many philosophers have 
appealed to have recently featured (in fresh and improved presentations) in 
arguments developed at some length by Sharon Street (2006) and Richard Joyce 
(2006), so their arguments will be considered before Joyce's is modified and shaped 
into the argument for atheistic Darwinian moral scepticism. 
2. Sharon Street's Darwinian dilemma 
Before engaging with Street's Darwinian dilemma (2006), it will be helpful 
to provide a summary. The structure of Street's argument is as follows: for reductio, 
assume that there exist objective, independent moral properties and facts such as 
moral realists believe in, whether non-natural properties and facts (as non-
naturalistic moral realists maintain) or properties and facts that can figure in causal 
relations and can or could playa role in causal explanations (as naturalistic moral 
realists hold). Then reflect on our Darwinian origins (implicitly, I think, unguided 
Darwinian origins), realise the extent to which natural selection has shaped our moral 
beliefs, and consider the question of what the relation is between (a) those 
independently existing moral properties and facts and (b) our evolving to form the 
moral beliefs we have. Is there a relation between them or not? Have we evolved in 
such a way that our moral beliefs have tracked those independent moral truths? If 
there is a relation between the objective moral facts and our evolving to have the 
beliefs we do, then what is it - how did moral truth constrain the evolutionary 
process? According to Street, there is no scientifically respectable answer to this 
question. So it must be held, she insists, that we have evolved to have moral beliefs 
in a way that is unconnected to the truth of those beliefs. But surely it would be a 
miraculous and inexplicable coincidence if, given this lack of connection between 
91 
the moral facts being what they are and our moral beliefs evolving as they have, we 
have evolved such that our moral beliefs are mainly in line with the independent 
objective moral truths; it is literally unbelievable. So although we assumed that there 
are objective moral facts, we must conclude that we are in all likelihood massively 
mistaken about them. (And in that case, I take it, there isn't much point in thinking 
they exist - once it has been conceded that if there is a moral realm then our beliefs 
about it are saturated with error, what reason do we have to think that there is such a 
realm?) So we end up rejecting moral realism, and instead hold that there are no 
independent moral properties or facts. 3 Given the assumptions in play in this chapter, 
the conclusion to draw is that our moral beliefs are most probably false. 
That is the outline of Street's argument. I will now consider the argument in 
greater detail, beginning with the shape that a Darwinian explanation of the origin of 
moral belief will take. 
Street and Joyce (in Joyce 2006) both argue that a Darwinian understanding 
of our origins (in connection with some empirical work on moral judgement) leads us 
to think that we make moral judgements because we have evolved a biologically-
determined (some say "innate") capacity and tendency to do so; furthermore, that this 
capacity and tendency evolved because of the connection between forming moral 
beliefs and being motivated to act (especially in being motivated to act in adaptive 
cooperative ways). This doesn't mean that they endorse moral judgement internalism, 
the thesis that it is necessarily true that one who has a moral belief has some 
motivation, however slight or outweighed by other motivations, to act in accordance 
3 Street doesn't conclude that all of our moral judgements are false, because she endorses an anti-
realist metaethical view she calls constructivism (2008), which makes the moral truths depend upon 
our beliefs about what the moral truths are (and therefore rejects stance-independence). I believe that 
it suffers from the general problems that views that reject stance-independence suffer from (see my 
brief comments, and note 26, at the end of chapter I). 
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with that belief.4 And such a strong thesis is not needed for it to be plausible that our 
capacity for moral belief evolved because of the role moral belief plays in motivating 
behaviour (especially adaptive cooperative behaviour); it is enough that moral belief 
tends to influence behaviour with some regularity, as it surely does. The capacity for 
moral belief may boost all kinds of adaptive behaviours; by thinking that certain 
behaviours (ones that are adaptive) are morally good or obligatory, and that others 
(ones that are maladaptive) are morally bad or wrong, organisms are more likely to 
engage or not engage in the respective behaviours. Therefore, we can understand 
why natural selection might favour a capacity and tendency to form moral beliefs. 
Street believes that we have reason to think that natural selection has 
indirectly shaped the content of our moral beliefs, in addition to giving us the 
capacity for moral belief. The way evolution has done this, Street surmises, is by 
way of shaping our "proto moral judgements", where proto moral judgements are 
somewhat like moral judgements but are more primitive and might be shared with 
apes; they are the sorts of things that cognitively and affectively underlie and 
constrain (or maybe are evolutionary precursors of) moral judgements. The proto 
moral judgements then influence the content of our moral judgements, perhaps by 
constraining what content they can have, or providing a raw base upon which natural 
selection can go to work. So, via the proto moral judgements, we have inherited a 
biological tendency to make particular moral judgements. 
In support of this contention - that natural selection has had an enormous 
influence on the content of our moral beliefs - Street first draws attention to the 
different effects on one's reproductive success that making moral beliefs with 
4 There is a substantial literature on the question of whether such internalism (sometimes called 
motivational internalism or appraiser internalism) is true. For arguments that it is false, see 
Svavarsd6ttir (1999) and Zangwill (2008). 
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different content can have, on the (reasonable) assumption that one's behaviour is at 
least fairly strongly influenced by the moral judgements one makes. As she puts it: 
"It is clear ... how fatal to reproductive success it would be to judge that the 
fact that something would endanger one's survival is a reason to do it, or that 
the fact that someone is kin is a reason to harm that individual. A creature 
who accepted such evaluative judgements would run itself off cliffs, seek out 
its predators, and assail its offspring, resulting in the speedy elimination of it 
and its evaluative tendencies from the world. In contrast, it is clear how 
beneficial (in terms of reproductive success) it would be to judge that the fact 
that something would promote one's survival is a reason in favour of it, or 
that the fact that something would assist one's offspring is a reason to do it" 
(p.114). 
It is certainly very plausible that natural selection could take an interest in the content 
of our moral beliefs, or those of our ancestors. Nevertheless, is there any reason to 
think that it has? In support of the view that natural selection has put "relentless" 
selective pressure on the content of our moral (and other evaluative) jUdgements, 
Street lists some judgements, or types of judgements, that she considers to be 
widespread, both across times and across cultures (p.IIS): 
(1) The fact that something would promote one's own survival is a reason in 
favour of it. 
(2) The fact that something would promote the interests of a family member 
is a reason to do it. 
(3) We have greater obligations to help our own children than we do to help 
complete strangers. 
(4) The fact that someone has treated one well is a reason to treat that person 
well in return. 
(5) The fact that someone is altruistic is a reason to admire, praise, and 
reward him or her. 
(6) The fact that someone has done one deliberate harm is a reason to shun 
that person or seek his or her punishment. 
Street asks what the best explanation of the widespread human tendency to 
make these judgements is, and answers that, "evolutionary biology offers powerful 
answers to these questions, very roughly of the form that these sorts of judgements 
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about reasons tended to promote survival and reproduction" (p.IIS). (Note that Street 
prefers the language of reasons, but everything she says can be stated in terms of 
moral obligations, or what we ought to do or should do, or what is good or right, etc.) 
Human beings have a widespread tendency to make these sorts of judgements (rather 
than others) because the content of our judgements has been shaped by natural 
selection. 
It is perhaps easiest to see the plausibility of this claim in the case of 
judgements (I) to (3), for it seems rather obvious how making such judgements, and 
behaving in accordance with them, would increase the probability that one would 
have offspring and that those offspring would survive. However, the cooperative 
behaviours that would be expected as a result of making judgements (4) to (6) are 
also behaviours that evolutionary biologists and others have explained could be 
adaptive (see Joyce 2006, pp.13-73). 
So, according to Street, the best explanation of why human beings have a 
tendency to make such judgements is biological and appeals to natural selection: 
biology has conferred upon us a capacity and tendency to make moral judgements, 
moral judgements with certain content, because making those judgements is adaptive. 
3. First horn of the dilemma 
Having established to her satisfaction that the content of our moral 
judgements has been significantly shaped by natural selection, Street goes on to offer 
moral realists (and realists about all value) a dilemma - how do they construe the 
relation between (a) the independent realist moral facts and (b) the judgements that 
natural selection has bequeathed us? One way is to affirm some kind of relation; I 
will return to that strategy in due course. The other way to go is to say that there is no 
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relation: there are independent moral facts and we have evolved to make moral 
judgements, but our evolution in this matter was unconnected to the moral facts 
being what they are; the moral facts play no part in the explanation of how we have 
evolved to make the moral judgements we do. (It seems that the non-naturalistic 
atheistic moral realist would be committed to this view, since he understands the 
moral facts to play no causal role in what takes place in the world.) But in that case, 
there is no reason to think that natural selection would provide us with true moral 
beliefs rather than false ones. There is reason to think that we would evolve 
tendencies to make moral judgements that are adaptive, but there is no reason to 
think that we would evolve to make moral judgements that are true. Indeed, we 
should think our moral judgements are probably false. 
According to Street, the number of possible configurations and patterns of the 
moral facts that could be actual (or could have been actual) is vast. To see this, just 
think of extremely bizarre moral claims. Consider the claims that it is morally wrong 
to ever speak, or that we have moral reason to wear red, that something's being 
purple is a reason to scream at it, or that it is a morally bad state of affairs that there 
are clouds. According to Street, presumably these are real metaphysical possibilities 
given moral realism - presumably, however values have come to be part of the world 
and received the pattern and distribution they have, they could have been distributed 
such that it is morally wrong ever to speak, or that it is morally bad that there are 
clouds, and so on. There is a veritable ocean of possible moral truths. Contrast this 
ocean with the relatively small subset of moral judgements that will be adaptive for 
beings like us humans and which (Street says) we should expect natural selection to 
provide us with, and which (she also says) we have good reason to think natural 
selection has provided us with. Given all the different moral truths there could have 
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been, the likelihood that we are lucky enough to live in a universe where the moral 
truths are happily in line with the judgements we have evolved to make - quite 
independently of those moral truths - is very small. 
As I understand her argument, Street would have us imagine all those 
possible worlds containing bizarre (to us) distributions of moral properties, in each of 
which we (or counterparts of us) evolve to make more or less the same moral 
judgements that we do in the actual world. In the vast majority of those possible 
worlds, our moral judgements (or, those of our counterparts) will be greatly out of 
alignment with the distribution of moral properties and facts. So, on the assumption 
that all the other possible distributions of moral value we can think of really are 
metaphysical possibilities, it is exceedingly more likely that we have evolved to 
make false moral judgements. That is, even if there are independent, objective realist 
moral facts, it is exceedingly more likely that one of the possible distributions of 
moral value other than the one we have evolved to believe in obtains. So, according 
to Street, the result of taking this hom of the Darwinian dilemma is the conclusion 
that most of our moral beliefs are, "in all likelihood mostly otT track ... [w]e should 
have been evolving towards affirming the independent evaluative truths posited by 
the realist, but instead it turns out that we have been evolving towards whatever 
evaluative content tends to promote reproductive success" (p.122). Furthermore, 
Street will have no truck with any realist reply that even if our moral judgements are 
"mostly otT track", we can nevertheless correct them by rational reflection and so get 
at the moral truth that way. The problem is that rational reflection - though it plays 
an important role in forming our moral beliefs - consists in evaluating some moral 
beliefs in the light of others, and if the correctness of the latter have been called into 
question (as is the case here) then any moral beliefs that are accepted on the basis of 
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reflection on them will also be in doubt; any appeal to rational reflection involves 
trying to separate the good judgements from the bad with a tool that is probably 
contaminated (p.124). So if the realist takes the first horn of the Darwinian dilemma, 
and holds that there is no relation between the realist moral truths and our evolving to 
make the moral judgements we do, the conclusion is that all of our moral judgements 
are probably false. 
4. Second horn of the dilemma 
Suppose, then, that the other horn of the Darwinian dilemma is taken: the 
moral realist avers that there is a relation between the independent moral facts and 
our making the moral judgements that natural selection has bequeathed us. Our 
complete answer to the question, "Why do we have a widespread tendency to make 
moral judgements with the content that we do?" is going to appeal to more than the 
fact that natural selection conferred such judgements upon us; it will include the 
proposition that we evolved to make those judgements because they are true. 
Somehow, we have evolved such that our moral judgements track the moral truth. 
However, Street argues that this explanation is untenable, and so this horn cannot 
really be taken. She raises separate problems for naturalistic and for non-naturalistic 
moral realism, with the problems for non-naturalism first. 
Why, on the assumption of non-naturalism, is the second horn untenable? For 
one thing, Street says, the explanation that we have evolved to make the judgements 
we have because they are true is obscure: once we have explained, in Darwinian 
fashion, how we evolved to have a strong tendency to make the moral judgements 
that we do, how does the alleged explanatory point that we evolved to make such 
judgements because they are true do any additional explaining? Street contrasts this 
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with explanations about why we have evolved to make the perceptual judgements 
that we do. In the case of perceptual judgements, the best explanation of why we 
come to make such judgements - e.g., judgements concerning material objects - is 
plausibly going to involve the truth of those judgements. We form perceptual beliefs 
about rocks and trees, predators and other people (etc) because natural selection has 
crafted us a certain way; but it has crafted us in the way it has because there are 
rocks and trees, predators and other people, and we can explain the truth of our 
perceptual judgements by appealing to the fact that having true beliefs about such 
things was more reproductively beneficial to our ancestors than having false ones 
would be.s (Creatures having many false beliefs about predators or objects that might 
affect one's chances of living long and finding mates might not live long enough to 
have many descendants.) In the case of perception, the typical evolutionary 
explanation of our judgements makes reference to the reliability of those judgements. 
Things seem very different in the moral case. At least according to the non-
naturalistic moral realist's picture, moral facts seem to be of a rather different kind to 
rocks and trees and predators, objects with spatial extensions and positions which we 
interact with and might interact with in more adaptive ways if we have true beliefs 
about them. 
In addition, Street claims, taking this hom of the dilemma results in 
substituting one explanation - the Darwinian one that we have evolved a tendency to 
make certain moral judgements because making such judgements is adaptive - for a 
more complicated one: that we have evolved a tendency to make certain moral 
5 As noted earlier in this chapter, it is a bit contentious whether unguided Darwinism would most 
likely lead to creatures with true perceptual beliefs - there is Plantinga's argument, after all. 
Nevertheless, Street's point clearly stands inasmuch as we understand what it is to evolve to form 
certain perceptual beliefs because they are true; there remains the contrast with moral beliefs and the 
idea that we evolved to have them because they are true, which certainly seems more obscure (at least 
on the assumption of non-naturalism). 
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judgements because making those judgements is adaptive and because such 
judgements are true. Because taking this horn results in an explanation that is less 
parsimonious (in addition to its being more obscure), it should be rejected. Therefore, 
the realist is back on the first horn of the dilemma (and ends up with the result that 
even if there are realist moral facts, our judgements about them are probably mostly 
off track). Even if the existence of such facts is granted, the explanation that we non-
accidentally evolved to make moral judgements in line with those facts is too 
extravagant and obscure to accept. 6 
When it comes to naturalistic moral realism (or, as Street calls it, "value 
naturalism"), the proponent of such a view holds that moral facts exist and can figure 
in causal relations, often suggesting that moral facts are identical with, or constituted 
by, other natural facts (Boyd 1989; Brink 1989; Sturgeon 2006). Naturalistic moral 
realists hold that moral facts are the sorts of facts we can bump into and interact with. 
So the reason that Street has thus far provided for holding that natural selection 
cannot be expected to provide us with true moral judgements - that moral facts are 
importantly different from facts about rocks, trees and predators (etc) - seems 
impotent against naturalistic moral realism. Natural selection might have bequeathed 
us accurate moral beliefs because we causally interacted with moral facts. This isn't 
to say that naturalistic moral realists have a good argument that natural selection did 
or would provide us with true moral judgements; rather, it is to say that, if naturalistic 
moral realism is viable, Street would have failed to show that it didn't or wouldn't. 
b There is something a bit strange about Street's appeal to parsimony, for it seems that if parsimony 
(and obscurity, for that matter) is such a powerful consideration, her argument against moral realism 
(or at least non-naturalism) could have been briefer and didn't need to appeal to Darwinism at all: it is 
more parsimonious to deny the existence of moral facts (or non-natural moral facts), so they should be 
rejected. I should also note that I don't think that the mere fact that believing in moral facts might give 
one a fuller ontology provides adequate grounds for denying their existence or for embracing moral 
scepticism. To think otherwise would seem to be too unfair towards moral facts - scepticism about 
other minds or an external world (say) doesn't follow from the mere fact that rejecting them could 
reduce our ontology. 
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Street argues that the naturalistic moral realist faces a slightly different, but 
ultimately similar, dilemma. The dilemma has the same structure as the earlier 
dilemma, but now the dilemma isn't with regard to whether there is a relation 
between our moral beliefs and their truth; it concerns whether there is a relation 
between the naturalistic moral realist's beliefs about the identities or constitution 
relations between moral facts and naturalistic facts and the truth of those judgements 
about identities and constitution relations. So whereas the first dilemma found 
problematic the idea that our moral judgements reliably track the independent moral 
facts, this modified dilemma finds problematic the idea that naturalistic moral 
realists' judgements about identity statements involving moral properties and natural 
properties accurately track the truth about such identities. Again, moral realists (in 
this case, naturalistic moral realists) can either assert or deny that there is a relation 
between their judgements about identities and the independent truths concerning the 
identities. If they deny that there is a relation, then they end up with the result that 
most of their judgements about the identities or constitution relations between moral 
and naturalistic facts will be "mostly off track". If they assert that there is a relation, 
Street says, they are no better off: 
"[I]f the tracking account [that judgements track the truth] failed as a 
scientific explanation when it came to arguing that we were selected to track 
independent evaluative truths, then it will fail even more seriously when it 
comes to arguing that we were selected to track independent facts about 
natural-normative identities. For it is even more obscure how tracking 
something as esoteric as independent facts about natural-normative identities 
could ever have promoted reproductive success in the environment of our 
ancestors" (p.141). 
So, Street argues, finding the second horns of their respective dilemmas 
unacceptable, moral realists of both naturalistic and non-naturalistic stripes are 
forced onto the first hom. But that hom leads to the conclusion that, in all probability, 
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our moral beliefs are massively mistaken. Therefore, moral realism is untenable. 
Darwinism (or unguided Darwinism) renders utterly implausible the idea that we 
humans reliably track moral truths that exist independently of what we think about 
them. Given this chapter's supposition that when we make moral judgements we are 
indeed trying to track such truths (and that in making moral assertions, we are in part 
claiming some success in the endeavour), the lesson to draw from Street's argument 
seems to be that unguided Darwinism implies that all of our moral judgements are 
probably false. 
However, I think that Street's argument fails, and I will explain why in the 
next few sections. The main reason it is important to see what is wrong with Street's 
argument is that it perhaps isn't so interesting to argue that atheistic Darwinists 
should embrace moral scepticism (my main purpose in this chapter) if Street has 
provided a convincing argument for the stronger conclusion - given the assumptions 
in play in this chapter - that atheistic Darwinists should embrace error theory 
(according to which all of our moral beliefs are false). As I see it, there are at least 
three problems with the Darwinian dilemma. 
5. First problem with the Darwinian dilemma 
My first concern centres on Street's claim that natural selection has not 
simply provided us with a capacity (and tendency) for making moral judgements, but 
has also shaped the content of our moral judgements by giving us a biological 
tendency to form certain ones. In support of this claim, Street provides some 
examples of types of judgement that are widespread and that, she claims, we would 
expect natural selection to provide us with because acting upon such judgements 
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would be adaptive: that the fact that something would benefit a family member is a 
reason to do it, that we have greater obligations towards our children than we have 
toward complete strangers, etc (see section 2 above). Street contrasts them with a set 
of judgements that we humans do not have a widespread tendency to make and 
which, she claims, we would expect Darwinian evolution not to provide us with 
because they wouldn't be adaptive (p.116): 
(I') The fact that something would promote one's survival is a reason against 
it. 
(2') The fact that something would promote the interests of a family member 
is a reason not to do it. 
(3') We have greater obligations to help complete strangers than we do to 
help our own children. 
(4') The fact that someone has treated one well is a reason to do that 
individual hann in return. 
(5') The fact that someone is altruistic is a reason to dislike, condemn, and 
punish him or her. 
(6') The fact that someone has done one a deliberate hann is a reason to seek 
out that person's company and reward him or her. 
According to Street, the best explanation of why we humans exhibit a widespread 
tendency to form the judgements on the first list but not the list above will appeal to 
evolutionary biology. Darwinism predicts one set of judgements over the other. 
However, it isn't clear to me that the set of judgements (1') to (6') couldn't 
be adaptive. Of course, if we simply consider one or two of the judgements and think 
of adding those to the set of judgements we in fact make, then we will probably do 
less well evolutionarily. Nevertheless, it doesn't follow from this that a given 
judgement in the set will be maladaptive within the context of making all of the 
judgements in that set. The set as a whole could be adaptive. This is somewhat hard 
to see, because it is difficult to imagine creatures that think so differently from us 
that they have a strong tendency to make the judgements in the set above; 
furthermore, these are only some of the judgements that the creatures would make 
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(just as the judgements Street draws attention to are only some of the judgements that 
we make). Nevertheless, consider a society of creatures that have a widespread 
tendency to make - and act upon - judgements (2') and (3 '). Such creatures shun 
their own offspring and family members but perhaps have a tendency to help the 
offspring of others. If all, or many, of the creatures in that society make the same 
judgements, then all the youngsters in the society might well get looked after, even if 
each has its interests cared for by elder creatures that are not its family members. A 
society of such organisms, making those judgements, might do just as well in 
surviving as a society of organisms who have a strong tendency to look after their 
own offspring. Suppose that the creatures in the hypothetical society we are 
considering also make judgements (4') and (6'); could the combination of those 
judgements be adaptive? In such a society, helpers would be treated badly in return 
for their help and would then do good to those who treated them badly, thus those 
who were originally helped have had good done to them twice. It might not lead to a 
very egalitarian society, but it isn't clear that the society wouldn't survive well. To a 
large extent, it depends upon how often one does good to another and in what 
circumstances. I think that all we can say is that we would expect natural selection, if 
it has shaped the content of moral judgements, to provide us with some set that is 
adaptive (or some set that was adaptive in the ancestral population). We cannot say 
that the particular stock of moral judgements that we in fact have a widespread 
tendency to make is exactly what Darwinism would predict. 
In addition, even if we can nicely explain why natural selection might favour 
the judgements that Street draws attention to, others point out that there are other 
widely-held moral judgements that are difficult to explain in terms of natural 
selection giving us a biological tendency to make them because it isn't clear how 
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they would be beneficial for our reproduction - e.g., "the widespread belief that it is 
morally wrong to kill or neglect senile elderly people who cannot survive without 
great help and who cannot reciprocate adequately or have more children" (Sinnott-
Armstrong 2006b, p.43). 
Furthermore, there are alternative explanations of why we make the moral 
judgements that we have a widespread tendency to make. For example, the content of 
moral beliefs may not be biologically determined but rather transmitted culturally 
through being taught to youngsters and instilled from a young age. It wouldn't be 
surprising that those societies which have survived have been ones that have taught 
and passed on moral beliefs that are adaptive. Some contemporary philosophers 
argue for the plausibility of elements of this sort of story. For example, Jesse Prinz 
(2008) has argued that there is no good reason to think that the content of our moral 
judgements is determined by natural selection or biology; and Philip Kitcher has 
speculated that we might have evolved a capacity for normative guidance, but that 
the content of moral beliefs may have been broad enough to allow for a number of 
"experiments in living" (2006, p.173). If a story of this kind is true, we should 
perhaps expect the moral judgements we have a widespread tendency to make to be 
ones that are adaptive, just so long as we and our ancestors have been making moral 
judgements for some time. Therefore, the evidence does not appear to favour Street's 
account over it. 
Given the above, it seems that Street's dilemma for the moral realist 
disappears. Recall that the dilemma the realist faced was to assert or deny a relation 
between our evolving to make the moral judgements we do and the truth of those 
moral judgements. If the content of those moral judgements isn't in fact the result of 
our biology, then it might be the case that our methods of forming moral judgements 
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are in fact more likely to be reliable. Or to put it another way: according to Street, the 
problem with viewing our judgements as being greatly influenced by natural 
selection is that natural selection is not primarily interested in producing true belief 
(hence it would be monumentally lucky - unacceptably lucky - if our moral 
judgements turned out to accurately reflect the independent moral facts). However, if 
the content of our moral judgements isn't greatly influenced by natural selection, but 
rather is determined by some other means, then it would seem to be left open that the 
method by which they are determined is conducive to tracking the truth about moral 
matters. 
6. Second problem with the Darwinian dilemma 
The second problem centres on what Street calls the "huge universe of 
logically possible evaluative judgements and truths" (p.122). The assumption is that 
there are numerous ways in which the moral properties could have been distributed. 
(Recall bizarre examples such as the fact that something is purple being a reason to 
scream at it, or it being morally wrong to ever speak.) Once this huge pool of 
possibilities has been conceded, Street concludes that it is highly unlikely that we 
happen to find ourselves in a world where we have the happy coincidence that the 
independent moral truths just happen to match the moral judgements that we have 
evolved to make. 
However, it isn't clear to me that a moral realist must agree with Street here. 
For while the bizarre scenarios Street draws attention to - e.g., an object's being 
purple providing a reason to scream at it - are logical possibilities (their description 
involves no contradiction), it nevertheless doesn't follow that they are metaphysical 
possibilities, ways the world really could have been. While logic alone doesn't rule 
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out the possibility of an object's being purple being a reason to scream at it, or it 
being morally bad that there are clouds, logical possibility and metaphysical 
possibility can come apart. For example, there is no contradiction involved in the 
idea of entities popping into existence completely uncaused; nevertheless, a good 
many philosophers think that such a logical possibility is nevertheless a metaphysical 
impossibility. So, granted that the bizarre possibilities Street draws attention to are 
logical possibilities, why should the moral realist grant that they are metaphysical 
possibilities? 
Nothing in Street's argument suggests a reason. Furthermore, I think that the 
realist is unlikely to hold that all of the logical possibilities really are metaphysical 
possibilities. For one thing, many moral realists - including non-naturalists - hold to 
the supervenience of moral properties on non-moral ones such that, necessarily, 
actions and states of affairs (etc) that have all non-moral properties in common will 
also have all moral properties in common (e.g., Parfit 2006). If so, there are 
constraints on how moral properties can be distributed. There may be no logical 
contradiction involved in the idea that there exist two actions exactly alike in their 
non-moral properties while differing in their moral properties, but nevertheless the 
moral realist is unlikely to grant that the world really could have been such that this 
sort of thing actually happened. 
Furthermore, there are other reasons for doubting that moral realists will be 
eager to affirm Street's assumption that there are countless ways in which the moral 
values really could have been distributed. Moral realists understand moral values to 
be tethered to actions, persons, states of affairs (etc) in ways that make sense. For 
example, only agents can be suitable objects of blame; it doesn't make sense to 
blame a non-agent object or state of affairs, or to say that something that isn't an 
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agent (my car, perhaps) did something morally wrong. Furthennore, the connection 
between moral properties and the objects that exemplify them must be intelligible to 
us. We cannot understand how an object's being purple could (in itself) provide a 
reason to scream at it (at least, I can't). But it seems intelligible to many of us that 
(e.g.) an action's causing distress to others might (in itself) make it wrong to perfonn. 
If this is so, then it isn't clear why moral realists must grant that the moral properties 
they affinn really could have had any manner of distribution. On this score, compare 
moral properties and moral reasons with epistemic properties and epistemic reasons. 
Suppose one holds that there are objective reasons to believe certain propositions in 
certain circumstances. Must one who grants this also grant that there are all manner 
of bizarre ways in which epistemic properties and reasons really (metaphysically) 
could have been distributed? For instance, might it have been the case that perceiving 
an apple in itself gives one reason to believe that one has a headache? Could my 
belief that I am sitting at a desk have had the property of supporting (all on its own) 
the belief that there exists intelligent life on other planets? It really isn't at all clear to 
me that an epistemic realist has to grant such bizarre logical possibilities as real 
metaphysical possibilities. Likewise, I suggest, for the moral realist. 
Indeed, not only might moral realists not accept that there is a vast number of 
diverse ways in which the moral properties could have been distributed, they might 
also consider the continued existence of us or our species to be obviously a good 
thing and think it couldn't have failed to be (unless, perhaps, the goodness of 
survival was outweighed by other factors). If so, realists might not be troubled by the 
idea that we have the moral beliefs we do because of their adaptive value, since they 
would expect that the true moral beliefs will by and large be ones that positively 
evaluate behaviours that are adaptive and negatively evaluate behaviours that are 
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maladaptive. At least, realists might not be troubled to the extent that they consider 
themselves to have reason to believe that the moral judgements we have a 
widespread tendency to make are in all likelihood Jalse. Street might well reply that 
the limitation on which distributions of moral properties the moral realist finds 
intelligible, possible, or probable has itself come about by way of Darwinian 
evolution and that therefore such considerations can carry little weight; indeed, 
perhaps she would urge a new dilemma concerning the metaphysically possible 
distributions of moral properties and our beliefs about such possibilities - after all, it 
is difficult to see why it should be evolutionarily advantageous for us to be able to 
accurately track the truths about which distributions of moral properties are possible. 
However, although I cannot develop and assess such an argument here, I suggest that 
an argument along these lines is going to be most convincing if its conclusion is not 
that most of our moral judgements arefalse, but rather that their being false is such a 
live possibility that (given the assumption of unguided Darwinism) moral scepticism 
is to be embraced. After all, if we cannot trust our beliefs about metaphysically 
possible distributions of moral properties, then the claim that there are vast numbers 
of possibilities (which Street's argument currently employs) cannot be accepted. At 
the same time, moral realists who accept unguided Darwinism might lose any 
grounds for holding that there aren 't vast numbers of ways in which the moral 
properties could have been distributed. As I say, I suspect that this line of argument 
may lead to a conclusion of moral scepticism - the atheistic Darwinist may not have 
reason to hold that all of her moral beliefs are probably false, but she might have 
reason to consider that a very live possibility. 
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7. Third problem with the Darwinian dilemma 
The third problem with Street's argument concerns her modified dilemma for 
naturalistic moral realism. As I explained, Street's challenge centres upon our ability 
to accurately grasp the truths about natural-normative identities. However, I think 
that her argument fails here, because the claim that we are able to recognise natural-
normative identities doesn't appear to be a claim that naturalistic moral realists must 
endorse. According to naturalistic moral realism, moral properties and facts are 
natural properties and facts; it doesn't follow from this that we know, or even 
reasonably believe, what the natural-moral (or natural-nonnative) identities are. 
Indeed, Street actually acknowledges this earlier on in her paper, writing that 
according to naturalistic moral realists, "we mayor may not ever be able to provide a 
reduction telling exactly which natural properties evaluative properties are identical 
with" (p.112). In addition, she mentions in a footnote that prominent naturalistic 
moral realists Nicholas Sturgeon, Richard Boyd and David Brink "think that such 
reductions may not be, and need not be, forthcoming" (p.157, n.6). Furthermore, 
some naturalistic moral realists hold that not only might we never be able to identify 
natural-moral identities, but we might in fact have no non-moral terms that pick out 
the moral properties (in other words, there may not be natural-moral identities). 
According to Sturgeon: 
["I]t seems extravagant to assume that we have nonethical tenns for all 
natural properties. To take just one consideration, the paradigm examples of 
natural properties are those dealt with by the sciences ... But a standard feature 
of scientific progress has been terminological innovation, in which new terms 
are introduced for properties not previously recognised, and there is no reason 
to think that this process is or ever will be at an end. So there is no assurance 
that, if "good" or some other transparently ethical term stands for a natural 
property, this must be a property that we can (or even: will be able to) also 
represent with nonethical terminology" (2006, p.99). 
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If naturalistic moral realism can be viable in the absence of any warrant for 
accepting natural-moral (or natural-normative) identities (and Street has not argued 
otherwise), then the naturalistic moral realist is free to respond to Street's original 
dilemma by affirming a relation between the independent moral truths and our moral 
judgements. For example, the naturalistic moral realist can endorse an account 
whereby our ancestors evolved in circumstances where (a) there were causally 
productive moral properties, (b) the moral properties were salient and of interest to 
them so far as their survival and reproduction was concerned, and so (c) it became 
evolutionarily beneficial to be able to make judgements that accurately tracked those 
properties. According to such an account, part of the explanation why we evolved to 
make those moral judgements would indeed be because they are true.7 
In summary, Street's Darwinian dilemma is problematic as she states it. So 
we have not been given reason to think that unguided Darwinism suggests the falsity 
of all of our moral beliefs. I suspect that Street's argument can be improved by 
tweaking it and making it an argument for moral scepticism; however, I think that it 
would probably need to be tweaked in the direction of a modified version of Richard 
Joyce's argument, to which I now tum. 
8. Richard Joyce's Darwinian argument 
Joyce's argument (2006, ch.6) is in some ways similar to Street's. In the 
chapters leading up to it, he explains the different sorts of helping and cooperative 
behaviours that could or would be adaptive, and argues that we have evolved a 
7 This isn't to say that such accounts don't face other problems; e.g., when it comes to adequately 
accounting for moral semantics (see Timmons and Horgan (1992». However, such objections are 
different from the Darwinian dilemma. 
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capacity for making moral judgements as a biological adaptation which boosts the 
likelihood of engaging in such behaviours due to moral judgements' motivational 
contribution Uudging that an action is right or obligatory, etc, raises the probability 
that we will perform it). However, Joyce's argument differs from Street's in that it 
does not involve the claim that natural selection has provided us with a biologically-
based widespread tendency to make moral judgements with a particular content. 
(This isn't to say that Joyce denies that natural selection has shaped the content of 
our moral beliefs (2006, pp.13-73), only that such a claim doesn't appear necessary 
for his argument.) Joyce does claim that there is good reason to hold that natural 
selection has given us a faculty of moral belief and that we have a biologically-based 
(or innate) tendency to employ moral concepts.s Appealing to evidence such as the 
widespread occurrence of moral evaluation throughout societies - both contemporary 
and down the ages - and studies on children's development (pp.134-139), he argues 
that a biological explanation of our capacity for moral judgement and our tendency to 
evaluate morally is the "best story we have" (p.139). 
Joyce's argument differs from Street's in that he directs it towards non-
naturalistic moral realism but not naturalistic moral realism. Indeed, Joyce 
supplements it with independent arguments against naturalistic moral realism. So as I 
explain Joyce's argument, it should be borne in mind that he presents it against non-
naturalistic realism. 
Earlier I documented that Street provides a contrast between a Darwinian 
explanation of our beliefs in objects like rocks and trees - which would also hold for 
our having the concepts "tree", "rock" and other material object concepts - and an 
evolutionary explanation of our moral beliefs. The existence of material objects 
8 At least, in his (2006); see below. 
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features in the explanation of why we have beliefs about material objects, but we can 
explain moral beliefs without needing to appeal to the existence of moral properties 
and facts. This general point goes back to Gilbert Harman, who in an influential 
argument against the existence of objective moral properties and facts (1977, ch.l) 
contrasted our explanations of (a) somebody's making a moral judgement based on 
observation and (b) a scientist making a scientific judgement based upon observation. 
Harman argued that in order to explain the scientist's judgement (e.g., that there is a 
proton in a cloud chamber), we will appeal to the truth of the judgement. In the moral 
case, he claimed, we do not need to appeal to the truth of the judgement, or allow 
that there are any moral properties and facts; we need only appeal to facts about how 
the moral sensibility of the person who makes the judgements came into being (facts 
about the agent's upbringing and history, etc). According to Harman, unless moral 
facts can be reduced to facts that figure in the psychological history of the person 
making the judgement, we have no reason to believe in their existence, because we 
can do all of our explaining without them. 
Joyce's argument is very similar to Harman's, and draws its inspiration from 
it, as he himself acknowledges. It differs in that it appeals (as Street appeals) to the 
evolutionary history, rather than the psychological history, of the person making the 
judgement. Whereas, on the assumption that when we form moral beliefs we at least 
in part attempt to track independent moral facts, the conclusion of Street's argument 
is that our moral beliefs are likely to be false, Joyce argues that our moral beliefs are 
unwarranted. The reason for this conclusion is that the Darwinian account of why we 
have a capacity for moral judgement shows that we would have evolved to employ 
moral concepts whether any non-naturalistic properties correspond to them or not 
and that therefore we must treat it as a very live possibility that we have evolved 
113 
such a capacity but there aren't any non-natural moral properties. (That is, we obtain 
a defeater for our moral beliefs - see chapter 2, section 1 for a brief explanation of 
defeaters.) We have evolved to attribute moral properties (to employ moral concepts) 
as a consequence of our biology, and this may well be mere "projection" with no 
properties out there to correspond to our beliefs. Joyce goes on to argue that the 
existence of this live possibility provides us with a reason to withhold belief in moral 
claims (at least, if naturalistic moral realism isn't an option); all of our moral beliefs 
are epistemically unwarranted. 
In arguing to the conclusion that all of our moral judgements are 
epistemically unwarranted - or moral scepticism 9 - Joyce appeals to non-moral 
analogies involving "Napoleon belief pills". The idea is that such a pill provides the 
person who swallows it with beliefs about Napoleon. Suppose that you are going 
about your life with the belief that Napoleon lost Waterloo, but then come to realise 
that you previously swallowed a Napoleon belief pill. All that you know about the 
pill is that it will have given you some belief or beliefs about Napoleon; you don't 
know which one(s). Furthermore, you have no independent reason to believe that a 
Napoleon belief pill is more likely to give you a true belief about Napoleon than a 
false one. All you know is that one or more of your beliefs about Napoleon will have 
been caused by the pill. 
In the light of your newfound awareness that you swallowed such a pill, your 
belief that Napoleon lost Waterloo becomes suspect. You haven't been given reason 
to think that it is false, but you have lost reason to believe it is true and you have 
been given reason to withhold assent to it. After all, one or more of your beliefs 
about Napoleon is the result of swallowing the pill, and who knows whether it will 
9 Joyce is happy for this to be called "error theory" (p.223), although he has elsewhere (2001) used 
that name for the position that all of our moral judgements are false, which is the more usual meaning. 
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have given you a true belief or a false one? Furthermore, you realise that as a result 
of swallowing the Napoleon belief pill, you would have at least one belief about 
Napoleon even if he didn't exist, even if the name "Napoleon" didn't have any real 
existing referent. In the light of this, if you can't remember learning your particular 
belief about Napoleon, or if you don't know that you held it before you swallowed 
the pill (perhaps from a coherent set of memories in which you told someone about 
Napoleon, evincing prior knowledge), your Napoleon belief is surely unwarranted. 
According to Joyce, the thing to do in such a case is to give up your belief about 
Napoleon as too dubious and go to the history books to gain beliefs about Napoleon 
that you can be warranted in accepting. 
On the assumption that for our moral judgements to be true they have to 
correspond to non-naturalistic moral facts, Joyce believes that our position with 
respect to our moral judgements is relevantly similar to the position of someone who 
has taken a Napoleon belief pill. Our moral beliefs aren't caused by moral facts, just 
like our belief about Napoleon that results from the pill isn't caused by facts about 
Napoleon. In both cases, we have reason to think that our beliefs of a certain sort 
result from a process that would provide us with beliefs of that sort even if their 
objects (moral properties, Napoleon) were (or are) non-existent. In the Napoleon 
belief pill example, when we realise that we would have had beliefs of the sort in 
question even if their object (Napoleon) did not exist, we have reason to give up our 
Napoleon belief as unwarranted and go to the history books to look for confirmation 
for it; likewise, when we realise that we would have had moral beliefs even if there 
were (or are) no non-naturalistic moral facts, we have reason to give up our moral 
beliefs. An important difference is that in the moral case there is no independent 
source that we can consult in order to confirm our moral beliefs. Even if we were to 
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ask other people, their moral beliefs are as much in doubt as ours, since their capacity 
for making moral judgements has the same origin as ours - it is as though we had 
swallowed a Napoleon belief pill and in addition knew that all the history book 
authors had, too, before writing their books. 10 
9. Joyce's argument modified and extended - the argument for atheistic 
Darwinian moral scepticism 
Given the assumptions of unguided Darwinism and that the best explanation 
of our tendency to engage in moral evaluation and employ moral concepts is that it is 
biologically determined (or innate), rather than resulting from our learning from our 
environment and being taught, etc, I think that Joyce's argument is convincing. 
However, this crucial latter assumption it depends on has recently been challenged; it 
has been argued that all of the evidence Joyce cites in favour of that claim can be 
explained in other ways (Prinz 2008, pp.221-224). In response, Joyce seems to have 
relinquished the claim that a biological explanation of our tendency to engage in 
moral evaluation is the best explanation, although he argues that there is nothing to 
support the denial of the hypothesis (Joyce 2008, pp.245-254). But without the claim 
that the best explanation of our engaging in moral judgement is that our doing so is 
determined by our biology (or is innate), the Napoleon belief pill example seems 
inapt, since in that example you have good reason to think that you will have a belief 
about Napoleon that has been produced by a pill. 
10 For a similar argument to Joyce's, see Ruse (1986, pp.2S0-2S6) . Ruse asserts that a Darwinian 
explanation for why we have moral beliefs makes "an objective foundation for morality" (or, 
independent non-natural moral properties and facts) redundant and that the idea that morality is 
objective is "illusory". However, it might well be thought a bit quick to move from objective moral 
facts not being necessary for explaining why we have moral beliefs to the idea that there aren't any; 
Joyce's approach - arguing for moral scepticism - seems to be a strategy more likely to convince. 
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Nevertheless, it seems to me that the argument can be modified so that it 
remains convincing and makes atheists' embrace of both non-naturalistic moral 
realism and naturalistic moral realism untenable. In what follows, I will explain how, 
developing the argument for atheistic Darwinian moral scepticism. 
The important thing to note is that although Joyce's argument is admittedly 
weakened by the loss of the claim that the best explanation of our capacity to 
evaluate morally is biological, it can nevertheless be strengthened (at least if directed 
at atheists) by drawing upon the "queerness" of moral facts. While there is nothing 
that seems strange, on the face of it, about the putative fact that Napoleon lost 
Waterloo or about typical putative facts about Napoleon, the same is not true when it 
comes to putative moral facts. Many philosophers have found moral properties and 
facts to be suspicious entities because the attribution of moral properties brings with 
it a strange kind of authoritative bidding. I think this is the most important element of 
the queerness of moral properties and facts; the classic statement is provided by 
Mackie (1977, ch.l), but it is perhaps put best by Richard Garner: 
"Moral facts are not just unusual in the way that facts about quarks and black 
holes are unusual, they are unusual in an unusual way - they demand. If a 
moral fact obtains, then we have a duty or a right to do something, which is to 
say that there is a legitimate and justifiable directive that applies to us, a 
directive that we can ignore or disobey, but one from which we cannot 
escape" (1990, p.143). 
The world may contain many strange entities and surprises, Garner says, but 
the strangeness of putative moral properties and facts goes beyond typical 
strangeness. He goes on to note that it "is hard to believe in objective prescriptivity 
because it is hard to make sense of a demand without a demander" (p.143), a 
particularly important point when what is at issue is whether atheists can believe that 
such prescriptivity is a real feature of the world (this is sometimes given as a reason 
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for thinking that moral obligations are best explained as directives from God). While 
"[e]ven the most vile of poisons does not say, 'Don't drink me'" (p.137), if there 
really are moral properties and facts then it is almost as if actions - to take one 
example of an object of moral evaluation - come along with a tag that says, "Don't 
do this". This strange nature of putative moral properties and facts is one of the 
reasons metaethics exists as a branch of philosophy devoted to trying to make sense 
of them in the first place. 
Some philosophers have considered this reason enough to reject the existence 
of moral properties and facts: they are too strange and alien in an atheistic universe -
as Gamer says, they seem like demands, but atheists don't believe in a demander 
who could have issued them. II However, it is clear that there are many atheistic 
moral realists who are not convinced that moral facts are unacceptably strange, and I 
find it difficult to see how Gamer (say) could convince atheists who have that 
reaction that they are wrong. If they do not find moral properties and facts too 
strange to be possible entities in an atheistic universe (and thus do not see that they 
should believe that there are no moral properties and facts), what more can be said to 
show them that they should deny the existence of such entities? However, it does 
seem to me that the queerness of putative moral facts at least makes them very 
suspicious on the assumption of atheism. And I think that this is a claim that atheists 
II Joyce (200 I) has argued that there are no moral properties or facts on the basis that (I) moral facts 
would give us reasons regardless of what desires we have (categorical, or external reasons), and (2) 
we cannot make sense of such reasons. (I think his arguments have been effectively criticised (see 
Shafer-Landau 2005).) Joyce has also drawn on the first point to argue against metaethical accounts 
that try to reduce moral facts to non-moral facts (2006, pp.190-209). The queerness of moral facts that 
I am drawing attention to is that, whether or not we think they provide us with categorical or external 
reasons, we take moral facts to issue a kind of prescriptivity and to apply to us or be directed at us 
(like demands) regardless of our desires. Furthermore, I am not arguing that the queerness of morality 
provides a reason for atheists to deny the existence of moral properties and facts. 
Sinnott-Armstrong also discusses Darwinian considerations and the queerness of moral facts 
(though, strangely, he doesn't discuss quite the kind of queerness that Garner points to) and claims 
that these at most yield grounds for moral scepticism without arguing that they in fact do (2006b, 
ppAO-53). 
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who believe that moral properties and facts are not unacceptably queer can more 
plausibly be brought to agree with. 
Suppose that Joyce's Napoleon belief pill example is modified to take the 
considerations I have mentioned in this section into account. Since it is not clear that 
the best explanation of our applying moral concepts is a biological one (as Joyce 
originally argued), the example will not involve having good evidence that you did 
take a pill that would give you such a belief whether it is true or false. However, it 
will leave that a live possibility; you will not judge it at all unlikely that your belief 
had that cause (so as to reflect the atheist's acceptance of unguided Darwinism, the 
motivational role of our moral beliefs, and how the other evidence regarding the 
cause of our moral beliefs appears to stand - compare Prinz (2008) and Joyce 
(2008)). In addition, your belief about Napoleon will be one that is strange and 
puzzling in the same way that putative moral facts are queer. Although you are 
inclined to believe a certain thing about Napoleon, that belief nevertheless puzzles 
you; it looks odd and suspicious given your other beliefs about the world. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to think of a putative fact about Napoleon that would 
really be strange in the way that moral facts are (and yet not so strange that you 
would immediately believe that it was false). I think that a putative fact involving 
strange behaviour might be the best that we can do: 
Suppose that you are merrily going about your life holding a few beliefs 
about Napoleon. One of the beliefs you have is the belief that Napoleon once killed a 
camel with his bare hands because of the way it looked at him. When you consider 
the putative fact of Napoleon's having done so, it strikes you as bizarre behaviour 
and a putative fact that you would be doubtful of if you hadn't learned of it through 
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reliable channels, as you assume you have done (you don't remember). Perhaps it is 
one of those facts reflection on which sometimes leads you to the thought that the 
truth can be stranger than fiction. One day, you gain some information about an 
event that transpired several years earlier. You remember that, at the time in question, 
you accidentally swallowed a pill. At the time, it didn't have any obvious effects. 
What you now learn about that event is that it is a live possibility - you do not judge 
it at all unlikely - that the pill you swallowed was a Napoleon belief pill. You know 
that if you swallowed a Napoleon belief pill, then it would provide you with a belief 
about Napoleon that could be true or false. Your thoughts tum to your belief - which 
you have considered strange on more than one occasion when reflecting on it - that 
Napoleon once killed a camel with his bare hands because of the way that it looked 
at him ... 
It seems to me that in the example above, (a) the strangeness of the Napoleon 
belief you have, combined with (b) the fact that you consider it a live possibility (not 
simply a mere possibility) that your belief has a certain origin that you have no 
reason to think is more likely to give you a true Napoleon belief than a false one (and 
which therefore nicely explains why you might hold afalse Napoleon belief) means 
that (c) you should consider it a very live possibility that your belief in this strange 
putative fact about Napoleon is a false belief that has resulted from taking a 
Napoleon beliefpil/ and you should be a sceptic with regard to that belief. 
I believe that atheistic Darwinists are in a similar predicament. They face (a) 
the queerness of putative moral properties and facts. They should (b) consider it a 
live possibility (much more than a mere possibility) that their moral beliefs have 
resulted from a biologically-based tendency to form such beliefs that has been 
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shaped by unguided Darwinism, given their belief in unguided Darwinism and the 
motivational role of moral beliefs (which makes it very plausible that we have them 
because of their connection to adaptive behaviour). If unguided Darwinism gives 
organisms a biologically-based tendency to form moral beliefs, we have no reason to 
think it is more likely that those beliefs will be true than that they will be false (recall 
Churchland's comments about truth "taking the hindmost") - only that having them 
will be adaptive - and therefore such an explanation can nicely explain why we 
might hold moral beliefs that are all false. Given all of this, (c) atheists should 
consider it a very live possibility that our moral beliefs are false beliefs that have 
resulted from a biology shaped to produce moral beliefs for reasons of adaptive 
behaviour rather than truth. 
Although this may not be enough to provide reason for atheists to believe that 
there are no moral properties or facts, I think that it robs atheists' moral beliefs of 
warrant and provides reason for them to accept moral scepticism. 12 Given unguided 
Darwinism and atheism, the motivational role that moral beliefs play, and the queer 
nature of putative moral properties, the idea that we have evolved to believe in moral 
properties in a world that is actually devoid of them - or we can say, to project moral 
properties onto a world devoid of them - is just too live a possibility for atheists to be 
warranted in believing that there are moral properties and facts. (I will call that live 
possibility the "streamlined evolutionary story" - it is streamlined because it rejects 
the existence of moral properties and facts.) 
12 It might be wondered whether this is in tension with my criticisms of Sinnott-Armstrong in chapter 
2, where I argued that he treats moral beliefs as being too easily rendered unwarranted. I don't think 
so. Although Sinnott-Armstrong appealed to the mere possibility and plausibility in others' eyes of 
dubious origins for moral belief, the atheist faces more than that: there is the acceptance of unguided 
Darwinism, the way in which the motivational role of moral belief fits in with a biological account, 
and (very importantly) the queerness of putative moral properties and facts; note that this important 
latter point did not figure at all in Sinnott-Armstrong's challenges. 
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As I see it, the above gives atheists reason to embrace moral scepticism 
regardless of whether they are initially inclined to non-naturalism or to naturalistic 
moral realism - whether they are inclined to view moral properties and facts as being 
causally productive entities or not. Even if one is inclined to think that we have 
evolved to accurately track causally productive moral properties and that the correct 
explanation of why we form moral beliefs would make reference to the existence of 
moral properties and facts, absent an argument that this scenario is significantly more 
plausible than the streamlined evolutionary story, it seems to me that atheists have 
reason to be moral sceptics - the streamlined evolutionary story is too live a 
possibility. I don't think that any additional argument that naturalistic moral realism 
is false is needed; it is enough that there isn't good reason to think that naturalistic 
moral realism is significantly more likely to be true than the streamlined 
evolutionary story. 
However, it may be replied that my modified Napoleon belief pill example is 
not analogous to the situation the atheist is in with her moral beliefs, and that there is 
reason to think that naturalistic moral realism is more plausible. For, whereas in the 
Napoleon belief pill example you initially hold your belief simply because it seems 
to you to be true, naturalistic moral realists often hold that moral beliefs and a belief 
in naturalistic moral realism can be warranted in a further way, making reference to 
the phenomenon of moral explanations. The most prominent philosopher who 
appeals to moral explanations in order to argue for naturalistic moral realism is 
probably Nicholas Sturgeon. In a number of places, he has over the years appealed to 
the fact that we can - and do - explain why people act in various ways by referring 
to moral character traits (e.g., that they were evil) and that we can - and do - explain 
examples like the unrest within a society by appealing to its injustice (see, e.g., 
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Sturgeon 1985). He has tried to counter the work of Gilbert Hannan and his 
argument (briefly mentioned in the previous section) that we do not need to appeal to 
moral facts in order to provide satisfying explanations. 13 
Those who argue that we do not need to appeal to moral properties or facts in 
order to provide adequate explanations typically point out that moral properties are 
taken to supervene upon bases of non-moral properties and aver that the causal, 
explanatory work is really done by the non-moral supervenience bases and not the 
putative moral properties. (For example, an instance of alleged injustice will involve 
people in a particular situation, and it can be argued that it is only the non-moral 
facts about the people and the situation that are actually causally productive.) It 
should be noted that it is doubtful whether an ability to explain without referring to 
moral properties provides good reason to reject the claim that moral properties exist 
and are causally efficacious, for - as many naturalistic moral realists have noted -
parity of reasoning would support the problematic conclusion that, if everything 
ultimately supervenes upon the basic properties of physics, only the basic properties 
of physics exist and are causally efficacious. 14 However, if adequate explanation 
could be provided by only appealing to the supervenience base of putative moral 
properties, this would seem to remove the possible warrant for favouring the view 
that there are moral properties and facts over the streamlined evolutionary story, 
according to which there aren't any. And the mere fact that we engage in offering 
moral explanations would not be surprising if we mistakenly project moral properties 
and facts onto a world devoid of them. 
13 The debate between Sturgeon and Harman had several episodes. Brad Majors (2007) provides a 
r,0od account of the debate; see also Miller (2003, pp.140-149). 
4 Majors says: "It would surely be quite absurd to regard only basic physics as causally efficacious, 
on the grounds that only basic physical properties do not supervene upon other properties. And this 
would appear to be the ultimate result of thinking employed here by the opponent of moral 
explanations" (2007, p.9). Many others have made the same point. 
123 
Although the treatment must be brief, I believe that the arguments of those 
who claim that there is an explanatory need for us to believe in moral properties and 
facts fail. I will illustrate by way of a recent example. Brad Majors has recently 
argued that adequate explanation cannot be provided by appealing to the non-moral 
supervenience bases of (putative) moral properties alone. He provides the example of 
explaining a society's revolt by appealing to the injustice manifested in the society 
beforehand, and draws attention to the counterfactual claim if the society had not 
been unjust. there would have been no revolt. Not only is this counterfactual one we 
are initially warranted in believing is true (let us suppose), Majors argues that it 
cannot simply be replaced with a counterfactual that makes no reference to a moral 
property (the moral property in this case being injustice). He writes: 
"Suppose that the injustice of the society supervened upon naturalistic [non-
moral] properties N J, N2, ... ,Nn• It is not true that had these naturalistic 
properties not been instantiated, the revolt would not have occurred. This is 
because the property of being unjust is multiply realizable" (2007, p.l 0). 
If Majors is right, we have a counterfactual claim we are initially warranted 
in accepting, and which suggests that a moral property (injustice) is responsible for a 
causal outcome - a revolt. The injustice explains why the revolt occurred. 
Furthermore, we cannot explain the occurrence of the revolt without reference to the 
injustice (by appealing to the non-moral properties the injustice is taken to supervene 
upon), because we will not have a true counterfactual if we replace its mention of 
injustice with mention of the non-moral properties in the supervenience base. This is 
because we can alter the non-moral properties a little (e.g., suppose a poor member 
of the society had 1 p more than they actually do) and the revolt would still occur. If 
we alter the moral properties (so that there would not be injustice), then the revolt 
would not occur. If belief in the property of injustice is eschewed or withheld, we 
124 
will not be able to explain as well as we can, because we will lose this counterfactual 
and have nothing suitable to replace it with. Therefore, we should believe that there 
is a causally and explanatorily relevant property of injustice. The same will apply for 
lots of other moral properties in other explanations. 
As I see it, the problem with Majors' argument is that, although he thinks he 
has discovered a counterfactual that cannot be adequately replaced with a 
counterfactual that does not make reference to a moral property, a counterfactual that 
makes reference to psychological properties may be sufficient. I think that instead of 
appealing to the property of being unjust, we could appeal to the property of being 
considered unjust by the members of the society, or causing the members of the 
society discontent, or some such non-moral property as that (depending on exactly 
how the scenario is envisaged). It seems to me that such a counterfactual would be as 
explanatory as the one Majors provides. For example, if we change the 
circumstances of society so that a poor member has 1 p more, the physical 
supervenience base changes but the fact that the society is perceived to be unjust by 
its members or the fact that the members of the society experience discontent will not. 
And we would expect psychological facts such as these to co-vary with the (putative) 
facts about injustice; after all, it is hard to envisage an injustice that is not believed to 
be an injustice or that does not lead to any discontent causing a revolt. But if these 
putative facts co-vary, then it appears that whenever an explanation that makes 
reference to moral facts is offered, it could be replaced with an explanation that 
instead makes reference merely to psychological facts. Majors is right in thinking 
that the counterfactual if the society had not been unjust, there would have been no 
revolt is true while it is not true that if the non-moral supervenience base N I , 
N1, ... ,Nn had not occurred, there would have been no revolt, and therefore appeal to 
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N(, N2, ... ,Nn does not provide as good an explanation as does appeal to moral 
properties and facts. However, alter Nt. N2, ... ,Nn in such a way that (we think) the 
injustice remains and, I suggest, the psychological facts about believed injustice 
and/or dissatisfaction will also remain. But in that case, we can do the explaining by 
way of non-moral properties, and so there is no reason to favour naturalistic moral 
realism over the streamlined evolutionary story. What is really true may simply be 
that if it hadn't been believed that the society was unjust, there would have been no 
revolt or if there hadn't been widespread discontent, there would have been no 
I 15 revo t. 
In summary, then, on the assumption that our moral beliefs try to track 
independent moral truths, atheists have reason to embrace moral scepticism. Given 
the acceptance of unguided Darwinism, according to which we have come into 
existence via a process that is primarily "interested in" adaptive behaviour rather 
than truth, given the motivational role that moral beliefs play (making it plausible 
that they result from our biology and that we have them primarily because of their 
survival value), and given the suspicious nature of moral properties and facts in an 
atheistic universe, atheists should view it as a very live possibility that the 
streamlined evolutionary story is true and that we have evolved to project moral 
properties and facts onto a world devoid of them. No doubt some will think that all of 
this - or even just some of it - provides reason for atheists to endorse the streamlined 
evolutionary story. However, as I have mentioned when discussing Gamer's 
15 lowe this line of thinking to Carson (2000, ch.7), who provides other non-moral explanations -
many of which make reference to people's beliefs and psychology - in response to the claims of 
naturalistic moral realists that moral explanations are indispensable or more powerful than non-moral 
ones. For example, Sturgeon has appealed to the explanation that large-scale moral opposition to 
slavery arose when and where it did because slavery was worse in such times and places; Carson 
provides an explanation that appeals to humans' moral beliefs about slavery and to human sympathy 
(pp.194-195). 
126 
comments on the queerness of morality, it is difficult to see how one could convince 
atheists who are not persuaded that moral properties and facts should be rejected as 
too queer. My claim is that the very real possibility of this story given atheism 
provides reason for atheists to embrace moral scepticism. Furthermore, since atheists 
are committed to the idea that we have come about by way of a process that 
fundamentally "cares about" reproductive success (and truth only insofar as it is 
connected to that goal), with no other plausible atheistic explanation on the horizon, 
it seems to me that the idea that we have evolved to have moral beliefs that are 
evolutionarily beneficial but false will remain a very live possibility for atheists and 
it can be expected that they will not lose these grounds for moral scepticism. 16 
10. Theism and Darwinian metaethical arguments 
A few comments about theism and the arguments surveyed in this chapter are 
in order. I have explained in chapter 1 why I don't think it is epistemically 
mandatory for theists to embrace Darwinism. If I am right about that, then theists do 
not have to see our capacity for moral judgement as something that has a very good 
chance of having come into existence primarily because of its motivating effects and 
adaptive value rather than a capacity God has created us with because it is a means of 
acquiring true beliefs. (Theists can happily hold to the idea that true moral beliefs are 
also adaptive; it might be surprising if God created us such that we were unlikely to 
16 Sinnott-Armstrong (2006b) believes that the idea that there are no moral facts - which he calls 
"moral nihilism" - isn't taken seriously in everyday contexts and that moral beliefs are justified (or 
warranted) out of a "modest contrast class" that contains the scenarios we take seriously in everyday 
contexts even if they are not justified out of a contrast class that contains moral nihilism. (He is 
sceptical about which contrast class is "relevant" for real justification.) However, it seems to me that 
even if we don't treat moral nihilism as a serious possibility without motivation (just like we don't 
treat brain-in-vats hypotheses as serious possibilities without motivation), the live and very real 
possibility (to the atheist) that there are no moral facts is one that could and would be taken seriously 
in everyday contexts if it became Widely acknowledged as a live possibility, and I see no reason to 
think it isn't able to rob atheists' moral beliefs of warrant in everyday contex ts. 
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survive by acting in accordance with correct moral judgements.) Likewise, theists 
who accept Darwinism can suppose that God guided our evolution so that we came 
to have moral truths that match a pre-existing moral reality, at least much of the time 
(e.g., when suitable reflection and lack of distortion takes place). Or if God is able to 
render many of the moral facts what they are by His will or commands,17 He could 
even render them what they are after, or because, we have evolved the tendencies we 
have, in the light of those tendencies. If any such proposal (or a combination of them) 
is available, then theists can embrace the second hom of Street's dilemma: they can 
hold that there is a connection between our evolving to make the moral judgements 
we do and the truth of those judgements - God provides the connection. And while 
Joyce has claimed that proponents of theistic metaethics (he mentions divine 
command theorists) face the same problem as non-naturalists, in that moral facts are 
not needed to explain our moral beliefs and so can be economically shaved from 
theists' ontologies, providing theists with no reason to believe in them (2006, p.21 0), 
this assumes (I) that theists must embrace Darwinism (which I have suggested is 
false), and (2) that theists cannot gain warrant for their moral beliefs from their 
theistic beliefs. But this second assumption is doubtful: many theists believe that 
there is good reason for them to accept theism (see, e.g., Plantinga 2000; Copan and 
Moser 2003; Swinburne 2004; Abraham 2006; Craig 2008), and it is not clear that 
theism will sit comfortably with the idea that God may well have created us so that 
we suffer from a massive illusion when it comes to beliefs that strike us as so 
important and significant to our understanding of human life as our moral beliefs do. 
So if there are good reasons for theists to be theists, it seems that theists will have 
17 See the introduction for some brief comments on the "Euthyphro dilemma". For a recent defence of 
a natural law approach - another option for theists - that takes into account evolutionary biology and 
psychology, see Boyd (2007). See also Haarsma (2004) on the compatibility of Darwinism and 
theistic approaches to ethics. 
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good reason not to embrace moral scepticism, even though the rejection of moral 
truths corresponding to our moral beliefs would reduce their ontology. Furthermore, 
to my knowledge nobody argues that moral properties or facts are objectionably or 
suspiciously queer and bizarre in a theistic universe. Whether theists do have good 
reason to be theists is not something that can be covered in this essay. But at any rate, 
theists who take themselves to have good reason to be theists will not - or at least, I 
think, should not - take Joyce's Darwinian argument, or the modifications to it that I 
have provided in developing the argument for atheistic Darwinian moral scepticism, 
to provide them with good reason to embrace moral scepticism. 
11. Conclusion 
I have argued that, on the assumption that moral beliefs are in the business of 
trying to track independent moral facts, atheists have reason to embrace moral 
scepticism. 18 I have also argued that theists do not have such reason. However, 
atheists might be able to avoid the argument of this chapter if they can reasonably 
hold that moral beliefs aren't in the business of trying to track independent moral 
facts. It is to that possibility that I tum in the next chapter. 
18 Scott James (2009) has very recently defended an account that seeks to combine Darwinism (l 
think implicitly unguided Darwinism) with "moral realism". However, his "moral realism" identifies 
moral facts with facts about what behaviour idealised others would approve or disapprove of, and so 
rejects stance-independence and therefore I believe it is untenable (see my comments at the end of 
chapter 1). I note that Joyce (2008) has actually criticised an earlier statement of James' view, put 
forward with Peter Carruthers (Carruthers and James 2008), but Joyce's criticism is not included in 
the bibliography of James' most recent paper. (1 presume that this is because James' 2009 paper was 
accepted for publication before Joyce voiced his criticisms.) Joyce's objections apply to the most 
recent statement of the view as well. 
Some brief additional comments: James argues for his account of moral facts by stressing 
that the approvals and disapprovals of others - at first real others but later hypothetical others· would 
be something we would expect our ancestors to have a great deal of interest in. Maybe so; however, it 
does not follow that moral beliefs would be beliefs about the approvals and disapprovals of others, 
rather than beliefs that are perhaps influenced by such approvals and disapprovals. Furthennore, James 
appears concerned to argue that moral facts canfit in with a Darwinian story, in opposition to those 
who claim that Darwinism rules out the existence of moral facts. However, even if he succeeds in 
doing that, I don't think that he would be able to sidestep the argument for atheistic Darwinian moral 
scepticism - even if there could be moral facts in an atheistic Darwinian universe, it doesn't follow 
that belief in them is warranted. 
Chapter 4: Avoiding atheistic Darwinian moral scepticism? 
Expressivism/quasi-realism 
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In chapter 3, I argued that atheists have reason to embrace moral scepticism 
and accept that all of their moral beliefs are unwarranted. However, the argument 
crucially depended upon adopting a certain view of one of the main functions of 
moral thought and discourse; it relied upon the idea that moral judgement is in the 
business of trying to accurately track independent moral properties and facts and that 
talk of the truth andfalsity of moral beliefs signals the perceived success or failure to 
meet that goal. So if it could be reasonably maintained by atheists that moral beliefs 
do not have the function of attempting to track independent objective moral 
properties and facts, the argument of the previous chapter could be sidestepped. In 
this chapter, I will examine the account of moral thought and discourse that meets 
this desideratum known as expressivism or quasi-realism. I While expressivism 
would provide a way for atheists to avoid the argument for atheistic Darwinian moral 
scepticism, I will argue that there is good reason to believe that expressivism is false. 
The chapter will proceed as follows. Firstly, I will explain what expressivism 
is, focusing on Simon Blackburn's particular account for a tidy exposition. I will then 
explain how expressivism would provide a way for atheists to avoid the argument for 
atheistic Darwinian moral scepticism. After some brief comments on the case for 
expressivism, I will present and defend two recent arguments against expressivism -
I "Quasi-realism" is Simon Blackburn's term for his version of the metaethical view that typically 
goes by the name "expressivism", although he has also used the former expression to refer to his anti-
realist approaches to modality and causation, among other things (1993). Since contemporary 
expressivists appear united with Blackburn in their desire to "save the ethical appearances" as Michael 
Ridge puts it (2006b), I will use the term "expressivism" with the understanding that it implicitly 
includes that (quasi-realist) ambition. 
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by Terence Cuneo (2006) and Andy Egan (2007) - that I believe are formidable and 
that I think will be successful against all versions of expressivism. 
1. Expressivism explained 
Unfortunately, the question of how exactly to characterise expressivism can 
be a contentious one, due to the expressivist project (sometimes dubbed "quasi-
realism") of trying to maintain the realist appearances of morality while trying to 
account for such appearances on an anti-realist foundation. The difficulty is that 
when it comes to explaining their position, expressivists deny some claims if those 
claims are understood in a realist sense, but are perfectly happy with those claims if 
they are understood in an anti-realist sense, and there is lack of agreement on 
whether the realist or the anti-realist sense is the natural one? I suggest that in the 
light of this, the best way to understand contemporary expressivism is via beginning 
with its precursors. 
The first thing to be clear about is that expressivism is a metaethical account 
that seeks to describe moral practice, providing an accurate account of the nature of 
actual moral psychology and actual moral language and moral semantics. Earlier 
ancestors of contemporary expressivism, such as the emotivism of A.J. Ayer (1946), 
claimed that moral predicates in moral sentences do not stand for moral properties 
and that moral thoughts, claims and sentences are not truth-apt - that is, not the sort 
of entities that can be true or false. Unlike the thought or utterance "Swans are 
white", which attributes the property of being white to swans and is true or false 
depending upon whether swans are in fact white, according to Ayer moral thoughts 
and utterances such as "Murder is wrong" do not attribute a property (being wrong) 
2 See Dreier (2004) for how difficult explaining expressivism has become because of this. 
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to the object of evaluation (murder) and are not rendered true or false depending 
upon whether the object of evaluation has such a property. Ayer held that, rather than 
attributing properties, moral predicates have the function of being vehicles for 
expressing our emotions. When someone claims, "Murder is wrong," they express 
their negative emotions towards murder; they do not express a belief about murder. 
Their utterance is to be understood as something akin to "Boo to murder!" and the 
claim "Giving to charity is good" as akin to "Hooray to giving to charity!" Instances 
of booing and cheering are not the sorts of items that can be true or false. 
Furthermore, booing and cheering do not express the psychological state of belief, 
which represents the world as being a certain way, but rather express different, non-
cognitive psychological attitudes towards the objects booed or hoorayed. Ayer and 
his metaethical descendants have disagreed over whether it is emotions that are 
expressed by moral claims, but they are all agreed that moral claims express being 
for or being against various things - having a psychological state which is really in 
the family of desires rather than the family of beliefs (that is, in the family of 
psychological states which seek to affect the world rather than report on it). For this 
reason, the ancestors of contemporary expressivism were dubbed versions of "non-
cognitivism", a label that is still sometimes used to refer to expressivism. 
Expressivists often refer to the attitudes we have when we make moral judgements as 
"approval" and "disapproval". 
Modem expressivists - the most prominent probably being Simon Blackburn 
(1993; 1998) and Allan Gibbard (1990; 2003) - put forward a picture that is 
substantially the same as Ayer's but modify the details in a desire to find space for 
(and vindicate) the realist appearances of morality. As I have explained, according 
to Ayer's view moral sentences are not truth-apt and the psychological attitude of 
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accepting a moral claim is not belief. One problem with such a view is that everyday 
thought about morality appears to hold that the attitude of accepting a moral claim is 
belief (we talk of our moral "beliefs"), and also that moral opinions can be true or 
false (we call moral opinions "true" and "false"). Ayer's emotivism commits us to 
the view that people are systematically mistaken about their psychological attitude 
towards moral claims and about the nature of moral sentences. It also has the 
consequence that when people worry about whether their moral opinions are true, or 
wonder which moral claims are true, they are deeply confused - moral opinions 
aren't the sort of things that can be true. But the idea that we are so mistaken and 
confused in this way strikes many philosophers as implausible, more implausible 
than the denial of emotivism. Furthermore, signing up to emotivism might bring with 
it a pressure to jettison our thought and talk of moral belief, and of moral truth and 
falsity, since emotivism construes such thought and talk as mistaken. Jettisoning such 
thought and talk strikes many as unattractive. So for these reasons - the 
implausibility that we are in such error, and the looming pressure towards jettisoning 
a practice that plays such a central role in our lives - a view that is essentially 
emotivist but which avoids these apparent consequences of Ayer's emotivism (as 
expressivism is intended to do) is attractive to many philosophers. 
So, expressivists have sought to provide room for thought and talk of moral 
"belief' and moral "truth" on a foundation that is essentially the same as that of 
Ayer's emotivism. Indeed, they have not stopped there but have tried to find space 
for deeply entrenched intuitions and thoughts about morality which many moral 
realists have appealed to in order to defend the idea that moral judgement has the 
function of tracking independent moral facts. Blackburn's "quasi-realist" strategy 
proceeds by drawing attention to the distinction between moral claims - that we make 
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when we are "moralising", engaged in moral thought and talk - and theoretical 
claims about morality, and construing moral talk and intuitions that might seem to 
favour a realist account of morality as falling into the former category rather than the 
latter. For example, although one might think that thought and talk of moral claims 
being "true" or "in accordance with the facts" is theoretical talk about morality - a 
metaphysical idea that some moral opinions accord with or correspond to how things 
are independently of our opinions - Blackburn adopts a deflationary or minimalist 
account of talk of moral "truth" and moral "facts" according to which everyday talk 
of moral "truth" is not theoretical but rather is simply used to express one's moral 
commitments (approval and disapproval). In making the claim that some moral 
opinion is "true" or that it is in "in accordance with the facts", one is simply 
expressing the moral opinion in a more flamboyant way; talk of "moral facts" and 
"moral truth" deflates into moral claims (not theoretical claims about morality) 
which are, according to Blackburn, expressions of our non-cognitive attitudes of 
approval and disapproval. In addition, talk of moral "belief' is not in error, since 
although the attitude we have when we accept moral claims differs importantly from 
the attitude that we normally call "belief' (the former is actually more akin to what 
we call "desire"), thought and talk of moral "belief' isn't theoretical thought and talk 
but again occurs within moral practice rather than from the outside looking in. If we 
have the attitudes and call them "beliefs", then that is simply what we call them; and 
there is no error in our so calling them. 3 
3 Other expressivists maintain that the psychological attitude of accepting moral claims is belief and 
should be labelled such from a theoretical stance towards morality, too - Terence Horgan and Mark 
Timmons hold that it is non-descriptive belief, a hitherto unrecognised category of genuine belief 
(Timmons 1999; Horgan and Timmons 2006). They have called their position "assertoric non-
descriptivism", "nondescriptivist cognitivism", and (most recently) "cognitivist expressivism". 
However, I don't think anything is gained by such a move; as Dreier points out (2004), everyday 
moral thought contains the idea that one can describe an object of moral evaluation as satisfying a 
moral deSCription, e.g., that one can describe an action as wrong. So even if their view allows 
everyday talk of moral belief to be about real belief (non-descriptive belief) their view will 
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Perhaps the best way to make the contrast between moral claims and 
theoretical talk about morality is to imagine extra-terrestrial aliens who lack any 
sense of morality and who are interested in examining and describing the activities of 
human beings. Blackburn's theoretical picture4 has us human beings evolving by 
Darwinian means in a world that is - the aliens would report - devoid of the 
objective moral properties and facts that moral realists claim exist. The aliens 
discover that humans develop various non-cognitive attitudes towards various objects 
(including actions, character traits, and states of affairs). The aliens perhaps find that 
humans' attractions and aversions toward such things were significantly shaped by 
the evolutionary process, it being adaptive to seek and promote some things and to 
shun and avoid others. They report that the humans' attitudes are desires (even 
though humans don't call them desires), states of being Jor or being against certain 
objects - or, approval and disapproval - rather than beliefs which represent the world 
as being some way. However, the aliens also report that humans call such attitudes 
"beliefs" and that they express these attitudes by way of uttering sentences that have 
the surface appearance of predicating properties of their objects. The aliens observe 
that humans talk and think of moral "truth", and "facts", but that when they do so 
they are just giving voice to those same attitudes; such talk does not signify anything 
metaphysically significant. The aliens would not convict humans of making an error 
nevertheless convict everyday talk of error when it comes to the idea that moral claims can describe -
unless they adopt a deflationary or minimalist approach towards "describing", in which case why not 
just introduce the deflationary or minimalist strategy for "belief'. as Blackburn does? 
Expressivists' agreement that we at least call our moral judgements "beliefs" renders ill-
conceived a recent argument against expressivism by Joyce, who says that since it is "Moore 
paradoxical" to say, "Murder is wrong, but I don't believe it" (2006, pp.55-57), "Murder is wrong" 
should be understood as expressing a belief. (Although Joyce directs this criticism at "pure non-
cognitivism", his remarks in context clearly show that he means it to refute expressivism, as do his 
later taxonomy of "global naturalist" metaethical options (p.209) and his sense of which metaethical 
views have been adequately criticised by the end of his book.) Expressivists can easily explain why 
the sentence is paradoxical - since we at least call moral judgements "beliefs", in uttering the sentence 
one is stating a moral opinion but then disavowing that opinion. 
4 See Blackburn's "How to Be an Ethical Anti-realist" (in Blackburn 1993, pp.166-181). 
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in engaging in moral thought and discourse, since although the world humans 
evolved in does not contain independent moral properties or facts, humans' moral 
judgements do not represent the world as containing such. They would also see that 
humans make moral claims which "contradict" each other (by expressing attitudes, 
such as desires, that can be in tension with each other) and that humans accuse each 
other of "error". Each such accusation is made from the standpoint of another human 
with their own commitments; from their morally detached perspective, the aliens 
have no verdict on the issue except to say that no error results from a mismatch 
between judgement and the world, since describing the world isn't something that 
those judgements that humans call "moral" are Jor. The aliens can see that all that is 
going on involves attitudes being endorsed and brought to bear against each other in 
(as the humans see it) relations of clashing and supporting. Whereas humans' talk 
about "truth" in science signals the correspondence between their (genuine, 
descriptive, representational) beliefs and the world, humans' moral claims and talk of 
moral "truth" and "facts" do not aspire to make reference to anything outside of the 
web of human approvals and disapprovals. 
The aliens adopt a purely theoretical approach to human morality. However, 
we humans are ourselves participants in moral thought and discourse. So, when we 
are engaged in such, we talk of "moral truth", "moral fact", and the like. We say and 
think that there are moral "facts", and there is no mistake along the lines of a 
mismatch between the world and our judgements when we accept and assert such 
claims. There is room for the thought that we or others have made an "error" and 
have "false" views - for example, if another's judgement conflicts with one that we 
accept then we will think their view "false" - and we may (from our morally engaged 
perspective) quite properly claim that they are wrong and that their view isn't "in 
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accordance with the facts". Moral realists (and other non-expressivists) are wrong to 
think that such talk is theoretical or that it signifies real belief that seeks to describe 
the world and track independent moral facts. 
This is, in broad strokes, how Blackburn and expressivists like him seek to 
satisfy the desiderata of having a view that would be called "anti-realist" by 
traditional labels but which also finds room for thought and talk about moral 
"belief', moral "truth", moral "facts" and the like that involves no error. As I have 
mentioned, expressivists have also tried to account for further moral commitments 
and intuitions that might appear to favour the idea that moral judgement is really in 
the business of trying to track independent moral truths. For example, it might seem 
that expressivism will make trouble for the mind-independence (or stance-
independence) of morality (discussed briefly at the end of chapter 1). If there are just 
us and our attitudes, which don't attempt to track independent moral facts, doesn't 
that make moral "facts" and moral "truth" dependent upon what attitudes we have? 
And doesn't that get deeply held beliefs about morality back-to-front? It seems to 
imply that if I held different moral views, even moral views that I and most people 
actually view as egregiously mistaken, then those moral views would be correct. 
However, Blackburn believes that his expressivism can accommodate the mind-
independence (or stance-independence) of morality. In demonstrating this, and 
holding that it is wrong to kick dogs, he takes as his example the thought (1984, 
p.218): 
(1) Ifwe had different sentiments [different moral attitudes], it would be right to kick 
dogs. 
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Blackburn believes that his expressivism is not committed to claims such as 
these, and indeed he rejects it. The way he does so is by holding that (I) is not a 
theoretical claim about morality, but rather voices a moral view. (That is, he follows 
the same strategy he adopts with regard to thought and talk of moral "truth", etc.) To 
say that if we had different sentiments, kicking dogs would be morally okay is to 
have a moral sensibility that only disapproves of kicking dogs in circumstances 
where people disapprove of it. While some people may have moral sensibilities like 
that, there is nothing in expressivism per se that commits one to it. For his part, 
Blackburn rejects it; he maintains that kicking dogs would be wrong even if 
everybody (himself included) had sentiments that endorsed such action, and he 
understands this claim to involve the expression of a moral sensibility, or outlook, 
that disapproves of kicking dogs in the (non-actual) circumstances in which 
everybody approves of doing so. Many philosophers find this an unpersuasive 
account of what thoughts about the mind-independence (or stance-independence) of 
morality come to (e.g., Zangwill 1994) - they insist that such claims and the common 
intuitions behind them are theoretical claims and intuitions and not simply moral 
commitments - but Blackburn insists that, "[a]ccording to me, 'moral truths are 
mind-dependent' can only summarize a list like 'If there were no people (or people 
with different attitudes) then X ... ' where the dots are filled in by some moral claim 
about X" (1998, p.311). 
There are other thoughts and intuitions about morality that it might be 
thought expressivism cannot account for, eschewing as it does the idea that our moral 
judgements are in the business of tracking independent moral facts. For example, if 
my thinking or asserting that my moral opinion is "true" is nothing more than my 
thinking or asserting the opinion, how do we make sense of my worry that some of 
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my moral opinions (which I hold, and I know I hold) might not be true? Blackburn's 
answer to this question - his account of the everyday idea that there might be a 
mismatch between our moral beliefs and the truth - appeals to other attitudes of ours. 
He writes: 
"The problem comes with thinking of myself (or of us or our tradition) that I 
may be mistaken. How can I make sense of fears of my own fallibility? Well, 
there are a number of things I admire: for instance, information, sensitivity, 
maturity, imagination, coherence. I know that other people show defects in 
these respects, and that these defects lead to bad opinions. But can I exempt 
myself from the same possibility? Of course not (that would be unpardonably 
smug). So I can think that perhaps some of my opinions are due to defects of 
information, sensitivity, maturity, imagination, and coherence. If I really set 
out to investigate whether this is true, I stand on one part of the (Neurath) 
boat and inspect the other parts" (1998, p.318). 
Blackburn explains (and tries to accommodate) the thought that one's current 
moral "beliefs" may not be true by construing it as the worry that one's moral 
"beliefs" might not be endorsed from a perspective that one approves of (or, perhaps, 
would come to approve of). Unable to explain the idea of a gap between one's moral 
belief and the truth along the lines a non-expressivist would (a mismatch between the 
moral beliefs representational content and the world it is representing), it appears 
that expressivists only have recourse to a mismatch or tension with other attitudes. 
(Later in this chapter, I will defend Andy Egan's argument against expressivism that 
focuses on this expressivist strategy of explaining error.) 
More could be said in explaining expressivism, as well as the different 
nuances that are exhibited by various philosophers' particular brands of it, but the 
above sketch (to be supplemented in the course of examining objections) should 
suffice for my purposes here.s 
5 In addition to the works already referenced, see also Michael Ridge's version (2006a; 2007). 
Although I focus on Blackburn's work, I think that the objections to expressivism defended in this 
chapter will apply to all versions. 
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2. Expressivism and atheistic Darwinian moral scepticism 
If expressivism is true, atheists can avoid the argument for atheistic 
Darwinian moral scepticism advanced toward the end of the last chapter. That 
argument crucially depended upon the idea that moral beliefs are beliefs in the 
existence of independent moral properties and facts and, furthermore, that such 
properties and facts are suspicious, or queer, in an atheistic universe. However, 
according to expressivism, (1) moral "beliefs" are not in the business of trying to 
accurately track independent moral properties and facts (they are really desires or 
desire-like), and (2) therefore, moral "beliefs" are not beliefs in the existence of 
properties and facts that are suspicious or queer in an atheistic universe. Rather, 
when people talk of "moral truth" and "moral facts", they are understood to use these 
terms in a deflationary, minimalist sense to express their attitudes, without intending 
anything metaphysically weighty. 
It isn't simply that expressivists can't find room for the possibility of moral 
scepticism. For, although expressivism claims that moral judgement involves a 
psychological attitude other than (real, descriptive) belief, and that talk of the "truth" 
of moral "beliefs" isn't connected to the idea that our "beliefs" are trying to match an 
independent reality, it nevertheless construes moral judgement as mimicking (real, 
Mark Kalderon has argued for a non-cognitivist position he dubs "moral fictionalism" (2005). 
He holds that the attitude of moral judgement is not belief but also that moral predicates do stand for 
moral properties and that therefore moral sentences represent the world as containing moral properties 
and facts. Moral thought and discourse, in Kalderon's view, consists in our having a non-cognitive 
attitude towards factual statements. The position has a number of problems which preclude the need 
for it to be considered here. For one thing, the arguments offered in support of it are problematic 
(Finlay 2006). Most importantly, although Kalderon does not explicitly develop an account of moral 
"truth", his position appears to imply that our moral sentences would only be appropriately called true 
if they accurately represent moral facts. That is, it seems that moral sentences have robust truth-
conditions (the existence of moral properties and facts) and moral claims will be true if and only if 
those conditions are met. The account of moral "truth" and "facts" expressivists like Blackburn appeal 
to will not be available to him; therefore, I don't think his position could sidestep the argument for 
atheistic Darwinian moral scepticism. Finally, Kalderon's account, unlike Blackburn's, is not intended 
to vindicate morality or to show that moral practice embodies no great error. Rather, Kalderon thinks 
that it does, and that morality may be inherently unstable. Kalderon's account has been well-discussed 
in a recent book symposium (Kalderon 2008a; Chrisman 2008; Friend 2008; Lenman 2008; Kalderon 
200Sb). 
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descriptive) belief in important ways. Our moral practice clearly involves norms that 
govern the acquisition, retention and rejection of moral attitudes - norms that appear 
the same as those that govern the acquisition, retention and rejection of non-moral 
and indisputably fully descriptive, genuine beliefs. Importantly, moral practice 
includes the idea of epistemic de/eaters for moral "beliefs" (see chapter 2, section I, 
for a brief explanation of defeaters). For example, suppose that I hold a moral view 
but come to realise that I hold that view solely because it is a remnant of my religious 
upbringing in a religious tradition that I no longer accept. Realising that this is the 
origin of my moral view may provide me with a defeater for it and render it 
unwarranted. Or, suppose that I have formed a moral judgement about a particular 
situation but then realise that when I formed my judgement I wasn't aware of all the 
non-moral facts pertaining to the case. Again, it seems that when I learn this I have 
reason to consider my judgement unwarranted. Expressivists must agree we take 
such norms to govern our moral "beliefs". But in that case, although expressivists 
will hold that doubt cannot be cast on the truth of all of our moral "beliefs" when 
truth is understood in a realist sense - moral beliefs have nothing to do with that -
they will hold that it can nevertheless cast doubt upon its "truth" when that is 
understood in a deflationary way. As Sinnott-Armstrong says: 
"Once expressivists admit that they need to mimic realists, they have only 
two options: either expressivists fail to capture all of the apparently realist 
elements in common moral language and thought, in which case expressivism 
is inadequate, or expressivists succeed in capturing all of the apparently 
realist elements, in which case expressivists can go on to do moral 
epistemology in exactly the same way as realists" (2006b, p.31). 
Indeed, as already seen, Blackburn would explain the thought that a certain 
origin renders one's moral belief less likely to be "true" by appealing to other 
attitudes one has; he mentions his concern for information, sensitivity, maturity, 
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imagination, and coherence (1998, p.3l8). So, for example, the realisation that my 
moral opinions have not been formed in the light of all of the non-moral evidence 
may call them into question even if expressivism is true because I value, or approve 
of, forming moral opinions on the basis of all the non-moral evidence. So it is 
possible that there may be arguments for moral scepticism that would work even if 
expressivism is true. 
However, while Sinnott-Armstrong is right that expressivists can "do moral 
epistemology in exactly the same way as realists" insofar as expressivists will have 
to allow that the same epistemic concepts, properties and relations (e.g., warrant, 
support, defeat) that can apply to non-moral, genuinely descriptive and 
representational beliefs can also apply to moral "beliefs", and that moral "beliefs" 
will in general behave in the same way as genuine beliefs, this shouldn't be 
understood to mean that expressivists must hold that there are defeaters for moral 
beliefs in all and only the cases that moral realists do. For example, given the 
considerations discussed in the last chapter, it can be seen why atheistic Darwinian 
origins may cause trouble for the claim that our moral beliefs are true if our model of 
moral judgement is a "tracking" one. However, it is hard to see why expressivists 
would be troubled by the idea that our moral "beliefs" may have been greatly 
influenced by natural selection and that we have them because of their adaptive value 
rather than because they accurately track independent moral facts, since expressivists 
already reject the idea that our moral beliefs are in the business of trying to 
accurately track independent moral facts. Also, as I have mentioned, Darwinian 
origins - implicitly, unguided Darwinian origins - are an explicit part of Blackburn's 
wider theoretical picture of which his expressivism is a part, so such origins are not 
among those which are such that he would disapprove of moral "beliefs" that result 
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from them (as he looks dimly upon moral "beliefs" formed with insufficient 
information, sensitivity, etc). 
So, expressivists may be able to find room for the possibility of moral 
scepticism - that all of our moral "beliefs" are "unwarranted" and that we must give 
up the claim that they are "true". And there may be arguments for moral scepticism 
that would be effective even if expressivism is true. However, the argument for 
atheistic Darwinian moral scepticism is not one of them. Therefore, it is important to 
see why there is good reason to believe that expressivism is false. 
3. First problem for expressivism - traditional religious believers 
Although I will present and defend two arguments others have offered against 
expressivism, space precludes a detailed discussion of the alleged reasons in support 
of expressivism (it also precludes a detailed discussion of all of the reasons against 
it). However, this should not be problematic. For, although I can here only state my 
view on this matter, the case for expressivism is pretty weak. For example, one 
consideration expressivists often appeal to in support of expressivism is moral 
judgement internalism, the idea that one who accepts a moral claim necessarily has 
some (possibly outweighed) motivation to act in accordance with it; it is claimed that 
moral judgement intemalism is both true and best explained by the thesis that moral 
"beliefs" really are motivational states which belong to the family of desires. The 
main problem with this argument is that there may be good reason to believe that 
moral judgement intemalism is false, and there is at any rate insufficient reason to 
believe that it is true (see, e.g., Svavarsd6ttir 1999; Zangwill 2008).6 Expressivism 
6 Teemu Toppinen (2004) has responded to Svavarsd6ttir. His response makes, and crucially depends 
upon, the claim that it is appropriate to convict someone of having a "fetish" about morality (an 
obsession with doing the right thing) if their desire (DA) to act in a certain way (A) - where A is 
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also faces the fonnidable (and well-known) challenge of accounting for the logical 
behaviour of moral sentences and in particular making sense of the function and 
logical behaviour of moral sentences that are less plausibly construed as expressing 
attitudes than are simple declarative moral sentences such as "Murder is wrong.,,7 It 
is not clear that expressivism can really account for all the features of moral 
sentences that non-expressivists have no need to explain since they believe that moral 
sentences are straightforwardly representational, just like everyday non-moral 
sentences. 
While detailed discussion of such well-known issues would, I believe, show 
expressivism to be subject to severe challenge, I want to focus on a couple of more 
recent arguments that, due to their lack of vintage, have been less discussed. I begin 
with an original argument advanced by Terence Cuneo (2006). According to Cuneo, 
charitable interpretation of the moral thought and discourse of traditional religious 
believers provides reason to believe that expressivism is false and that moral 
sentences and claims do represent the world as containing moral facts and properties 
(on a non-deflationary understanding of "facts" and "properties"). 
Cuneo's argument is best understood by first setting out (as he does) to 
undennine an alleged - and possibly overlooked - reason why some philosophers 
embrace expressivism. It appears that one reason why some are attracted to 
expressivism is that they hold (for various reasons) that there are no realist moral 
judged to be morally right - is causally produced by a more general desire to act in ways that are right 
(DR), as opposed to desiring to A for its own sake. Responding to Svavarsd6ttir, Toppinen maintains 
that a person has a problematic moral fetish even if they don't reason from DR to DA and the causal 
production takes place outside their consciousness. If successful, this claim would cause trouble for 
some of Svavarsd6ttir's argument, but Toppinen simply states it without any argument and I see no 
reason to think it is true. 
7 For important recent papers on the "Frege-Geach" problem, see Dreier (1996), Unwin (1999), and 
Sinnott-Armstrong (2000). For the first book-length treatment of the problem, see Schroeder (2008). 
Although I cannot enter into the debate over this matter in this essay, I think that the realist-seeming 
nature of moral sentences warrants a strong presumption against expressivism. For a different but 
related objection to expressivism, see Dorr (2002); for an expressivist reply. see Lenman (2003). 
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properties and facts and they also think that it is uncharitable, and violates the 
canons of interpretive methodology, to interpret the moral discourse of people such 
that it turns out that their thought and discourse embodies a widespread and deep 
error (the belief that there are realist moral facts). Blackburn has said on at least one 
occasion that the "essence" of expressivism is "to protect ... against the descent into 
error theory" (2002, p.167), and Cuneo thinks that considerations about charitable 
interpretation may be part of the reason why Blackburn (and others) thinks there is 
reason to protect against this descent. Cuneo argues that adopting expressivism 
because of such motives is unreasonable, drawing attention to the fact that charitable 
interpretation of a body or sample of discourse does not require interpreting the 
discourse so that it is rendered not false, or contains no error; rather, it involves 
something along the lines of interpreting it in such a way that the speaker's 
commitment to what is said in the discourse makes sense in the light of their other 
beliefs and commitments. To illustrate, Cuneo uses the example of Anselm's 
theological arguments. Charitable interpretation of Anselm's theological discourse 
doesn't involve interpreting it in such a way that it comes out not mistaken, but 
rather interpreting the discourse in such a way that it makes sense in the light of 
Anselm's other beliefs and commitments; it involves interpreting what Anselm says 
as being about God as God was understood by medieval theists and not by Egyptian 
polytheists, for example (p.60). But in that case, one shouldn't opt for expressivism 
on the basis that charity involves interpreting moral discourse such that it is rendered 
not false - there is no reason to think that attributing error, even large error, is in 
conflict with interpreting charitably. 
I think that Cuneo's point about charitable interpretation is right, and that he 
has undermined what may well be a consideration that plays a large part in some 
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philosophers' embrace of expressivism. Furthermore, once it is realised that 
charitable interpretation involves interpreting in the light of a speaker's other beliefs 
and commitments, it is hard to see how a good argument for expressivism from 
charity could possibly be in the offing. For what background beliefs and 
commitments do people have that fit better with the idea that they are acting as 
expressivism says than they fit with the idea that people believe the world contains 
(realistically-construed) moral properties and facts? I don't see any promise for an 
expressivist argument there. 
Cuneo's argument against expressivism takes off from this discussion of 
charitable interpretation. He draws attention to the real-life example of the 
"traditional religious believer": 
"[A] traditional Jewish, Christian, or Muslim theist, a person who believes 
such things as: that a personal God exists; that God has various characteristics 
such as being the creator of the world, being perfectly good, all-powerful, and 
all-knowing; that God acts in human history and has revealed God's self in 
various ways to human beings; that a sacred text (or texts) such as the Bible 
or the Koran or a particular religious tradition is authoritative on matters of 
faith and morals; and so forth. Thus described, the traditional religious 
believer is a theological realist; she rejects all 'naturalistic' accounts of the 
nature of reality. She is also a moral realist ... the traditional believer needn't 
have a very well worked-out account of the nature of [moral] facts; she 
usually believes that they in some way depend on God's nature or will" 
(p.61 ). 
In addition to pointing out that the number of traditional religious believers is 
vast, Cuneo cites some sociological evidence in support of the view that, "the moral 
views of religious believers do not float free from their theological convictions, but 
are deeply affected by them" (p.61). In light of this, Cuneo suggests, charitable 
interpretation of the moral discourse of traditional religious believers requires 
interpreting their moral utterances not as expressions of psychological states that do 
not seek to describe the world as containing realist moral properties and facts (as 
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expressivism teaches) but rather as putative descriptions of realist moral facts 
believed to be in some sense dependent upon God's nature or will. This seems to fit 
best both with traditional religious believers' avowed theological beliefs about the 
dependence of morality upon God (beliefs which - Cuneo notes - philosophers who 
are traditional religious believers often claim are beliefs in moral realism) and the 
fact that their moral behaviour is so affected by what they claim to believe that God 
has authoritatively commanded. Considerations of charity, far from supporting 
expressivism, actually provide reason to believe that it is false: it doesn't accurately 
describe the moral thought and discourse of traditional religious believers. 
Now, one could allow for the possibility that traditional religious believers 
and others (call them non-believers) simply talk past each other when they engage in 
moral discourse and debate. Traditional religious believers and non-believers might 
literally mean different things when they use moral tenns such as "good" and "right", 
etc. If so, then it could be the case that (as charity suggests) traditional religious 
believers' moral discourse is in accordance with a moral realist construal, but that (at 
least some) others' moral discourse is accurately described by expressivism. 
Although some philosophers might be happy with such a state of affairs where theists, 
atheists and others are literally talking past each other, most have wanted to avoid 
such a conclusion, as Cuneo notes. 8 Cuneo suggests that we think of all parties to 
moral disputes as describing the world as containing realist moral properties and 
facts, and the traditional religious believer simply having a further belief about what 
those facts consist in or why they are there (appealing to God) that the non-believer 
denies or lacks (p.68). This proposal interprets traditional religious believers' moral 
discourse charitably; it also doesn't seem to uncharitably interpret the moral 
8 Also, as I mentioned in chapter I, note 23, in this essay I am following the common approach to 
metaethics that eschews the idea that different descriptive metaethical accounts may be true of 
different people's moral thought and discourse. 
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discourse of non-believers. Therefore, it seems, we should accept this interpretation. 
But if this charitable interpretation is correct, then expressivism is false. So we 
should hold that expressivism is false. 
4. How expressivists could perhaps reply 
It seems to me that Cuneo's argument is possibly vulnerable as it stands; I 
think that there are things that an expressivist might be able say in reply. Before 
discussing such things, however, I must point out that, whereas Cuneo describes 
traditional religious believers as being moral realists in such a way that that appears 
to become part of the definition of "traditional religious believer", I am in the 
remainder of this chapter going to use the expression "traditional religious believer" 
to refer to someone who fits the rest of Cuneo's description without it being assumed 
that such a person really is a moral realist. 
Cuneo says that traditional religious believers hold that the moral facts "in 
some way depend upon God's nature or will" (p.61). As stated, this belief is rather 
vague. However, suppose we take it as the claim that there are only right and wrong 
actions, or good and bad states of affairs, because of God. All of the moral facts 
depend on God, and if God didn't exist, nothing would be good or bad, or right or 
wrong. (Taking the claim in a weaker sense - e.g., as the claim that almost all of the 
moral facts depend upon God - would not significantly alter this reply.) In other 
words, suppose that what traditional religious believers are assenting to is: 
(2) If God didn't exist, there would be no moral facts. 
While I do not know of any expressivist treatments of claims exactly like (2), 
earlier in this chapter I showed how Blackburn accounts for a claim very much like 
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(2) - the claim that if we had different sentiments, it would be right to kick dogs. 
According to Blackburn, the claim that kicking dogs would be right if our sentiments 
were different amounts to having the disagreeable attitude of approving of kicking 
dogs in circumstances where everyone approves of it. So it seems that Blackburn 
would understand the traditional religious believer's commitment to (2) as consisting 
in their having a moral sensibility that neither approves nor disapproves of any 
actions, persons, states of affairs, etc, in which God does not exist. The traditional 
religious believer imagines the world being different from how it actually is (as she 
sees it) in that God's existence is removed, and when she does so, she does not 
approve or disapprove of anything that she imagines taking place. It doesn't follow 
that if traditional religious believers come to reject belief in God then they will stop 
approving and disapproving; nevertheless, their sensibility is one that expects to. 
Now, some philosophers will believe that this is an implausible construal of 
the traditional religious believer's thought that if God does not exist, then nothing 
would be right or wrong; such a construal appears to share the plausibility or 
implausibility of Blackburn's account of the kicking dogs sentence, and his account 
has been criticised as implausible (e.g., Zangwill 1994). However, I don't want to 
rely on this reply here. Cuneo's argument is presented as a new, independent 
argument against expressivism and is not supposed to rest on the strength of another 
argument against expressivism. So I will suppose that another sort of reply is 
required. 
One might reply that the proposed expressivist understanding of (2) fails for 
more reasons than the account of (1) - the kicking dogs sentence - does. For there is 
perhaps something more to the traditional religious believer's claim; there is perhaps 
something that the expressivist account suggested above doesn't capture. The 
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traditional religious believer doesn't just believe that the moral facts only exist if 
God exists, as if their doing so might just be a matter of accidental correlation; rather, 
she believes that the moral facts depend on God, that He is their source, that He 
creates them by His commands, etc. 
However, I think that the expressivist might be able to account for that aspect 
of what traditional religious believers think, too. The expressivist might tell a story 
which accounts for the traditional religious believer's view that the moral facts 
depend upon God. Such a story might go something like as follows: 
Expressivism is true, and the moral judgements human beings make are 
expressions of approval and disapproval, desire-like states; they are not attempts to 
describe moral facts as realists think of them. Some human beings - who become 
traditional religious believers - come to believe (for whatever reason) that there 
exists a very powerful and intelligent divine person, God. They come to believe that 
God has done special things for them such as creating them and showing favour to 
their ancestors. Before coming to the belief that God exists, these human beings 
already made moral judgements, by which they expressed approval and disapproval 
of various things. One thing many of them approve of is reciprocating favours 
rendered to them. This, in conjunction with their new belief that God has been 
overwhelmingly generous and favourable towards them, results in their approving of 
reciprocating towards God. One of the beliefs they come to acquire about God is that 
He Himself approves and disapproves of certain things, and also that He commands 
them to do certain things, and promises rewards or punishments depending upon 
whether they act in accordance with His commands. Since they approve of repaying 
favours rendered to them, these humans approve of obedience to what God 
commands and so what He Himself is taken to approve of; they disapprove of what 
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God disapproves of and of what He commands not to be done. (This results in a re-
shaping of some or many of their moral commitments.) Their moral language that 
was in use before the advent of their religious beliefs is still used in the same way as 
before; they express their approval for the things God approves by saying that 
whatever God commands or approves is "right" or "good" and their disapproval of 
what God disapproves of by saying that whatever He forbids or disapproves of is 
"wrong" or "bad". It is but a short step from there to them saying things like, 
"What's morally right or wrong depends on God's commands," or, "The moral facts 
depend upon God's will." 
I am not sure that this expressivist story of the moral thought and discourse of 
traditional religious believers is implausible in itself, or that it is uncharitable, at 
least when it comes to accounting for what Cuneo has mentioned about traditional 
religious believers in his paper. It explains why traditional religious believers derive 
their morality from sacred texts - they want to learn what God approves and 
disapproves of so that they can approve and disapprove of those same things - and 
why, if they subsequently came to doubt that God has commanded some action, their 
approval for that action would diminish. In other words, it explains why "the moral 
views of religious believers do not float free from their theological convictions, but 
are deeply affected by them" (p.61). There is a giving over to God of the authority to 
determine what one approves of and disapproves of. Furthermore, the expressivist 
can perhaps explain the traditional religious believer'S holding to (1) - that if God 
didn't exist there would be no moral facts - as follows. After giving over to God the 
authority to determine what one approves of, traditional religious believers are so 
consumed with the religious form of life and their relationship to God that they judge 
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that if they discovered that God doesn't exist, they wouldn't approve or disapprove 
of anything; life would have lost its meaning for them. (The suggestion is that this is 
what traditional religious believers now think they would do if they came to believe 
that God doesn't exist. It might be the case that, if they in fact came to believe that 
God doesn't exist, they wouldn't cease approving and disapproving; instead, their 
moral sensibilities might change.) 
I see no reason to believe that the expressivist story I have given above is 
true. Nevertheless, I am not sure that it is clearly uncharitable, and it seems it might 
be able to explain the data about traditional religious believers and the relationship 
between their theological and moral views that Cuneo draws attention to. (It might be 
suggested that it is implausible because philosophers who are traditional religious 
believers tell us that they and other traditional religious believers are moral realists. 
But mightn't they have misunderstood what their moral thought and discourse comes 
to? After all, non-expressivists hold that expressivists have misunderstood what their 
(and others') moral thought and discourse comes to.) 
So I think that, in the light of this expressivist explanation of the 
commitments of traditional religious believers that Cuneo mentions in his paper, the 
argument that their moral thought and discourse is a problem for expressivism might 
need elaboration and improvement. 
5. Improving the argument 
Nevertheless, I think that the argument can be improved, by being more 
specific about the commitments of traditional religious believers. When this is done, 
I believe, expressivism is seen to provide an implausible account of their moral 
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thought and discourse. Indeed, in an email communication to me,9 Cuneo has 
elaborated on the argument in light of some of the things I have said in the possible 
expressivist reply I have provided above, and I find part of what he has said 
convincing. In what follows, I draw on some of his explicit comments and develop 
some thoughts that seemed to me less explicit but nevertheless implicit in, or 
suggested by, his comments - thoughts which seem to me to be good ones. So it 
should be noted that I am indebted to him in what follows. 
The expressivist account of the moral beliefs of traditional religious believers 
that I have provided may be possible, or judged possible if we only consider some 
such believers. However, it doesn't follow that it is really plausible, or that it is the 
most probable account. The first point to note is that influential theologians have, 
down the ages, put forward doctrines inconsistent with expressivism. (It isn't just 
modem philosophers, who may have less influence or be less connected to ordinary 
traditional religious believers - and who might misconstrue traditional religious 
believers' moral thought and discourse just as non-expressivists think expressivists 
misconstrue it - who have done so.) They haven't just had a vague belief that 
morality depends upon God, or a "belief' in moral "facts" that expressivism 
plausibly accommodates, but have clearly been moral realists. A particularly 
important example is Thomas Aquinas, whose doctrine of divine simplicity identified 
all of God's properties (including God's moral properties) with each other and with 
God Himself. For expressivism to accurately capture Aquinas' thought and talk on 
this matter, it seems, we would also have to understand his theological talk as 
consisting in the expression of non-cognitive attitudes; but that is wildly implausible 
and to my knowledge nobody advocates such an understanding. Furthermore, since 
9 Personal email communication, 15th November 2006. 
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Aquinas' position in this regard is the official teaching of the Roman Catholic 
Church, which many traditional religious believers sign up to and accept, and given 
Aquinas' influence on subsequent medieval and post-medieval Christian theology, 
interpretive charity gives us reason to believe that ordinary traditional religious 
believers who are influenced by, connected to, and committed to such tradition (and 
by tradition influenced by and connected to such tradition, and those connected to 
tradition that influenced Aquinas - and Jewish and Muslim medieval theology are 
relevant here also) are using moral thought and discourse to describe moral 
properties and facts, and not merely expressing attitudes as expressivism claims. 
Indeed, there are scores of influential theologians whose lives and work have been 
connected to the lives and thoughts of ordinary traditional religious believers (e.g., 
by influencing religious confessions) and who have clearly been moral realists, 
endorsing moral realist theories such as divine command theories or natural law 
theories (Holmes 1997, pp.1-83). So there is good reason to think that those who are 
connected and committed to these theological traditions - both the theorists and more 
ordinary traditional religious believers - are using moral thought and discourse to 
describe moral properties and facts. That is more plausible than an expressivist 
construal. 10 
Many theologians down the ages have clearly held understandings of moral 
thought and discourse that are inconsistent with expressivism (and in addition to the 
metaethical views of theologians like Aquinas, think of philosophers' views like 
10 In response to these sorts of considerations, James Lenman has raised the example of the late 
Richard Hare, a Christian philosopher who was also an expressivist. However, the example of Hare in 
no way calls into question the argument above. I don't see reason to think that Hare has had much 
influence on traditional religious believers. Furthennore, to the extent that his understanding of moral 
properties and facts clearly differs from that of earlier thinkers in religious traditions, he may not 
qualify as a traditional religious believer. In any case, it would be implausible to think that Hare's 
believing that Christianity and expressivism could be reconciled means that expressivism stands a 
good chance of being true of traditional religious believers. 
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Plato's doctrine of the Fonns). How plausible is it that so many thinkers have (as 
expressivists see it) misunderstood the nature of their moral thought and discourse? 
Why have they done so? Of course, one might push the question back at the non-
expressivist and ask how the non-expressivist explains the fact that (as the non-
expressivist sees it) expressivists have misunderstood the nature of moral thought and 
discourse. But that question isn't hard to answer. The first thing to note in answering 
it is that, unlike views which construe our moral thought and discourse as seeking to 
describe independent moral properties and facts, the expressivist account of moral 
thought and discourse appears to be a relatively recent idea. Some claim to find the 
origins of expressivism in Hume in the 18th century, while others have argued that 
Hume was not a precursor to modem expressivism (Sayre-McCord 2008), but at any 
rate it appears that the origins of expressivism and its precursors are to be found at 
most a few hundred years ago, and it was only really in the 20th century that 
expressivist (or emotivist) positions started to become popular, with the work of 
philosophers like Ayer. II SO the error that needs to be explained by the non-
expressivist isn't one that is so widespread. Furthennore, it appears that the primary 
reason philosophers endorsed expressivist views was not due to reflection on moral 
psychology or our moral practices but rather their commitment to empiricism and 
naturalism. For example, since Hume may have been a non-cognitivist, it is worth 
stressing that his whole approach to philosophy was characterised by empiricism, 
and his approach to morality was driven at least in large part by the inability to detect 
moral properties by empirical means. As he famously put it in the Treatise: 
II Of course, there have been metaethical anti-realists throughout the history of philosophy; it is the 
lack of a clear endorsement of a non-cognitivisl or expressivisl anti-realist view before the last few 
centuries that is important. In addition, as far as I am aware the idea that talk of "truth" or "facts" in 
morality typically doesn't even purport to signify anything metaphysical is only found since the 20th 
century. 
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"Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine 
it in all lights .. .In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, 
motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. 
The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never 
can find it, till you tum your reflexion into your own breast, and find a 
sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is 
a matter of fact; but 'tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, 
not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be 
vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you 
have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and 
virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, 
according to modem philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions 
in the mind[.]" (1978, pp.468-469 - Book 3 "Of Morals", part I). 
Ayer, likewise, was motivated by empiricist commitments. He accepted the 
logical positivist doctrine that utterances are only cognitively meaningful if they can 
be verified, and held that moral claims could not be verified because of 
disagreements over moral intuitions. So it is easy to explain why expressivists have 
come to hold an incorrect view of the nature of moral thought and discourse. But 
why should so many non-expressivist theologians (and philosophers) have done so? 
And why wasn't the error realised earlier? If in making moral judgements they were 
basically just expressing desires, why didn't they realise that? It seems more 
plausible that expressivists are the ones who are in error about moral thought and 
discourse. 
Although these comments are brief, it seems to me that these sorts of 
considerations provide good grounds for holding that the best explanation of the 
moral thought and discourse of traditional religious believers is one that is non-
expressivist and that therefore the possible expressivist story I told in the previous 
section is inadequate. (And if the moral thought and discourse of traditional religious 
believers is best explained that way, then so is the moral thought and discourse of 
contemporary non-believers.) So this seems to me to provide good evidence that 
expressivism is false. 
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6. Second problem for expressivism - fundamental moral error 
In the course of explaining what expressivism is earlier in this chapter, 
briefly explained Simon Blackburn's approach to accounting for the everyday 
thought that one's current moral beliefs might be mistaken. On the face of it, it isn't 
obvious that an expressivist can account for that thought. There would appear to be 
no difficulty for an expressivist in explaining what it is to think that someone else's 
moral view is wrong (it is to approve o/what they disapprove of, or disapprove of 
what they approve oj) or what it is to think that you used to hold a mistaken moral 
view (it is to now approve of what you once disapproved of, or disapprove of what 
you once approved oj), but the thought that you might be mistaken in the moral 
views you hold now cannot be explained in such a way. And given expressivism, 
what more can there be to the "truth" of your current moral views than your 
endorsement of them? Blackburn's deflationary view of moral "truth" maintains that 
to say that a moral claim is "true" or that it "corresponds to the facts" is just to 
endorse it: what room, then, for worries about the possibility that they aren't true? 
However, as I have already stated, Blackburn has an answer to this problem; it will 
be appropriate to quote it again: 
"The problem comes with thinking of myself (or of us or our tradition) that I 
may be mistaken. How can I make sense of fears of my own fallibility? Well, 
there are a number of things I admire: for instance, information, sensitivity, 
maturity, imagination, coherence. I know that other people show defects in 
these respects, and that these defects lead to bad opinions. But can I exempt 
myself from the same possibility? Of course not (that would be unpardonably 
smug). So I can think that perhaps some of my opinions are due to defects of 
information, sensitivity, maturity, imagination, and coherence. If I really set 
out to investigate whether this is true, I stand on one part of the (Neurath) 
boat and inspect the other parts" (Blackburn 1998, p.318) 
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Andy Egan (2007) has recently argued that Blackburn's explanation of fears 
about fallibility (of thoughts of the sort "I believe moral claim M, but I could be 
mistaken") is problematic because it provides you with an a priori guarantee that 
you are immune to a certain kind of error that others can suffer from, thereby failing 
to capture the important thought that, unless we have good evidence that we are 
better placed than others when it comes to forming moral judgements, we cannot 
have a guarantee that others are more likely than us to be prone to moral error. In 
what follows, I will layout the argument and then criticise Blackburn's recent 
response to it. I will conclude that the argument is strong and provides good reason 
to believe that expressivism 12 is false. 
In Blackburn's quote above, he accounts for the worry that I might be 
mistaken in my moral views by construing it as an acknowledgement of the 
possibility that I might no longer endorse those moral views ifmy epistemic situation 
changed in ways that I admire. Egan phrases this as the acknowledgement that I 
might no longer endorse those moral views if my epistemic situation changed in 
ways that I view as improvements. 
Egan firstly points out that Blackburn's proposal on this score is sensible, in 
that it does seem to provide a plausible account of what worry about the possibility 
of current error could come to (p.211). He furthermore points out that this looks like 
the sort of account that Blackburn and other expressivists will have to endorse. For 
while non-expressivists can explain my worries about the truth of my current moral 
views as worries about a possible mismatch between (a) my judgements and (b) the 
moral facts that my judgements represent as being a certain way, expressivists don't 
have recourse to this explanation since they eschew the idea that moral "beliefs" 
12 Egan differentiates between expressivism and quasi-realism, and directs his argument at the latter. 
However, as already explained, I am using "expressivism" to refer to theories that include the quasi-
realist ambition of capturing the realist-seeming nature of moral thought and discourse. 
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really seek to represent moral facts. (Expressivists will want to leave room for the 
thought that one's moral "belief' might fail to "represent the facts", but they will 
understand these expressions in a deflationary or minimalistic way and so cannot 
appeal to such notions when explaining moral thought and discourse.) Without an 
"external" world of moral facts for moral beliefs to fail to match up to, it seems that 
expressivists will have to explain worries about fallibility by appealing to "internal" 
concerns - the worry or acknowledgement that the "belief' might in some way clash 
with other "beliefs". Furthermore, as Egan says, "Some story about stability under a 
course of improving changes seems to be the only sensible way to cash this out" 
(p.212). 
However, Egan doesn't think that Blackburn's proposal will work. Call 
someone's moral beliefs that would survive a course of changes that they judge to be 
improvements their stable moral beliefs. Call the error that someone is subject to if 
their stable moral beliefs are false fundamental moral error. The person who is 
subject to fundamental moral error is in the undesirable situation that no epistemic 
change that they regard as improvement will get them to the moral truth. As Egan 
notes, it seems pre-theoretically possible that someone could be so unfortunate that 
they are subject to fundamental moral error; it is possible that somebody could have 
such mistaken moral beliefs, and such a mistaken view of what constitutes an 
improved epistemic condition, that all of their stable beliefs are false. To see this, 
imagine someone who holds completely contrary moral views to those that you think 
are correct, and who also has very different beliefs about what constitutes 
improvement (e.g., perhaps they think that more information is likely to lead them 
astray in their moral views and therefore think that greater ignorance is an 
improvement). No doubt we don't think that many people are like this (we think 
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some of our moral views are true and that they would survive our undergoing the 
epistemic changes we believe are improvements, and we perhaps typically think that 
others who we disagree with could be "brought around" to the right way of seeing 
things), but we should acknowledge that fundamental moral error is a possibility, 
even if a remote one. Egan stresses how important it is that we pre-theoretically think 
that there is a symmetry between the possibility of error - even fundamental error -
in our own case and in the case of others. We have no a priori guarantee that we are 
immune to a possible error that may inflict others; our stable beliefs could be false, 
just as others' could. To think otherwise would be, as Blackburn himself put it, 
"unpardonably smug". It would undermine a deep conviction about morality. As 
Egan puts it, it "really does seem extremely implausible that I have a special, a priori 
guarantee against some sort of (very serious) moral error to which you are 
vulnerable" (p.216). He quotes the rhetorical question, asked by Michael Smith in 
conversation, "What's supposed to make me so [dam] special?" and stresses that it is 
"part of our ordinary moral practice that I'm not so [dam] special. Or at least, that ifI 
am, I don't have an a priori guarantee of it, which I can find out just by thinking 
about the nature of ethics" (p.216). Expressivists want to accommodate, not 
undermine, our deep convictions about morality; they need to in order that 
expressivism provides an adequate and plausible account of our moral thought and 
discourse. If expressivism undermines our beliefs about the symmetry of the 
possibility of moral error, we have reason to think expressivism is false. 
But, Egan argues, expressivism does undermine this conviction, at least if 
Blackburn's account of fears of our own fallibility is accepted. Given Blackburn's 
account, I can have an a priori guarantee that I am immune to fundamental moral 
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error; I can have an a priori guarantee that my stable beliefs are true. 13 If 
Blackburn's account is true then, simply by virtue of knowing that it is true, I can be 
sure that my stable moral beliefs are true and that I am not subject to fundamental 
moral error. For when I worry that one of my moral beliefs might be mistaken, I 
know from Blackburn's account that I am worrying that that belief may not be 
among the stable ones; I am worrying that it would be rejected if I underwent a series 
of changes in my epistemic circumstances that I regard as improvements. If worries 
that my moral beliefs might be false are worries that they would be rejected after 
those changes and are not stable, then the beliefs that I would retain after those 
changes must be true. Therefore, I can know for certain that my stable moral beliefs 
are true; I have a guarantee that I am not subject to fundamental moral error. At the 
same time, I have no guarantee that others are not subject to fundamental moral 
error. Indeed, it seems clear that some of others' stable beliefs could be false (for 
example, they might contradict my stable beliefs, which I have a guarantee are 
true}. 14 As stated, this sort of asymmetry is unacceptable since it conflicts with 
deeply ingrained thinking about the possibility of moral error; it gives the one who 
knows that expressivism and Blackburn's account of fears of fallibility are correct an 
a priori guarantee that they are immune to an error that others may well be subject 
to. Therefore, since this is a consequence of Blackburn's account of what the thought 
that one might be mistaken in their moral belief comes to, that account is untenable. 
Furthermore, since expressivism appears committed to an account at least very much 
13 It doesn't follow that I have a guarantee that any particular belief is true, since I have no guarantee 
that any particular belief is stable. The guarantee I have is of the truth of the claim my stable moral 
beliefs are true. 
14 Egan points out that not only do I have a guarantee that I (and not others) am immune to 
fundamental error, but everybody else has their own guarantee that they (and not others) are immune 
to fundamental error! All they need do is accept Blackburn's account and they acquire such a 
guarantee. 
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like Blackburn's in order to be able to explain such thoughts, expressivism is 
untenable. 
7. Blackburn strikes back 
Blackburn (2009) has recently replied to Egan's argument. Significantly, he 
is candid about his agreement with Egan that if expressivism is committed to an 
asymmetry in a priori guarantees of immunity to error, then expressivism is "indeed 
in trouble," and, "since we will not believe this [that stable beliefs are true] a priori 
of other people, it certainly violates my own 'no smugness' requirement, which 
requires me to think of myself and other people as symmetrical, so far as any a priori 
guarantee against error goes" (p.203). Nevertheless, Blackburn argues that his 
account doesn't provide one with such a guarantee. 
Blackburn's criticism of Egan's argument is rather simple. He holds that 
Egan has run together and conflated two distinct ideas. They are (pp.205-206): 
(M) If something is entrenched in my outlook, in such a way that nothing I could 
recognise as an improvement would undermine it, then it is true. 
(I) If something is entrenched in my outlook, in such a way that nothing that is an 
improvement would undermine it, then it is true. 
According to (M), one's stable beliefs (if one has any) are true. This is the 
claim that Egan says I can know a priori if Blackburn's account is true and I know it 
is true. It is the claim that Egan thinks Blackburn's account of fears of our fallibility 
allows me to know. However, Blackburn argues that his expressivist account does 
not commit him to the idea that I have an a priori guarantee that (M). At most, an 
expressivist like him will endorse (I). And (I) poses no problem for expressivism, 
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since it generates no asymmetry between how I must view myself and how I must 
view others. It may well be a priori for me that if a belief of mine would survive 
complete improvement in my epistemic circumstances then it is true (after all, if the 
belief is false then my epistemic situation could be improved by replacing the belief 
with its negation), but nevertheless it is also a priori for me - for the same reason -
that if someone else's beliefs would survive complete improvement in their epistemic 
circumstances then their beliefs are true. So (I) poses no problem for expressivism. 
Why does Blackburn's account commit him to my having at most an a priori 
guarantee that (I) and not an a priori guarantee that (M)? Blackburn points out that 
we are able to doubt whether everything we regard as an improvement is an 
improvement: 
"A very small tincture of self-doubt would entail silence, on my own part, 
about whether everything that is an improvement is something that I regard 
as an improvement, or conversely. And an even smaller tincture is enough to 
enable me to interpret others as intelligibly supposing that although 
something is one of my stable commitments, it is untrue, which is enough to 
dismiss an a priori status for the denial of this" (pp.206-207). 
After his brief criticism of Egan's argument, Blackburn goes on to diagnose 
Egan's error. The problem, Blackburn surmises, lies in Egan's taking Blackburn to 
have an account of moral truth. In response, Blackburn stresses that he has no 
account of what moral truth is, or what it consists in; indeed, the whole expressivist 
project eschews such notions. Rather, expressivism provides an account of what we 
are doing when we use words like "truth" in our moral practice. Similarly with 
"improvement": the expressivist project is not to provide an informative analysis or 
reduction of such thought and talk, nor to ask the metaphysical question of what 
improvement is (the expressivist eschews such an idea), but rather to explain the 
function of the thought and discourse. Blackburn reminds us: 
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"[E]xpressivism and quasi-realism present themselves as theories, as more 
than mere deflationary platitudes ... but not by finding 'truth-conditions' for 
moral statements. The extra theory is a theory of the overall practice and the 
emergence of content. We try to explain the emergence of the propositions 
that serve as the counters of thought, out of the necessary conditions for this 
practice to take place" (pp.207-208). 
Egan's crucial error lies in thinking that expressivists endorse sentences like 
(M), which provide truth-conditions for moral sentences and "beliefs", whereas 
expressivists eschew the project of providing truth-conditions in the moral domain. 
Rather than seeking to provide an account of moral truth or error, what Blackburn 
offers is "an account of a state of mind and a process - the state of mind of worrying 
whether oneself is in moral error, and of the process of seeking to root out any 
hidden error" (p.207), nothing more. IS 
8. A reply to Blackburn on improvement 
There are a number of problems with Blackburn's reply. The first thing I 
want to draw attention to concerns the indented quote from Blackburn that I have 
supplied on the previous page. There Blackburn draws on the fact that we can doubt 
whether what we think to be improvements are improvements and that we can doubt 
whether our stable moral beliefs are true. However, it isn't clear that Blackburn can 
legitimately draw on this. Blackburn thinks he can, or that at any rate it needs to be 
shown that he can't; indeed, after drawing attention to the fact that we can have such 
15 Blackburn's direct reply to Egan is supplemented with what he considers a parallel case to the 
deflationary account of "truth" his expressivism incorporates: judgements about singular case 
probabilities (pp.208-210). However, it isn't at all clear to me that a deflationary account of the truth 
of such judgements should be accepted; rather, judgements like "the probability of singular event E is 
0.5" may have some kind of reduction, perhaps to claims about rational expectation and credence, and 
therefore be able to be true in a realist sense. (Blackburn would presumably want to understand talk 
about what is "rational" in an expressivist way, but no argument has been given that we must.) So I 
don't see that expressivism's deflationary account of moral "truth" is rendered more plausible, or 
unproblematic, by appealing to the example of singular case probability judgements. 
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doubts, he says that, "To sustain his charge, Egan must now try to deny that [an 
expressivist] should be able to say the things I have just said" (p.207). However, this 
seems to me to put onto Egan a burden that Blackburn actually shoulders. I don't 
think the burden lies upon Egan, or the non-expressivist, to show that expressivists 
can't accommodate our beliefs about error, stable beliefs and improvement. Rather, 
the burden lies on expressivists to show that they can. No doubt we do think that our 
stable beliefs could be false and that we might be mistaken in our ideas about what 
constitutes improvement; however, it is another question entirely whether these 
thoughts are consistent with expressivism. Expressivists need to show that. This 
explanatory burden is faced by expressivists because they claim that moral beliefs (or 
"beliefs") are desire-like, motivational states that belong to the family of desires 
rather than the family of psychological attitudes which contains non-moral (or non-
normative), genuine beliefs. For this reason, expressivists are unable to simply help 
themselves to (for example) the idea that moral beliefs can be true or false; first 
appearances suggest that, if our moral "beliefs" really are what expressivists say they 
are, that idea is mistaken. In general, expressivists need to show that our having the 
thoughts and worries about morality that we do is consistent with expressivism. 
Now, Blackburn certainly realises that he faces this burden at times. After all, 
he feels the need to explain how expressivists can make sense of fears of one's own 
fallibility; he doesn't just say that fears that our moral beliefs might be false are, 
well, fears that our moral beliefs might be false (and then say that it is for the non-
expressivist to try to deny that expressivists can legitimately say such things). But 
when he appeals to the fact that we can worry that our ideas about which epistemic 
changes are improvements could be false, he simply helps himself to the thought that 
what I judge to be an improvement might not actually be an improvement; he just 
165 
assumes that expressivism can make sense of this thought. But the problem with such 
a move is that the notion of a possible difference between one's beliefs about 
improvement and actual improvement looks suspiciously like the notion of a possible 
difference between one's moral beliefs and the moral truth. The reason why is as 
follows. It seems that the expressivist needs an account of what it is to judge a series 
of changes to constitute "improvement" that makes reference to our having an 
approving attitude of some sort towards those changes. A non-expressivist could say 
that we have beliefs that attribute to changes properties like being an improvement or 
enabling one to get to the moral truth or increasing the likelihood that one's moral 
beliefs will be true. But the expressivist cannot say this (that is, the expressivist 
cannot say this in his theoretical account; the aliens mentioned earlier would have no 
place for such talk). So it seems that the expressivist needs to explain the idea that 
some epistemic changes are improvements in terms of our having an attitude of 
approval toward those changes (which is what Blackburn's words suggest when he 
mentions that there are things he "admires"). But in that case, the problem of finding 
room for a possible gap between one's current moral "beliefs" - what one approves-
and the "truth" returns with respect to our current ideas of what constitutes 
improvement: how do we make sense of our having the thought of a possible gap 
between the changes we believe are improvements (those changes that we currently 
approve) and the changes that are really improvements? It is strange for Blackburn to 
simply help himself to our everyday thoughts about the possibility of a gap - and to 
employ such in his reply to Egan - when he realised that he couldn't just help himself 
to the everyday thOUght that our moral beliefs might be mistaken but realised that the 
expressivist owes us an explanation of that. It seems to me that unless a plausible 
expressivist explanation of our thought of a possible gap between our beliefs about 
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improvement and actual improvement is offered, Blackburn has no right to draw 
upon such a thought in his reply to Egan and suggest that the burden is on Egan to 
show why expressivists can't account for such thoughts. 
That said, my second point in response to Blackburn is that I think we 
actually have reason to believe that expressivists can't sensibly account for the 
thought that our stable moral beliefs might be false or the thought that we might be 
mistaken about what constitutes improvement. Note that in order to explain worries 
about current moral error (worries about the possibility of a gap between our moral 
"beliefs" and the "truth"), Blackburn appealed to a possible difference between our 
attitudes now and our attitudes in another circumstance, a circumstance where we 
have changed in ways that we judge to be improvements (more information, greater 
sensitivity, etc). Given that the non-expressivist explanation appealing to a possible 
gap between our moral beliefs and the truth is unavailable to an expressivist, it seems 
that this possible difference between our attitudes as they are now and as they would 
be after we have undergone changes we approve of is the only sensible way for an 
expressivist explanation to go: we need to appeal to another set of our attitudes, so 
that there is something for the attitudes we have now to possibly be in disagreement 
with; that set of attitudes will have to consist of attitudes we would have if we 
underwent changes from how we are now; and it makes sense for the changes in 
question to be changes I approve o/(after all, I know full well that my moral beliefs 
might change if I simply underwent some change or other; there's no cause for any 
worry there). It looks like this is the sort of explanation of worries about current 
moral error that an expressivist will have to endorse. However, what about fears that 
our beliefs about what constitutes improvement might be mistaken? As with the 
explanation of worries about current moral error, the non-expressivist can again 
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appeal to a possible gap between our beliefs and properties such as being an 
improvement or enabling one to get to the moral truth or increasing the likelihood 
that one's moral beliefs will be true. But for the expressivist to provide the same sort 
of explanation for fears about mistaken views of improvement as he did before (that 
is, as he did for worries about current moral error) leads to problems. 16 It may be 
plausible to explain worries about current moral error by way of worries about the 
attitudes we might have after "improvement", but it isn't so plausible that worries 
that our idea of improvement might be wrong can similarly be explained by way of 
worries about the attitudes we might have after "improvement". It appears that such a 
strategy would cash out the worry that we are wrong about improvement as 
recognition of a possible gap between the changes we actually approve of and the 
changes we would approve of if we underwent improvement. But that seems to 
amount to our recognising that there is a possible gap between the changes we 
actually approve of and the changes we would approve of if we underwent. .. those 
changes we actually approve oft That isn't a plausible construal of fears that we 
might be mistaken about improvement. If the improvement-status of the changes that 
we actually approve of is in doubt then it is hard to see why our worry is about what 
we would endorse if we underwent them - such an explanation seems to have us 
assuming that our current ideas of improvement are correct, since it portrays us as 
caring about what we would endorse if we underwent them. 17 But it is difficult to see 
how else such worries could sensibly be explained. In short, the problem is that in 
16 I have realised that this challenge is similar to one raised recently with regard to expressivists' 
ability to explain moral certainty and uncertainty (Bykvist and Olson 2009, p.210). 
17 Perhaps it might be suggested that we are worrying about whether we would endorse our current 
ideas of improvement if we underwent those changes we think are improvements, and that the reason 
why is that we are worried that our ideas of improvement are "self-refuting" - we are worried that if 
we underwent those changes we would no longer think them improvements. However, although all 
self-refuting ideas of improvement might be false, we don't think that all false ideas of improvement 
must be self-refuting; worries that our ideas of improvement might be false do not amount to the 
worry that they might be self-refuting in this way. 
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order to explain thoughts of a difference between current moral beliefs and the moral 
"truth", Blackburn appealed to a gap between our current moral attitudes and our 
moral attitudes after we have undergone certain changes (improvements) and have 
gained a better perspective. In order to explain the worry that our idea of 
improvement might be wrong, we likewise need a gap between our current attitudes 
and the attitudes we would have after undergoing some changes such that we have a 
better perspective. But what better perspective can there be than that which we have 
after we have undergone improvement? 
So it seems to me that although Blackburn has provided an arguably plausible 
account of what worries about current moral error amount to, expressivists cannot so 
plausibly explain what worries that our beliefs about improvement might be mistaken 
amount to (despite Blackburn's helping himself to the fact that we can have such 
worries). At any rate, even if they can offer a plausible explanation, I suggest that a 
presumption against expressivism is warranted until they do so. Indeed, it seems to 
me that there is here a further good argument against expressivism in addition to that 
which Egan has pressed. 
9. In defence of Egan 
Specifically in defence of Egan, Blackburn's response is inadequate because 
even if expressivists can make sense of worries that we might be mistaken about 
which changes are improvements, or that our stable beliefs might be false, and even 
if we do in fact think that we could be wrong about improvement and have false 
stable beliefs (as Blackburn draws attention to), it simply doesn't therefore follow 
that Blackburn's account lacks the implication that I can have an a priori guarantee 
that my stable beliefs are not mistaken. By pointing out that he can doubt the truth of 
169 
(M) and saying that therefore it isn't something he knows a priori, Blackburn misses 
the point: the point at issue isn't whether Blackburn or an expressivist is 
psychologically able to doubt (M) or whether they feel themselves personally 
committed to it; the question is whether it is a consequence of Blackburn's account 
that each of us can know a priori that (M) is true of ourselves. And it seems to me 
that that is a consequence of Blackburn's account, and that Egan's challenge 
succeeds. 
If expressivism is true and if Blackburn's account of worries about the 
possibility of current moral error is accepted, then I have access to a theoretical 
account of what I am doing when I worry that my current moral beliefs might be 
false - I know that I am worrying that I might not endorse the moral "beliefs" I now 
do if I underwent changes that I approve of. (This is the account of what I am up to 
that the aliens would provide.) The thing to notice is that there is nothing to stop me 
from reflectively consulting that theoretical account when I am engaged in moral 
thought and practice. If I take a theoretical perspective (that of the aliens), then I can 
know that when I have the worry that my moral beliefs might be false, I am worrying 
that they wouldn't survive if I underwent particular changes that - still looking at it 
from a theoretical perspective - I consider to be improvements. I am worrying that 
they are not among my stable beliefs. But in that case, by bringing in the theoretical 
account, I can know that worrying whether my stable beliefs might be mistaken is to 
worry about the possibility of an impossible situation - that situation being that my 
stable beliefs are not among my stable beliefs. So I have an a priori guarantee that 
my stable moral beliefs are not mistaken, because to worry that they might be 
mistaken is to worry about a situation that is impossible. (Blackburn's response that 
we don't in fact think that we have such a guarantee is irrelevant; the fact is his 
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expressivist account gives us such a guarantee.} But I don't have a guarantee that 
your stable beliefs aren't mistaken. So, as long as I can bring what I know from the 
theoretical perspective into my moral thought and discourse (and why not?), I can 
see that there is an asymmetry between us. Any worry on my part that my stable 
beliefs might be false is confused; however, my worry that your stable beliefs might 
be false is a fair one to have. 
Blackburn's reply to Egan suggests that he thinks that Egan has mistakenly 
taken Blackburn's expressivist account to provide an account of truth-conditions for 
moral sentences, as if mention of "truth" figured in the theoretical account and not 
simply in moral thought and discourse; in reply, Blackburn stresses that he rejects 
that idea. However, I think that Egan understands that. The point is not that the 
theoretical account will include claims along the lines of (M) - claims that our moral 
beliefs are or are not true, false, mistaken, etc - but rather that when the theoretical 
account is in hand, and it can be seen what our different thoughts amount to, we can 
bring what we glean from that account into moral thought and discourse and realise 
that certain worries just don't make sense (that is, we can bring what we learn from 
the theoretical account into our moral thought and discourse and then see that we can 
be sure of claims along the lines of (M». Once I know what worries about current 
moral error amount to, I can see that my stable beliefs can't be mistaken and that 
worrying that they are mistaken is to worry about the possibility of something 
impossible. At the same time, I can see that my thought that your stable beliefs might 
be mistaken is one that does make sense for me to have. So it seems to me that 
Egan's argument is successful. 
One further note: it seems to me perfectly possible that an expressivist 
account of worries about moral error might have the consequence that we can have 
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an a priori guarantee that some of our moral beliefs are true while at the same time it 
also being possible that they are not true. Why? Well, notice that Blackburn's 
account seems to imply that there are at least two distinct uses of the truth predicate 
in moral thought and discourse. On the one hand, it is used in connection with moral 
approval (to think or say that a moral claim is "true" is to endorse it). On the other 
hand, it is related to the approval we have towards epistemic changes when we 
consider them improvements (we think that the moral opinions we would have after 
the changes we approve of would be "true"). Without a unified explanation of such 
uses of "true" (such as a non-expressivist can provide by appealing to our thoughts of 
the property of being true, which non-expressivists believe moral claims can have), 
we seem to have no guarantee that these aren't two different uses of "true" that can 
come into conflict. So I think that even if expressivists somehow manage to show 
that it does make sense to worry that our stable beliefs might not be "true", it doesn't 
follow that they have shown that Egan's argument goes wrong - we might also have 
a guarantee that they are "true". 
In summary, as Egan says, many people find it intuitive that if our moral 
beliefs are really desire-like rather than genuine representational beliefs then the idea 
that they might be mistaken is itself a mistake. Expressivists have shown that they 
can find room for the idea that moral "beliefs" are erroneous in some cases - they 
can find room for my thought that you are mistaken, and my thought that I was 
mistaken. But in the end, if expressivists really live up to their explanatory burden, 
the common intuition is found to be fundamentally correct. Expressivism leads to 
asymmetry in how one views others and how one views oneself; one has a guarantee 
about immunity to error in one's own case but not in the case of others. And as 
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Blackburn himself acknowledges, this provides strong reason to believe that 
expressivism is false. 
10. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have explained expressivism and why atheists could avoid 
the argument for atheistic Darwinian moral scepticism if expressivism were viable; 
nevertheless, I have argued that expressivism is false. Although the focus has been 
on Blackburn's version of expressivism, I think the arguments defended here will be 
effective against any version of expressivism (perhaps with small modifications to 
render them appropriate to the particularities of each). Cuneo's argument should be 
effective against any expressivist view because it offers direct evidence for 
construing moral thought and discourse in the non-expressivist way that moral 
realism does. Egan's should be effective because any version of expressivism that is 
adequate to capture moral thOUght and discourse will - if it is to be plausible - have 
to provide an explanation of what our thoughts and worries about the possibility that 
our moral "beliefs" are in error comes to; it will need to say what possible 
circumstance we are worrying about. With such an account in hand, it seems, the 
sawy expressivist will be able to learn that they are guaranteed to be immune from 
afflictions that others may well be subject to, because they will have a guarantee of 
immunity for their "beliefs" that would survive in those circumstances worried 
about, yet those "beliefs" could possibly be different to others', and therefore others' 
could be "false". 
So it seems that the argument for atheistic Darwinian moral scepticism cannot 
be sidestepped. In the next chapter, I will suggest that interesting consequences 
follow from this fact. 
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Chapter 5 - The consequences of atheists' acceptance of moral 
scepticism 
So far in this essay, I have argued that atheists have good reason to embrace 
moral scepticism; that is, to consider all of their moral beliefs to be epistemically 
unwarranted. To some, this may seem to be an obviously negative conclusion for 
atheists, and one that they will wish was otherwise. However, it isn't obvious that 
that is in fact so. Some philosophers think that the embrace of positions like moral 
scepticism may have very few costs, if any. In this chapter, I will examine whether 
the fact that atheists have reason to embrace moral scepticism is bad news for 
atheists and what some of the costs are. 
I will argue that embracing moral scepticism will have consequences that 
many atheists should view as undesirable. Firstly, I will criticise the revolutionary 
moral fictionalist proposal, according to which accepting moral scepticism isn't 
costly for atheists because even if they have to accept that their moral beliefs are 
unwarranted, atheists might nevertheless be able to make-believe, or pretend, that 
they have warranted moral beliefs and carryon with their moral life pretty much as 
before. Secondly, I will suggest that even if revolutionary moral fictionalism is 
generally viable, atheists still face costs. It appears that atheists will be unable to 
rationally endorse certain arguments that many of them have wanted to endorse, 
arguments that they don't want to just pretend to endorse. Perhaps ironically, atheists 
have sought support for atheism, and particularly for viewing atheism as more 
probable than theism, in such arguments; if atheists' moral beliefs are undermined 
and rendered unwarranted, therefore, it seems that these arguments for atheism are 
likewise undermined and that atheism loses any support it might have enjoyed from 
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such arguments. I will argue that there is reason to think that atheists will not be able 
to endorse the argument from evil (traditionally called "the problem of evil") and that 
they cannot reasonably take what they consider to be moral error in a purported 
divine revelation (such as the Bible) to be moral error and provide evidence against 
the claims that it is a good depository of moral truth and that it owes its origin to the 
claimed divine source. 
1. Introducing moral fictionalism 
I have said that some will view the conclusion that atheists should embrace 
moral scepticism as obviously bad news for atheists, and it isn't difficult to see why. 
To accept moral scepticism is to accept that all of one's moral beliefs are 
epistemically unwarranted, and we usually think that beliefs that are unwarranted -
and especially beliefs that we ourselves acknowledge to be unwarranted - should no 
longer be held. Indeed, we often expect that someone who acknowledges that they 
lack good reason to hold a belief (to be distinguished from thinking that they have 
good reason but being unable to articulate or remember what their reasons are) will 
no longer hold the belief, although their shedding the belief may be difficult if it is 
habitual or deeply ingrained or is a belief that we are biologically "wired" to have 
(and in that case, even if the beliefis difficult to give up, we would probably expect 
the person in question to stop asserting the belief). So isn't it the case that if the 
atheist's moral beliefs are unwarranted, and especially if she acknowledges them to 
be such, she should give them up? Or that she should try to give them up? At the 
very least, in the interests of truth, shouldn't atheists stop making unwarranted moral 
assertions? 
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If the answer is yes, then - assuming the argument of this essay thus far is 
correct - it appears that many atheists face bad news. Of course, there may be some 
who find dispensing with moral evaluation to be liberating, giving them a greater 
sense of freedom in deciding how they will live; in addition, some have suggested 
that getting rid of morality would be beneficial for the satisfaction of our desires 
because moral thought and discourse arouses and entrenches conflict and reduces the 
likelihood of compromise with others (Gamer 2007, pp.506-507). However, I 
suspect most atheists would view having to dispense with moral thought and 
discourse as very costly. For one thing, it may result in the sense of a loss of (e.g.) 
our actions' significance, triggered by our no longer thinking of the objects of our 
evaluation as having the kind of value (moral) that we used to think they have. For 
another, there is the practical problem of how we go about restructuring our ways of 
evaluating so that we avoid evaluation that is moral. And even if the restructuring 
project succeeds, even if atheists manage to rid themselves of moral evaluation, will 
the kinds of evaluation that replace it be adequate for the job? For example, it might 
be possible to rid ourselves of moral evaluation and instead just evaluate according to 
our non-moral desires and preferences. But evaluating just by our preferences would 
plausibly lack the force and authority of moral evaluation - will others be as 
impressed or moved by appeals to our desires as by appeals to the rightness or 
goodness of a course of action? It isn't hard to see, then, why some might think that 
the fact that atheists should embrace moral scepticism is clearly bad news for atheists, 
at least those atheists who have a fondness for morality and its benefits. 
Does atheist acceptance of moral scepticism suggest that atheists should try to 
dispense with moral evaluation and give up their moral views? A number of 
philosophers would presumably hold that it does, since they have held that such 
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would be the right response if we come to acknowledge that there are no moral truths 
or that certain of our moral concepts are problematic. 1 However, other philosophers 
have argued that even if we have good reason to think that all of our moral beliefs are 
false (plausibly a more severe conclusion than that they are unwarranted), we can 
nevertheless substantially retain our moral thought and discourse. These philosophers 
claim that even if we should stop believing the moral claims we have believed, 
nevertheless we can in effect continue to hold them and more or less continue to 
assert them. We may not strictly believe the moral claims, but we can have an 
attitude towards them that is significantly similar to belief - we can make-believe 
them, or pretend they are true.2 Likewise, we can pretend to assert them. If these 
philosophers are correct, then although atheists may have to "give up" their moral 
opinions in the sense of no longer believing them, nevertheless they can at the same 
time not "give up" their moral opinions - they can make-believe them. This position 
- that we should make-believe, or pretend, moral claims - is called moral jictionalism, 
or revolutionary moral jictionalism (hereafter simply the former). 3 It is a proposal for 
reforming-yet-essentially-retaining moral thought and discourse. 
Richard Joyce (2001) has been the most prominent spokesman for moral 
fictionalism, advocating it in the wake of arguing for error theory (that there are no 
I See Anscombe (1958, p.l) and Blackburn, "Errors and the Phenomenology of Value" (in Blackburn 
1993, pp.149-165), p.149. 
2 Could atheists acknowledge that their moral beliefs are unwarranted but continue to hold them as 
literal beliefs (not pretence) and literally assert them? I don't think so. The first thing to note is that 
the fact that we normally think one should give up, and stop asserting, a belief one acknowledges to 
be unwarranted at least provides a presumption against the reasonableness of such an idea - why 
should atheists' moral beliefs be an exception? In addition, there is something unstable about holding 
a belief, and therefore thinking it true, without thinking it warranted; so, I think that in order to retain 
literal moral belief, atheists would need to also have the false belief that their moral beliefs are 
warranted. But if atheists have in fact accepted that their moral beliefs are unwarranted - because of 
the argument for atheistic Darwinian moral scepticism - then it seems that, in order to maintain their 
moral beliefs, they will have to deceive themselves about this. I assume that most atheists will not find 
the proposal that they thus deceive themselves (however exactly the deception might proceed) an 
attractive one. 
3 Although proponents have largely simply called it "moral fictionalism" (as indeed I will mainly do 
in this chapter), it should be distinguished from the distinct position that Mark Kalderon (2005) has 
also called "moral fictionalism", mentioned in the previous chapter (in note 5). 
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moral facts and so all of our moral beliefs are false), although there have been other 
proponents (Nolan et al. 2005).4 If moral fictionalism is a viable strategy for people 
to adopt in light of the realisation that their moral beliefs are false or unwarranted, 
then there perhaps need be few costs to atheists who embrace moral scepticism. 
Although they will have to replace belief with make-believe, they may be able to 
carry on with morality pretty much as before. 
In the next few sections, I will explain moral fictionalism in a bit more detail 
by explaining Joyce's account of it - which is the most thorough account in the 
literature. I will explain the advantages that Joyce considers moral fictionalism to 
have (or to plausibly have, since he stresses that he is not certain about its viability). 
I will also argue that moral fictionalism will not be a viable strategy for atheists to 
adopt upon realising that they have reason to consider all their moral beliefs to be 
unwarranted. 
2. Richard Joyce on moral fictionalism 
Moral fictionalists called their position moral ./ictionalism because it is 
supposed to have certain affinities with fiction. We are all used to fictional claims; 
we come across such claims in books we read, in films we watch, and (although they 
aren't generally called "fictional", but rather "make-believe" or "pretend") in 
utterances made by children playing games such as "Cops and Robbers". Fictional 
claims may be false (or, such that we do not believe that they are true) but they are 
nevertheless not thereby disqualified from discourse; it can be perfectly proper and 
correct to make fictional claims despite the fact that they would be dubious or 
4 In addition to advocating moral fictionalism in response to error theory, Joyce seems to have 
advocated moral fictionalism in response to moral scepticism; I say he "seems to have advocated" 
because his discussion is very brief and he doesn't mention moral fictionalism by name (2006, 
pp.227fl). 
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mistaken if they were genuinely asserted claims about the real world. Suppose that I 
am an actor in a play and I play a character called Bernard who is married to a 
woman called Clarissa. In the play, I introduce Clarissa to another character and say, 
"This is my wife." Now, in acting out this part of the play I have spoken falsely - for 
I am not married to the actress who plays Clarissa. However, I am not really 
asserting that she is my wife; rather, I am pretending, or making-believe, that I am 
Bernard, and I am making-believe that the actress is Clarissa, and I am making 
believe that she is my wife. What I have said is, strictly speaking, false; however, it 
is nevertheless perfectly proper and correct. If someone in the audience stood up and 
proceeded to correct me because in fact the actress isn't my wife, they would be very 
confused indeed. The moral fictionalist's suggestion is that we can likewise perfectly 
properly pretend when it comes to moral thought and discourse. 5 Although we no 
longer believe the moral claims we did, we can decide to pretend - in our thoughts, 
utterances and actions - and carry on pretty much as before. Indeed, if we have a 
desire to continue with the framework of morality (or a desire for the benefits of 
doing so), then we have reason to adopt the pretence - not a moral reason, but a 
practical reason generated by our desires (we have reason to pretend because doing 
so will fulfil our desires). 
What exactly is the attitude that the person engaged in moral make-believe 
has towards moral claims? According to Joyce, the answer is thoughts (2001, p.197). 
Instead of believing that (say) murder is wrong, one entertains the thought that 
S Some fictionalists might construe fictional utterances as true, or believed to be true, but as 
containing an implicit "In the fiction" prefix. For instance, if we are talking about Star Wars and I say, 
"Darth Vader is Luke Skywalker's father," then it might be held that what I have said is true, because 
my utterance is to be understood as equivalent to, "In the Star Wars story, Darth Vader is Luke 
Skywalker's father," and that statement is true. However, although this is plausible when we are 
talking about a fiction from a standpoint outside of it, it seems less plausible as an account of our 
utterances when a fiction requires a higher level of engagement (such as acting or playing a game 
does); see Joyce (2001, pp.199-202). Nolan (2005) provides a good discussion of ways to understand 
fictional attitudes and claims. 
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murder is wrong. Now, one might worry that if the fictional attitude is simply 
thought, then the pretence will be too shallow. Will simply entertaining thoughts 
really provide a foundation for moral practice? Indeed, will engaging in moral 
pretence really just involve talking in a certain way - as ifwe believe moral claims -
and going through the motions, and nothing more? For, one might think, that is the 
case in examples like acting in a play: there are some words to say, and some actions 
to perform, but not much more. One might worry that this will be a poor substitute 
for moral belief and that it will lack the seeming authority and the motivational 
contribution to our behaviour that our current moral beliefs have. However, Joyce 
points out that we can have emotional responses to fiction, and that these emotions 
and feelings can sometimes be quite powerful (p.197). We sometimes cry during 
films or when reading books; at other times we get angry at characters that we really 
know don't exist. (Indeed, actors can really "get into" their role and "lose 
themselves" in it.) Engaging in pretence when it comes to morality may well employ 
the range of emotions we currently experience in forming real moral beliefs and 
making real moral assertions, and in that case moral make-belief may still have a 
seeming authority about it and the power to greatly influence our behaviour and 
motivate us to act, like our moral beliefs do. 
Someone might now have the opposite worry. They might wonder: if moral 
make-believe manages to mimic moral belief well, in what ways would it really 
differ? Of course, Joyce says that make-believe isn't (or wouldn't be) belief, but one 
might suspect that if it can guide our behaviour and thinking to the extent Joyce 
hopes it can (mimicking real moral belief) then it would actually be belief. Indeed, 
Joyce doesn't envisage the person who makes-believe finding themselves in a given 
situation and there and then consciously and explicitly deciding to engage in moral 
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pretence in that situation. Rather, he understands them to make the decision and then 
to lose themselves in the fiction, such that when they come across a situation which 
calls for moral action (or which, when they had moral beliefs, they believed calls for 
moral action) they engage in the pretence but without there and then explicitly 
considering that that is what they are doing. In that case, one might worry that such 
supposedly pretending moral agents would actually believe the moral claims they 
make and act on. 
To get around this worry, Joyce appeals to the notion of critical contexts. 
These are contexts of discussion or inquiry in which one considers the question of 
what they believe. Someone who embraces the moral fictionalist proposal will in 
some contexts make all kinds of moral claims (when she is pretending). In other 
contexts - for example, when delivering a metaethics lecture or writing a book 
arguing that all of our moral beliefs are dubious - the very same person will either 
deny, or refuse to assent to, the very same claims. Joyce holds that whether someone 
is engaged in a fictional practice depends upon what she assents to in the most 
critical context she finds herself in. One critical context C 1 is more critical than 
another C2 "if and only if Cl involves scrutiny and questioning of the kinds of 
attitude held in C2 but not vice versa" (p.193). 6 When discussing metaethics or 
writing a book defending moral fictionalism, moral fictionalists scrutinise and 
question everyday moral attitudes; they ask questions about the moral judgements 
that they and others make (say) when at the supermarket or watching the news or in 
other everyday activities. There is an asymmetry - when in the supermarket, 
watching the news, or engaged in other everyday activities, people do not scrutinise 
and question the kinds of attitude they have and judgements they make when doing 
6 I have changed the numbering to make it clearer. 
181 
metaethics. Therefore, the context where metaethics is being engaged in is the more 
critical context, the context that reveals our real beliefs. In that context, the moral 
fictionalist concedes that moral claims are dubious and admits to not having any 
moral beliefs. Therefore, her claims that such-and-such is right, wrong, good or bad 
in the everyday contexts - where metaethics doesn't arise - should be understood as 
pretence. 
One might worry that implementing the moral fictionalist proposal will lead 
to doublethink, and that the person who does so will end up self-deceived or 
desperately confused, but Joyce doesn't think that such must be the case. He nicely 
illustrates his understanding of moral fictionalism and the question of self-deception 
with the example of an enthusiastic Sherlock Holmes fan: 
"A ... [Sherlock] Holmes fan takes great pleasure in pretending that the stories 
are veridical. She visits the London sights that Holmes is said to have visited; 
she says, "If Holmes saw Moriarty here, and then lost track of him there, then 
he must have followed him down this street"; she pictures Holmes being 
there. For the space of the day, perhaps, she gives in to the fiction and 
"forgets" all about Conan Doyle ... To call this character "self-deceived" is 
unfair, since she can, at any time, readopt the critical perspective from which 
she knows very well that it's all fiction ... The moral fictionalist is in 
important respects like this ... He is not self-deceived, since it is within his 
grasp to enter the "critical mode" should he care to ... When the context of 
discussion shifts towards the more rigorous, philosophical end of the 
spectrum - when the person is asked about what he really believes - then the 
maker of the fictive judgement can, but the victim of self-deception cannot, 
move with the context" (pp.195-196). 
However, Joyce doesn't believe that one who engages in moral pretence can 
be quite like the Holmes fan. He holds that for moral make-believe to be viable, it 
needs to be the case that a group adopt it - not just the odd isolated person. The 
reason for this is that, given that at the moment people are forming real moral beliefs 
and asserting those beliefs when they make moral claims, one who simply started 
pretending on their own - Joyce terms such a person a "lone fictionalist" (p.203) -
182 
would fail to properly communicate, and their utterances would be deceptive because 
people would take them to believe the moral claims they utter. So, while he doesn't 
say exactly how many people need to embrace it, he holds that, "if [the fictional 
attitude] is to be viable, it must be an attitude that a group may take towards a 
hitherto believed theory" (p.204). 
Joyce is hopeful that ifa large enough group were to adopt moral fictionalism 
and engage in moral make-believe (such that it became viable) it would deliver many 
of the benefits of full-fledged moral belief. He doesn't claim that moral make-believe 
will have all of the benefits of moral belief, but he is hopeful that it will prove 
significantly better than simply dispensing with moral thought and discourse. He 
argues that moral make-believe may be able to motivate us as moral belief does, 
which would be useful because often moral judgements dissuade us from doing 
things that would be imprudent and frustrate the satisfaction of many of our desires. 
On this note, he provides the example of having the desire to steal sweets from a 
shop; moral belief and moral make-believe can help one not to act on that desire, 
which means that one doesn't get caught shop lifting and end up having a lot of their 
other desires frustrated (p.223). He acknowledges that it is possible that the moral 
fictionalist will at that moment reflect on what they are doing and find themselves so 
confronted with reality (that they really don't believe any of this morality stuff) that 
they will thereby be unable to engage in make-believe to the extent that it can 
overrule their desire to steal, which they think (possibly wrongly) they can get away 
with doing. But Joyce doesn't think that this is a particular problem for moral 
fictionalism, since even if one really believes that it is wrong to steal, they still might 
find themselves suffering from weakness of will and give in to their desire to steal. In 
short, there is no guarantee that one will act in accordance with their make-believe, 
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but there is similarly no guarantee that one will act in accordance with moral belief; 
so moral fictionalism isn't at a great disadvantage on that score (p.227). 
It should be noted that while Joyce does not argue that moral fictionalism will 
be just as good as full-fledged moral belief when it comes to satisfying our desires, 
that is nevertheless a view a moral fictionalist could adopt. And a great benefit of 
moral fictionalism would be that those who adopt it could evaluate actions, persons, 
states of affairs (etc) with a framework that routinely influences others and that is 
already habitual and completely familiar. 
3. General problems for moral fictionalism 
Although moral fictional ism has a number of advocates, it nevertheless also 
has its detractors. One major problem it faces is that it is hard to believe that moral 
make-believe will actually be able to motivate adequately when it comes to difficult 
moral decisions and dilemmas. As I have mentioned, Joyce presents us with the 
example of making-believe that stealing is wrong when in a shop; by engaging in the 
moral make-believe, we dissuade ourselves from stealing. However, while it might 
be plausible that engaging in moral make-believe could help one to resist stealing 
sweets, it is doubtful whether it will be able to provide real authoritative guidance in 
other cases where doing what morality requires is more difficult. As Hallvard 
Lillehammer says: 
"For the sake of pretence, I will happily fetch the water, cook the paella, wash 
the dishes, or even kill the ants (much like children undertake make-believe 
obligations when playing house). In other cases, the fictionalist strategy will 
only succeed if someone is literally taken in by the fiction ... Moral thought 
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frequently prescribes costly sacrifices, such as the abandonment of basic 
personal projects or the involuntary tennination of life" (2004, p.l 01). 7 
It is difficult to see why, when the moral demand is costly, the moral 
fictionalist won't bring to mind the fact that morality is dubious and satisfy her non-
moral desires instead. After all, there is no reason to think that bringing to mind the 
dubious status of morality, and the fact that she is pretending, will be particularly 
difficult; indeed, her belief that moral claims have a dubious status might force itself 
upon her involuntarily. But, once she has brought that to mind, it is hard to believe 
that she will be able to carry on with the pretence. 
Joyce could perhaps reply that, in many situations, including ones where 
morality prescribes very costly behaviour, an agent will need to act quickly and will 
be so immersed in the situation that she will have no real opportunity to bring to 
mind the problematic status of morality and the fact that she is pretending. For 
example, suppose that a moral fictionalist is looking after somebody else's children, 
children she isn't particularly fond of, and the children have fallen into a fast-flowing 
river. She knows that to jump in and attempt a rescue will involve putting her own 
life in great danger, but feels the moral demand of a duty to the children and their 
parents to attempt a rescue. In such a case, she has to think and act quickly, and it 
might seem unlikely that she will bring to mind the metaethical considerations she 
has thought about in her study and which led her to a conclusion of error theory or 
moral scepticism. 
However, while I grant that it is possible that some or even many cases of 
morality's demanding costly sacrifice may be cases where there simply isn't time to 
bring to mind one's considered metaethical views (although I am less than convinced 
1 Lillehammer has in mind a different moral pretence - that if we managed to rid ourselves of all non-
moral disagreement then our moral views would converge on a single view - but his point is pertinent 
to Joyce's fictionalism too. 
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about that), there will nevertheless be many cases where agents have a lot of time to 
deliberate and carefully consider which action to perfonn, removed from the scene 
where the effects of their action (or of their inaction) will be felt. A good example 
would be charitable giving. Although it is perhaps plausible that a moral fictionalist 
would be too distracted to reflect on her metaethical views when (e.g.) accosted and 
asked for money by a needy person or somebody collecting for charity on the street, 
it is hard to see why she won't bring them to mind when she is alone in her study 
with (e.g.) a charity's request for financial aid in one hand and her chequebook in the 
other. There is no pressure to act immediately; she can fully reflect on the situation 
and bring her considered metaethical views to bear upon it. In such a case, it would 
be strange if she nevertheless continued to pretend that she is required to give to 
charity. It seems to me that in the quiet of the study, the moral fictionalist will be 
able to prevent metaethical thoughts from intruding only if she is very forgetful or -
to put it bluntly - a bit dim (which seems inconsistent with her following the 
reasoning that makes moral fictionalism an attractive prospect in the first place). So 
it seems to me that adopting the moral fictionalist's proposal will lead to a restricting 
of morality's demands, as moral decisions formed in circumstances that allow 
reflection fall by the wayside (that is, the moral pretence is abandoned in such 
circumstances) and only moral decisions formed in more urgent and immanent 
circumstances remain. (This isn't to say that people might not continue to sometimes 
act in accordance with morality's demands in situations that allow for reflection, 
only that they will do so out of prudence or to satisfy non-moral desires rather than 
from moral belief or moral make-believe.) Of course, it is difficult to be sure about 
this, since in the final analysis it is an empirical matter to what extent moral 
fictionalism can mimic moral belief, one that depends upon the psychology of actual 
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agents. Maybe the pretence won't be abandoned in such circumstances. Nevertheless, 
the prospects do not look good to me. 
I have suggested that moral make-believe will be a poor substitute for moral 
belief because it will fail to mimic moral belief in important ways (it won't be 
maintained in all of the situations in which moral belief currently exists) However, 
suppose that moral make-believe instead apparently does an excellent job of 
mimicking moral belief in every way. I think that if that is so, then another worry 
arises. It isn't clear that we really will have a case of moral make-believe mimicking 
moral belief. Plausibly, the supposed moral fictionalist will be in the situation of 
really believing that morality has dubious credentials and also really believing the 
moral claims that they are meant to be pretending are true. As I have mentioned, 
Joyce's way around this worry is to appeal to different critical contexts and claim 
that the fact that the purported moral make-believer disavows her moral judgements 
in the metaethical context reveals that the moral attitudes she has in other contexts 
aren't really beliefs. The problem is, it is possible that moral make-believers are (or 
would become) believers in moral claims when they are in everyday, less critical 
contexts and non-believers in moral claims when they are in the more critical, 
metaethical context. For while it is implausible to suggest that (e.g.) the Sherlock 
Holmes fan believes that Holmes really had been in the London locations where she 
makes-believe he had when she is engaged in her pretence, it is not so implausible to 
suppose that moral fictionalists might believe the moral claims they purport to 
pretend when they are engaged in their "pretence". In no way does it appear to the 
Holmes fan as if Holmes had been there; plausibly, however, it will continue to 
appear to moral fictionalists that certain actions (say) have certain moral qualities _ 
after all, they have been trained for a long time to evaluate morally and doing so has 
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become habitual. It is plausible, then, that whereas the Holmes fan can lose herself in 
the fiction without thereby falling into belief, a moral fictionalist who loses 
themselves in the fiction will fall into belief, with the help of habituation (and 
perhaps also biology). Indeed, to the extent that her moral judgements provide as 
great motivation as they did before she came to view morality as dubious, I would 
suspect that she still believes moral claims, even if she disbelieves them in other 
contexts.S In that case, failing to discard moral judgement and discourse may lead to 
"moral fictionalists" actually being in the undesirable state of falling in and out of 
moral belief. 
There is another reason why Joyce's appeal to critical contexts is 
problematic.9 Here the problem is with moral discussion, rather than action. Suppose 
you and I are considering and talking about the morality of a certain action; say, a 
pre-emptive military strike. While it might be the case that one of us simply states 
what we think, or that we both agree, it wouldn't be all that unusual if we disagreed 
with each other. Or at any rate, we might talk about those who disagree with us. It 
would be very easy for the discussion to move to consideration and scrutiny of our 
moral beliefs and not simply of the military strike. We might discuss moral feelings 
and reasons and putative sources of moral knowledge. I might say that you are being 
too emotional; you might say that I am being too cold and detached; I might criticise 
the weight you give to moral "hunches" and say that to really know if the action is 
right or wrong, we need to consider the wider situation; you might disagree. 
Suddenly the context is not only one where the moral propriety of the military strike 
is being scrutinised (or pretended about, if we are moral fictionalists); in addition, the 
8 Richard Gamer also realises such a possibility, especially if the more critical contexts where one 
acknowledges they engage in pretence are rare (2007, p.509). 
9 My already-mentioned objection concerning moral pretence when one has time to reflect also 
concerned critical contexts - there the worry is that when one has time and space for reflection, the 
context wiJI become one that is critical (via the intrusion of metaethical thoughts). 
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status of our moral judgements, moral feelings, and moral reasoning is in question. 
Even if I don't scrutinise my own moral judgements and sensibility too much, 
perhaps simply taking them for granted, nevertheless if you disagree with me I may 
wonder about possible illegitimate influences on your moral sensibility. But as soon 
as this happens, we are in a context where the status of our moral judgements has 
arisen, as has the issue of potentially illegitimate influences leading us to think as we 
do. And this looks like a very critical context. It is a context in which we are 
questioning the status of our moral judgements and feelings and therefore a context 
in which the reasons why moral belief has been thought dubious, which have 
prompted the adoption of moral fictionalism in the first place (such as the argument 
for atheistic Darwinian moral scepticism), could be expected to rear their heads and 
join other possible reasons to think our moral judgements might be dubious on the 
table for discussion. It looks like a critical context in which the moral fictionalist, if 
they really don't believe moral claims and do consider all moral judgements to be 
false or unwarranted, will say so. 
If I am right about this, then it seems that moral fictionalism will not be 
viable. Moral fictionalism depends upon there being distinct contexts in some of 
which metaethical claims are on the table (and so morality will be renounced) and in 
others of which moral but not metaethical claims are on the table (and moral make-
believe can be engaged in). But it looks like it is too easy for the latter sort of context 
to collapse into the former, especially when it comes to moral discussion and 
disagreement. Moral contexts can too easily become metaethical contexts. 10 
10 Gamer agrees: "Any time we find ourselves involved in some difficult question of applied ethics, 
questions of metaethics inevitably arise. It is often reasonable to ask if some disagreement may be 
based on a semantic misunderstanding, and it is customary for both sides of any moral argument to 
display and demand reasons" (2007, p.505). And: "Joyce may believe that...metaethical excursions 
would be rare, but I suspect that questions about meaning and justification will tum up as soon as we 
disagree about anything that really matters to us. Since very many things do matter to us, frequent 
189 
I will consider one more general problem for moral fictionalism. As has been 
seen, Joyce explicitly says that, to be viable, moral make-believe needs to be 
embraced by a group. The problem with a lone ranger fictionalist is that they are 
engaged in pretence when everybody else really believes, and so they either fail to 
communicate, or are deceptive, or both. Such problems make lone ranger 
fictionalism unattractive. However, I think that there will be difficulties in avoiding 
lone ranger fictionalism, at least in an interim. For the conclusion that we all (or, a 
sizeable number of us, such as those who are atheists) should view our moral beliefs 
as having dubious credentials is one that people may only accept gradually. The 
same holds true for the claim that moral fictionalism should be embraced; it may take 
atheists, for example, time to be persuaded that there are sufficient benefits to 
retaining moral thought and discourse as make-believe. Joyce's arguments for error 
theory and his advocacy of moral fictionalism can be taken as an example. Suppose 
that every member of every philosophy department found Joyce's arguments for 
error theory and for moral fictionalism convincing. We might all agree among 
ourselves that we will engage in moral make-believe with each other. Nevertheless, 
we all have to venture outside and deal with those who aren't philosophers and who 
haven't (yet) signed up to moral fictionalism - the checkout staff at the shop, the 
bank manager, the people at the tram stop, family members, etc. Although we and 
metaethical digressions will remind us of our belief in the error theory [or our moral scepticism], and 
that will make it increasingly difficult to stay immersed in our fiction" (pp.508-509). 
James Lenman has suggested another worry to me - is moral fictionalism consistent with 
doing ethics as a philosophy subject? After all, if the philosophy classroom is the most critical context, 
then won't the moral fictionalist when delivering their ethics lectures have to avoid moral claims? 
And in that case, wouldn't trying to work out what is right and what is wrong - the business of ethics -
be an impossible exercise? However, I think that even if we all embraced moral fictionalism, 
philosophers could nevertheless continue with ethics, albeit in a modified form. Instead of asking and 
considering questions like, "Is euthanasia wrong?" they could ask questions like, "Would moral make-
believe sufficiently in tune with our moral feelings and the moral beliefs we used to have consider 
euthanasia to be wrong?" or something along those lines. That said, one might suspect that in working 
out their answers to such questions, supposed moral fictionalists would in fact be consulting and 
refining (unofficial) moral beliefs· 
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our colleagues may have embraced the moral fiction, we will nevertheless each day 
rub shoulders with many people who haven't. Our discussions and interactions with 
them may require moral claims or moral action, in which case we adopt our pretence 
but either fail to communicate or else act deceptively (since others will take our 
moral claims to be genuine assertions of belief, whereas we do not in fact believe the 
moral claims we utter). We might be able to inform non-fictionalists about our 
metaethical views, and perhaps even convert them to the moral fictionalism that we 
embrace, but it seems this will only be possible in small steps. It might end up the 
case that a huge number of people adopt moral fictionalism and that when we engage 
in moral make-believe in our daily lives we are neither deceiving nor failing to 
communicate since enough of us are well aware of what we are all doing. However, 
it can't start there. It seems that if moral fictionalism is to be embraced, it will 
require a period of its advocates being lone ranger fictionalists, or belonging to a 
relatively small group who, while they communicate non-deceptively with each other 
(since they are all aware of the fact that they are engaged in moral make-believe), 
nevertheless fail to communicate, and are deceptive, when it comes to the wider 
society and the larger groups they find themselves part of. 11 If we are error theorists 
or moral sceptics, we will be unconvinced that such deception would be morally 
problematic, but nevertheless I think it is something that would be uncongenial to 
many atheists' wishes and desires. Also, even if moral sceptics don't believe that 
deception is wrong, and so don't face a problem on that count, it seems it would be 
impossible (at least at first) to live faithfully in accordance with a moral pretence 
II This is another problem for moral fictionalism that Richard Gamer has also noticed: "If we are to 
be ... moral fictionalists we will either have to speak "morality" only with the members of our group, 
or bring it about that the larger group accepts a convention to the effect that uttering a moral 
judgement triggers a withdrawal of assertoric force" (p.S09). 
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which includes pretending that deception is wrong - if one pretends, one deceives 
and so does something that one pretends is wrong. 
Given these problems for moral fictionalism, it seems to me that it is not 
viable. 
4. Special problems for atheist moral fictionalism 
In addition to the problems with the moral fictionalist proposal that I have 
discussed above, I think that there are additional problems when it comes to the 
suggestion that atheists embrace moral fictionalism in response to the realisation that 
they should accept moral scepticism. Earlier in this essay I have argued that, while 
atheists have reason to embrace moral scepticism, it is by no means clear that theists 
have reason to; there are problems with arguments for moral scepticism that draw on 
empirical considerations apart from the question of atheism (see chapter 2), and the 
argument for atheistic Darwinian moral scepticism (in chapter 3) applies to atheists 
but not theists. This is important, because although many atheists might think that 
theists should embrace atheism and therefore accept moral scepticism too, theists 
themselves will not acknowledge this. Many theists hold that theism, or a particular 
theistic tradition, has significant evidential support in its favour (e.g., Copan and 
Moser 2003; Swinburne 2004; Craig 2008), and others hold that warranted theistic 
belief doesn't require as much evidential support as many have assumed (e.g., 
Plantinga 2000; Abraham 2006; Peters 2009). Therefore, we end up with the 
following situation: assuming the agreed cogency of the argument for atheistic 
Darwinian moral scepticism, atheists will acknowledge that all of their moral beliefs 
are unwarranted (and theists will agree), but theists will not acknowledge that their 
moral beliefs are all unwarranted. Because of this asymmetry, even if all atheists 
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embraced moral scepticism and also agreed to adopt moral make-believe, it 
nevertheless is very implausible that theists would join them in embracing moral 
scepticism or take up moral fictionalism. But in that case, the potential group that the 
moral fictionalist hopes will come to embrace moral fictionalism - thus rendering 
moral make-believe something that doesn't involve a lack of communication and 
isn't deceptive - will not include theists, the number of which is significant. 
So far, my remarks simply call into question the plausibility of the idea that 
the circle of moral fictionalists might expand until moral fictional ism is generally 
accepted, and others have also noticed that the implausibility of this poses a problem 
for moral fictionalism. 12 Perhaps this will not be too much of a problem if enough 
atheists embrace moral fictionalism; if there are a sizeable number of moral 
fictionalists then it may constitute a group large enough for moral fictionalism to not 
involve deception and lack of communication, or at least to not involve too much of 
it. Indeed, we can suppose that it could come to be the case that a large body of 
atheists embrace moral fictionalism and that everybody - theists included - knows 
that atheists have done so. In that case, it seems that atheists' engaging in moral 
make-believe need not involve deception at all. Everybody would know that they 
don't believe the moral claims they make. 
Nevertheless, I think that a problem would remain for atheists, and this is 
where my points about the atheist-theist asymmetry above are significant. For theists 
would have the ability to bring metaethical considerations to the fore in any moral 
discussion or disagreement with atheists, thus making the context of discussion a 
more critical one and one in which atheists will be unable to maintain their moral 
pretence. If it were the case that everybody embraced moral fictionalism, then 1 
12 Again, Gamer has noticed the same problem; he points out that the number of people who are likely 
to accept Joyce's error theory for the reasons he gives (and to then embrace moral fictionalism) will 
be small, at least at present (p.512). 
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suppose this might not happen. If we all face the problem that raising the metaethical 
issues spoils our engagement in the moral fiction and reminds us that we have no 
warranted moral beliefs, then we might all refrain from raising metaethical issues 
when engaged in moral discussion or disagreement - I might not raise an issue (the 
dubiousness of moral judgements) that frustrates what you want to say if it also 
frustrates what I want to say. Maybe. But theists are not in the same boat, or at any 
rate will not consider themselves to be in the same boat, as atheists when it comes to 
moral scepticism. (And theists won't be moral fictionalists.) So if atheists become 
atheistic moral fictionalists, theists could potentially frustrate their engagement in the 
fiction by continually raising the metaethical issues, reminding atheists of the 
argument for atheistic Darwinian moral scepticism and drawing attention to the fact 
that atheists are engaged in pretence. In the same way, I suspect that one can wreck a 
children's game of make-believe by (a) stressing to them that they don't really 
believe that (for example) they are a cowboy and their friend is an Indian, and (b) 
pointing out and making them acknowledge what they really believe - that they are 
children who have dressed up, and that they are in a garden in England and not the 
Wild West, etc. By drawing attention to atheistic moral fictionalists' pretence, and 
thereby wrecking it, theists would frustrate the benefits that atheistic moral 
fictionalists seek to derive from engagement in the fiction. Furthermore, it seems that 
theists would have motive to do so. On the one hand, theists might object to the 
hijack of terminology and sentiments that were used (and, theists might think, were 
intended by God to be used) to state beliefs and make genuine important assertions. 
Theists might view moral make-believe no more highly than they would view 
religious make-believe. In addition, there are certain areas of moral disagreement 
where many atheists are on one side of the debate and many theists are on the other 
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(e.g., the debate over the morality of abortion). 13 At present, such debates involve 
moral claims and moral reasoning being deployed by both sides. If the atheists who 
engage in such debates were to adopt moral fictionalism, theists would surely want to 
point out and draw attention to the fact that when the atheists make and defend moral 
claims contrary to theists' moral views, the atheists don't actually believe the claims 
they are making. Theists can make the context a critical one and get their atheist 
opponents to admit (if they are honest) that they do not have any moral beliefs, or at 
least not officially - not any that they believe are warranted. Such an opportunity in 
debate would be too good - and theists will think too important - to miss. But in that 
case, the moral pretence would be ruined. Deprived of the use of moral claims, 
atheists participating in such debates would have to either exit the debates or else 
change their contribution so that their position does not concern the morality of the 
issue being debated but rather something else (such as appeal to the satisfaction of 
our non-moral desires). Naturally, it would be open to the atheist participants in such 
debates to argue that the theist's position is untenable because it involves 
inconsistency or appeals to a false empirical claim, or because theism is false or 
unwarranted. However, leaving aside the questions of consistency and empirical 
veracity (which will depend upon the particularities of each debate), the problem 
with the appeal to the falsity of theism, or its lack of warrant, is that it is unlikely to 
persuade theists; after all, many theists are familiar with the arguments against 
theism but find them unpersuasive. Again, the fact remains that there is an 
asymmetry between how atheists and theists will consider the warrant of their moral 
beliefs, and such asymmetry would be expected to disadvantage the atheist. The fact 
13 The abortion debate is a particularly apt example, since (whether or not it is in fact true) it appears 
to be widely held that only theists are against abortion at all stages of development from conception to 
birth. 
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that the atheist considers the theist's theism to be false or unwarranted (or both) will 
not be of help in the envisaged circumstances. 
So, given the arguments of this section and the previous one, it seems to me 
that embracing moral fictionalism will not be a viable strategy for atheists to adopt 
upon accepting moral scepticism. It appears that atheists will have to abandon moral 
thought and discourse (or at the very least try to abandon moral belief - trying not to 
endorse any moral beliefs which perhaps might at times be formed involuntarily -
and certainly stop making moral assertions) and perhaps replace it with a different 
kind of evaluation; for example, evaluating solely by reference to non-moral 
desires. 14 
5. Moral scepticism and real truth-seeking inquiry 
I have argued that moral fictionalism won't be a viable strategy for atheists to 
adopt to mitigate the effects of accepting moral scepticism. If I am right about that, 
then when atheists acknowledge that their moral beliefs are unwarranted, they will be 
unable to continue engaging in moral thought and discourse. Nevertheless, it is 
important to point out that even if moral fictionalism did prove viable, I think that the 
fact that atheists have reason to embrace moral scepticism would still bring in its 
wake consequences that will be unwelcome to many atheists. 
14 This is what Gamer - who accepts moral error theory - advises. 
What about the possibility that atheists adopt an expressivist approach not as a description of 
actual moral thought and discourse, but as a reformation of it? I have argued in chapter 4 that 
expressivism is false, and that our moral beliefs represent the world as containing moral properties and 
facts; given that, I do not think it is at al1 clear that we could use moral sentences and claims to 
express desire-like attitudes and not genuine beliefs. (At any rate, it isn't clear that we could use them 
that way without that constituting a massive departure from moral thought and discourse that 
wouldn't really count as a way of more-or-less retaining it.) However, even if we could, I think that 
some of the objections to moral fictionalism considered in this chapter would apply; for example. 
there are the problems of deceiving the larger population as to what is being done when moral 
judgements are voiced and the proposal appears vulnerable to the problems concerning moral debates 
with theists that I have discussed. 
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Even if atheists were to adopt the moral fictionalist proposal, it is clear that 
there are some contexts in which the pretence will be acknowledged to be such (if 
there weren't any contexts of this sort, moral fictionalists couldn't argue for moral 
fictionalism or suggest that atheists accept it). In the philosophy classroom, engaged 
in real truth-seeking inquiry into the nature of the world, or when writing philosophy 
books defending moral scepticism or moral fictionalism, atheistic moral fictionalists 
will want to come clean and acknowledge both that they have no warranted moral 
beliefs and that in the course of their everyday lives they are engaged in moral make-
believe; the person who still endorses their moral opinions in the context of a 
metaethical discussion in a philosophy classroom is no moral sceptic. Therefore. 
even if (contrary to what I have maintained) moral fictionalism is viable. there will 
still be contexts where atheists cannot make moral claims. So, if atheists want to 
endorse moral claims in such contexts, moral scepticism incurs a cost, even ifmoral 
fictionalism is generally viable. Given that the philosophy classroom looks like a 
very critical context, it seems that atheists will not be able to accept arguments that 
have moral premises that are put forward in such a context. And indeed, not only will 
atheists have to fail to engage in pretence in such contexts, engaging in moral 
pretence may be wholly inappropriate because atheists may really care about 
whether the conclusions of arguments with moral premises that they consider in the 
philosophy classroom are true or not. They might not find it much comfort if they 
could pretend that the premises are true or warranted and on that basis pretend that 
the conclusion is true or warranted. Many atheists have wanted to endorse arguments 
with moral premises in the context of the philosophy classroom and real inquiry into 
the nature of the world; perhaps ironically, many atheists have endorsed such 
arguments and considered them to provide evidence for the claim that atheism is 
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more likely to be true than theism. In the remainder of this chapter, I consider two 
such arguments (or families of arguments), which are currently endorsed by many 
atheistic philosophers but, I suggest, atheists will no longer be able to reasonably 
endorse once they have embraced moral scepticism: the argument from evil, and 
"Unholy Scripture" arguments. 
6. The argument from evil 
The argument from evil is more traditionally called "the problem of evil" 
(since it is thought to pose a problem for theism) and is a rubric for arguments that 
reason from premises that assess features of the world in a morally negative way -
that is, premises that describe the world as containing bad states of affairs or "evils" 
- to the non-existence of God, or the reduced probability of God's existence, or the 
greater probability of atheism than theism. In short, it is argued that the world 
contains bad features that an all-good and all-powerful being would not (or probably 
would not) allow to exist and that, since the world exhibits those features, such an 
all-good and all-powerful being (God) doesn't exist (or probably doesn't exist). 
Versions of the argument from evil are probably the best-known, and oldest, anti-
theistic arguments in philosophy. They are widely endorsed; for example, in a recent 
collection of essays by (mainly) atheist philosophers on atheism and the secular life 
(Antony 2007), many of the contributors cited the argument from evil as an 
important consideration in support of their atheism. 
As I have suggested, the argument from evil comes in different versions, and 
space unfortunately precludes much more than a brief overview of them here. The 
argument as originally formulated claimed that the existence of God is logically 
incompatible with the existence of any amount of evil at all. It was held that the 
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propositions God exists and there is evil are inconsistent, the idea being that (a) if 
God is omnipotent then He could prevent there being any evil, and (b) if God is 
perfectly good, He would want to prevent there being any evil, so (c) if God exists, 
He will prevent there being any evil. Since there is evil, God doesn't exist. One 
instance of evil was considered enough to refute God's existence. However, 
contemporary philosophers of religion appear unanimous in holding that the 
argument in that form is a failure (Hasker 2008, pp.55-69); the reason why, in short, 
is that neither God's omnipotence nor His goodness would be compromised if He 
allowed the occurrence of some evils such that (I) the existence of the evils secured 
the existence of a greater good that could not be had without the corresponding evils, 
or (2) the genuine possibility that the evils might occur was necessary for the sake of 
a greater good. More recent versions of the argument from evil (often labelled the 
"evidential" or "probabilistic" argument from evil) do not appeal to the simple fact 
that there is evil but rather reason from the character of the evils the world contains. 
They claim that there is too much evil for God to have allowed, or that God wouldn't 
allow evil to be distributed in the ways we find it to be, or that He wouldn't allow the 
types of evil we find, or (pointing to a particular example of evil) He wouldn't pennit 
the occurrence of that evil. Furthennore, the claim made is that various features of 
the evils that we find provide evidence against God's existence, although the 
evidence is often taken to be more or less conclusive. It is acknowledged (in contrast 
to the original version of the argument) that God might allow the evils in question if 
He had a good reason to allow them, but it is argued that we are warranted in 
believing that He would have no such good reason; we are warranted in believing 
this because we cannot think of any good reason, such as a greater good the existence 
of which is secured by the existence of the evil. Furthermore, whereas the cogency of 
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the older version would make the theist's theism untenable and the atheist's atheism 
warranted (that is, it would demonstrate that the possibility of reasonable theistic 
belief was ruled out for everyone), if evil is taken to provide less-than-conclusive 
evidence against theism then whether it makes theistic belief unreasonable will 
depend upon what other evidence one has. If someone has good evidence for theism 
then they might be reasonable in believing that God has a good reason for allowing 
the evils we find even if they can't think of what such a reason could be. Therefore, 
while some have directed the argument from evil against theists and argued that it 
makes their theism untenable (Mackie 1982), other atheists allow that some theists 
could possibly have an outweighing reason to accept theism but maintain that the evil 
we find in the world warrants their atheism (Rowe 1979). 
While space precludes much more than this overview, it will be helpful to 
have at least one instance of the argument from evil in front of us. William Rowe's 
influential version is as follows (Rowe 1979, p.2): 
1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient 
being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or 
permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any 
intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing 
some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. 
Rowe supports the first premise with the example of a fawn dying slowly in 
great pain after suffering severe burns in a forest fire. Unable to think of a greater 
good that the fawn's suffering secures, or a worse evil that it prevents, Rowe 
concludes that there is good reason to believe premise I. In addition, he takes 
premise 2 as more or less self-evident. So, he concludes that there is good reason to 
believe the conclusion - 3 - and deny that God exists. 
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Theists have defended a range of responses to different versions of the 
argument from evil, and just as space precludes much more than a brief overview of 
arguments from evil, so space likewise precludes saying much about them here. 15 
However, I will consider one kind of theistic response to the argument from evil, 
which is to offer a theodicy.16 Although theists disagree about the requirements that a 
theodicy must have in order to be successful, a theodicy is an attempt to "justify the 
ways of God to man" by providing reasons why God might well allow the bad states 
of affairs the atheist points to - reasons that would or might justify an omnipotent, 
omniscient being who allowed them to occur; that is, that would or might render such 
a being not less than morally perfect in allowing them to occur. Although the 
expounder of a theodicy (a theodicist) doesn't usually claim to be confident that she 
is giving God's actual reasons for allowing bad states of affairs to occur (to do so is 
sometimes viewed as presumptuous), nevertheless she offers them as reasons that are 
live candidates for God's actual reasons. Sometimes theodicists claim that the 
reasons they identify would (or do) justify God in allowing the identified bad states 
of affairs; other theodicists make the more modest claim that we should not be at all 
confident that the reasons they identify don't justify God in allowing those states of 
affairs, and that therefore the argument from evil still fails because it will not be 
reasonable to believe all of the argument's premises. Some theodicists argue that, for 
every bad state of affairs that occurs, God has a specific reason tied to that state of 
affairs - some outweighing good is secured by the existence of that particular bad 
state of affairs - and they try to identify what that good could be. (Such a strategy 
involves attacking or rejecting premises of arguments from evil like the first premise 
IS William Hasker's recent book (2008) provides a good overview of the history of the debate and its 
current state. 
16 The most popular theistic response at present may be the "sceptical theist" response, which claims 
that no theodicy need be offered; see the essays collected by Howard-Snyder (1996), However, for 
criticism, see Hasker (2008, pp.180-187). 
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in Rowe's argument above.) Other theodicists argue that God might have a good 
reason to create a world where bad things occur without each individual evil's 
occurrence always being necessary for the existence of an outweighing good; for 
example, some argue that God may have good reason to create a world where many 
bad things occur more or less at random in that their pattern of occurrence is not 
closely tied to securing the existence of any particular good (van Inwagen 1988; 
2006; Hasker 2008, ch.7). (That strategy involves attacking or rejecting premises of 
arguments from evil that are like the second premise in Rowe's argument above.) 
If a theodicy is successful, then the argument from evil fails because the 
claim that God would have no sufficient reason to allow the occurrence of the evils 
in question has been shown to be false or at least such that it should not be accepted. 
Naturally, atheists who continue to press the argument from evil argue that the 
proposed theodicies are not successful - that the proposed reasons for God to allow 
the evils we find would not be sufficient to justify the occurrence of the evils - and 
that theists are wrong in suggesting otherwise. The debate often ends in a stalemate 
with a clash of differing moral judgements between theodicists and theodicies' 
detractors. As theistic philosopher Richard Swinburne writes in the context of 
presenting a theodicy: 
"I have almost always found in discussion of these matters that my opponents 
are usually happy to grant me, when I bring the suggestion to their attention, 
that the states which I describe as "goods" cannot be had without the 
corresponding evils, and quite often happy to grant that the former states are 
indeed good states and even that a world is not on balance worse tor 
containing a few of these goods in the mildest of forms with the 
corresponding evils than it would otherwise be. But my opponents usually 
object to the scale - there are, they claim, too many, too various, and too 
serious evils to justify bringing about the goods which they make possible ... 1 
suggest that the reluctance of my opponents to see [the true value of the 
goods] arises primarily from overestimating the goodness of mere pleasure 
and the evil of mere pain, and grossly underestimating the value of being of 
use and being helped" (1996, p.44, my italics). 
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Theists like Swinburne develop their theodicies and, in the light of them, 
consider the argument from evil to have been adequately answered. Their opponents, 
disagreeing with theodicists' moral assessment of various states of affairs, either 
consider the theodicies presented to be unacceptable for theists (holding that theists 
are unwarranted in believing the moral claims that figure in their theodicies) or at 
least consider themselves to have good reason to reject the theodicies as inadequate -
and therefore good reason to maintain their acceptance of the premises of the 
argument from evil and to endorse the conclusion that God does not exist - on the 
basis of their warranted rejection of the moral claims that the theodicies employ. 
7. Moral scepticism and the argument from evil 
If atheists have reason to accept moral scepticism and consider all of their 
moral beliefs unwarranted, what bearing will this have upon how they should view 
the argument from evil and the debate over it? The first thing to note is that the 
premises of versions of the argument from evil include moral claims. Note, for 
example, the premises of Rowe's argument above - they make reference to the idea 
of things that are good and things that are bad ("evil") and to what a wholly good 
being would do. Therefore, it seems that - at least in contexts of real inquiry into the 
nature of the world - atheists will be unable to affirm the premises of versions of the 
argument such as Rowe's. And it seems that atheists will be in the same position 
with regard to all versions of the argument from evil - if you don't believe that there 
are bad states of affairs (or evils) because you accept moral scepticism, it seems that 
you cannot hold that there exist bad states of affairs that wouldn't exist, or probably 
wouldn't exist, if God does. Atheists will be unable to believe that there are bad 
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states of affairs or that a wholly good being would do such-and-such. Furthennore, 
atheists will not be able to criticise theodicies in the sorts of ways that Swinburne 
notes his theodicies' detractors do - by rejecting his moral claims and putting 
forward evaluations of their own. 
However, while I think that this is correct, it would be too quick to leave the 
discussion there. This is not the first place where philosophers have considered the 
question of how one's metaethical views (such as moral scepticism) might affect 
what one should think about the argument from evil. 17 For example, an instructive 
example of a philosopher doing precisely that occurs in an essay by naturalistic 
moral realist Nicholas Sturgeon (1995), who considers John Mackie's embrace of 
both moral error theory (according to which all of our moral beliefs areJalse) and the 
opinion that the argument from evil provides a powerful objection to theism. 
Sturgeon's discussion of Mackie is instructive and relevant for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, since Mackie doesn't (officially) endorse any moral opinions, being an error 
theorist, Sturgeon points out that he initially looks to be in the position that I have 
suggested above that moral sceptics are in - if you don't believe that there are bad 
states of affairs (or evils), then it seems you cannot hold that there exist bad states of 
affairs that wouldn't exist, or probably wouldn't exist, if God does. 18 Secondly, 
Sturgeon points out that there is a way - even quite an obvious way - in which, one 
might think, Mackie could nevertheless still think that the argument from evil poses a 
severe problem for theism; and if successful, that would be a way that atheistic moral 
17 Although, it has recently been stated that discussions of the argument from evil "presuppose and 
appeal to axiological and metaethical assumptions, but seldom pay adequate attention to those 
assumptions" (Carson 2007, p.349). 
18 Sturgeon (1995, p.159) notes that one might think that error theory would itself provide a reason to 
think theism and theodicies false, since they posit values and according to error theory there are no 
values. However, he also points out that Mackie was clear that his case for error theory depended 
upon theism being rejected beforehand, since his main argument for error theory (that moral facts and 
properties are objectionably queer) would not be cogent if God exists (facts and properties would not 
be so queer if they were to be understood as created by God). 
204 
sceptics could likewise think that the argument from evil poses a severe problem for 
theism. Thirdly, Sturgeon's discussion of Mackie is instructive because Sturgeon 
maintains that, despite the promise of this way in which (it might seem) Mackie can 
continue to think the argument from evil is a severe problem for theism, it seems that 
error theorists like Mackie actually can't; and it looks like the same will be true for 
the atheistic moral sceptic. 
So, what is the perhaps obvious way in which Mackie might, despite his error 
theory, be able to think that the argument from evil poses a severe problem for 
theism? Sturgeon notes that, "the nihilist about value [Mackie] might press [the claim 
that there are evils] only dialectically, as a purely ad hominem objection to theism" 
(p.160), or partially dialectically by relying on the theist's moral beliefs and his own 
non-moral beliefs. Given that theists believe or claim that there are evils, even if 
error theorists (or, I add, atheistic moral sceptics) are not warranted in believing that 
there exist evils, they can perhaps nevertheless hold that the beliefs and claims about 
evil that are endorsed by theists make God's existence unlikely. (Of course, in order 
to be fair and to the point, such a challenge has to take into account the theodicies 
theists have developed, since those are explicitly developed in order to show that 
theists' beliefs about evil do not make God's existence unlikely; I mean these to be 
included when I mention theists' beliefs.) Theists' beliefs that are pertinent to the 
argument from evil (e.g., those that figure in theists' theodicies) may themselves be 
inconsistent, or they may contain non-moral claims that there is good reason to reject. 
If such a strategy is adopted and successful, Mackie could consider theistic belief to 
be seriously challenged by the argument from evil. (Atheistic moral sceptics might 
be able to do likewise.) 
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Indeed, Sturgeon notes that Mackie takes himself (at least in part of his work 
that Sturgeon cites) to be engaged in such an ad hominem strategy, 19 stating that it is 
for the theist and not him (Mackie) to declare what counts as good (Sturgeon, 
p.161 )?O As Mackie sees it, it seems, the problem of evil is exactly that - a problem 
- a problem for theists, due to inconsistency in their beliefs. And he intends to point 
the inconsistency out. However, as Sturgeon shows, while apparently officially 
implementing this strategy of launching an ad hominem attack on the beliefs of 
theists and theodicists, Mackie in fact draws upon moral opinions of his own (even 
though he officially doesn't have any). For example, Mackie endorses John Stuart 
Mill's complaint against theists whose view can be represented by the slogan "God's 
goodness is not ours" - the objection being in effect that such people call God 
"good" but their description is really one that makes Him out to be bad - and 
dismisses the view, held by various Christian theists, that "sin plus repentance is, as 
an organic whole, better than sinlessness" as one that is "hard to endorse" (Sturgeon, 
pp.162-164), by which he means there is reason to reject it.21 Mackie also "takes 
several strong stands about the value, or lack of it, of various imagined forms of free 
will, with no indication of how he might be arguing by his opponents' standards" 
(Sturgeon, p.165). 
I think Sturgeon's discussion of Mackie is instructive because the fact that 
Mackie in fact draws upon (unwarranted) moral opinions of his own, despite 
apparently realising that he couldn't, seems to reveal the difficulty of successfully 
implementing the suggested ad hominem strategy in practice. Indeed, although there 
unfortunately isn't space here to consider specific theodicies and possible criticisms 
19 I give page references to Sturgeon's paper in the text, and references to Mackie's work that 
Sturgeon refers to - (Mackie 1982, ch.9) - in footnotes. 
20 (Mackie 1982, p.173). 
21 (Mackie 1982, p.156, 159). 
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of them, it seems to me that there are theodicies which are such that the prospects of 
atheists criticising them and rejecting them as inadequate without relying on their 
own (unwarranted) moral opinions are not good. For, although many theodicies 
incorporate the claim that human beings have libertarian free will, and so criticism of 
them could perhaps proceed by way of arguing that such free will does not exist or is 
even incoherent, whether the notion of such free will is incoherent is highly 
contentious and the possibility and actuality of libertarian free will have many 
defenders (Hasker 1999, ch.4; Moya 2006). Furthermore, other grounds for thinking 
that libertarian free will does not exist tend to be narrowly scientistic (Unger 2002) in 
a way that, it could be argued, appear to assume the falsity of theism and so seem 
question begging in the context of the argument from evil. In addition, even if 
atheists consider themselves warranted in rejecting libertarian free will as non-
existent and/or incoherent, theodicies are defended that do not appeal to it, or which 
appear not to need to given the other claims they advance (see, e.g., Plantinga 2004). 
I find it hard to see how the atheist could criticise such theodicies without having 
warranted moral opinions of her own. 
Now, my comments have been very brief and I haven't been able to discuss 
or explain any theodicies. Even if I had, it would be very bold - too bold - to claim 
that atheists definitely won '( be able to reject theists' theodicies as inadequate 
without relying on their own (unwarranted) moral opinions. However, it seems to me 
that, as Sturgeon's discussion of Mackie illustrates, there are grounds for thinking 
that the prospects are not good. (Perhaps Swinburne's stated experience that 
opponents of his theodicies often grant that the "goods" he points to couldn '( be had 
without the corresponding "evils" - important non-moral claims - and that they take 
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issue with his moral evaluations is also instructive here.) So I tentatively suggest that 
that is the case. 
If that is right, then it seems that atheists are unlikely to be able to hold that 
theism is false (or probably false) and/or that theistic belief is unreasonable due 10 
considerations of evil. Furthermore, to the extent that an atheist bases her atheism 
upon the argument from evil, we seem to have reason for thinking that the grounds 
for her atheism will be undermined: because of her atheism, she acquires a reason to 
adopt moral scepticism, which in turn undermines the grounds for her atheism, 
possibly even rendering it such that she should consider it unwarranted (if she takes 
most of her warrant for her atheism to come from the argument from evil). 
8. The argument from evil unbowed? 
I have suggested that, upon accepting moral scepticism, atheists will be 
unable to endorse the argument from evil. The ad hominem appeal to theists' beliefs 
seems unlikely to work and moral sceptics don't have warranted moral beliefs that 
can contradict those of the theodicist. However, one might think that the argument 
from evil can be salvaged, and that there are other possibilities available to the moral 
sceptic (and, for that matter, to the error theorist like Mackie). I will assess two ways 
in which one might seek to preserve atheists' ability to endorse the argument from 
evil despite the claims of the last section. 22 I call these possibilities "going 
conditional" and "the argument from lack of love" respectively. 
I will consider going conditional first. One might reason as follows. 
Atheistic moral scepticism results from the fact that the streamlined evolutionary 
story is (to atheists) a very live possibility, because if the streamlined evolutionary 
22 Thanks to James Lenman for drawing attention to these sorts of strategies. 
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story is true, then there are no moral facts (see chapter 3, section 9). But what if the 
streamlined evolutionary story isn't true? Even if the moral sceptic cannot be 
warranted in believing there are moral facts or the moral facts are such-and-such, 
could she be warranted in believing that if the streamlined evolutionary story isfalse, 
then there are moral facts and if the streamlined evolutionary story is false, then the 
moral facts are such-and-such (where "such-and-such" contradicts the claims of the 
theodicist)? Or, since she can be warranted in believing that if theism is true, then 
there are moral facts, could she be warranted in believing that if theism is true, then 
the moral facts are such-and-such (again, where "such-and-such" contradicts the 
claims of the theodicist)? If so, it appears, she would still be able to endorse the 
argument from evil. She would be able to hold that if theism is/were true, or if the 
streamlined evolutionary story is/were false, then the moral facts are, or would be, 
such as to render problematic the theodicist's proposal.23 
Call the belief if the streamlined evolutionary story is false, then there are 
moral facts and they are such-and-such - where "such-and-such" contradicts the 
moral beliefs of the theodicist - "the conditional claim". The question is whether 
atheistic moral sceptics can be warranted in believing the conditional claim when, 
due to the live possibility of the streamlined evolutionary story, they aren't warranted 
in believing any straightforward moral claims. I think that the answer is no. 
The first thing to note, I think, is how strange such claims appear in a debate. 
There seems to me to be something intuitively strange about somebody who is 
23 It should be noted that it is insufficient for the atheistic moral sceptic to rely on the claim that ifshe 
believed there were moral facts. she would believe them to be such-and-such. She needs to be 
warranted in holding that her envisaged belief that they are such-and-such would be (rue or likely to 
be true. Furthennore, it is not enough that she can hold that if she believed there were moral Jacts. she 
would be warranted in believing them to be such-and-such, for the question is whether she is now 
warranted in believing that those envisaged opinions would be right - an error theorist can hold that 
she would be warranted in having certain moral opinions if she wasn't an error theorist (and had no 
good reasons in favour of error theory), but given that she is an error theorist, she will hold that her 
beliefs in the imagined circumstances would be warranted butfalse. 
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agnostic about whether there are any moral facts, and therefore agnostic about 
whether she is reliable when it comes to detecting moral [acts, but who nevertheless 
is confident that if there are moral facts then they are thus-and-so when there is 
disagreement on that. If Swinburne (say) is asked why he endorses the particular 
moral claims that he does in his theodicy, he can reply that as he considers the claims, 
he can see that they are true; he simply finds himself believing them. Others may 
disagree with him, but what more can he do than believe what seems to him to be 
true? The moral sceptic who wants to go conditional does not hold any moral beliefs 
and so cannot say (or should not rely on the fact) that she just finds herself believing 
that the moral facts are otherwise than Swinburne thinks them to be. Swinburne can 
suggest that he can just see that the moral facts are thus-and-so. It would be very 
strange for the moral sceptic to claim that she can just see that the moral facts arc 
otherwise than as Swinburne says, for she doesn't believe that there are any moral 
facts. 
However, we can go further than this intuitive strangeness. (Perhaps you do 
not share the intuition.) When engaged in inquiry into the nature of the world, we 
generally start out with the assumption that things are as they appear to us to be, and 
nonnally only relinquish this assumption when it gets us into inconsistency or a 
related problem. This is so in the moral domain, but also in others - e.g., when it 
comes to our beliefs in an external world, in other minds, in material objects, etc. 
Following this reasonable epistemic strategy, which requires a measure of confidence 
in our epistemic reliability, we form moral beliefs on the basis of how things appear 
- moral "appearances". We are warranted in accepting the moral appearances at face 
value, and I think we can be so even in the face of disagreement (see chapter 2, 
section 4). However, one who embraces moral scepticism no longer believes the 
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appearances or trusts her epistemic faculties (when it comes to moral belief), and has 
given up the assumption that she is reliable at forming moral beliefs; the warrant of 
her moral beliefs and of her belief in her reliability has been removed. The problem 
with this warrant being removed is that conditional beliefs of the form ~r there are 
moral facts, then they are such-and-such appear to be most naturally understood as 
deriving their warrant from straightforward beliefs of the form the moral facts are 
such-and-such. (In the same way, our beliefs of the form if there are other minds, 
then such-and-such a body has a mind are best understood as deriving from our 
simple beliefs that other human bodies in fact have minds.) Whereas Swinburne and 
other theodicists will have beliefs of the fonn if there are moral facts, then the moral 
facts are such-and-such, which I think are best understood as being based on beliefs 
of the fonn the moral facts are such-and-such, it is hard to see how the moral sceptic 
can have warranted beliefs of the former sort because she has no warranted moral 
beliefs of the latter sort. 
Another way of looking at the problem is as follows. The moral sceptic who 
wants to reject theodicists' theodicies has given up the presumption in favour of her 
own reliability, but still wants to believe that if there are moral facts then she is 
reliable at detecting them (and, note: more reliable than the theodicist is). But what 
grounds does she have for thinking that, absent the initial presumption in favour of 
her reliability? Her taking herself to be reliable in fonning moral beliefs - and her 
trusting herself when she disagrees with others without further grounds for thinking 
them wrong (again, see chapter 2, section 4) - is a starting point for inquiry; she 
doesn't have additional evidence for it, and she cannot reject it but remain warranted 
in believing that ~rthere are moral facts, then she is reliable (and. importantly. more 
reliable than the theodicist). 
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Now, this isn't so with all kinds of belief. There are many cases in which, due 
to the presence of some plausible hypothesis, one is not warranted in believing in the 
existence of some class of entities but one is nevertheless warranted in believing that 
if such a class exists, then a certain identified entity belongs to that class. For 
example, suppose that, for whatever bizarre reason, you come to believe that it is a 
live hypothesis that there are no cats in a particular neighbourhood and that all 
appearances to the contrary are due to the presence of mechanical, robot cats that 
someone has made and sometimes lets out of their house. According to the live 
hypothesis, the robotic cats are extremely lifelike. So when you see what appears to 
be a cat, you do not believe that it is. Nevertheless, it seems you would be warranted 
in believing that if the no-cats-in-the-neighbourhood-and-robotic-cats hypothesis is 
false. then what I saw was a cat. On a similar note, suppose that visiting a widget 
factory, you notice that all of the products on the assembly line appear red and you 
naturally believe that they are in fact red.24 However, suppose that you overhear two 
factory employees disagreeing about whether the widgets are red. One employee 
claims that they are, mentioning that so-and-so told him; the other employee insists 
that the items appear red because they are all irradiated with lighting - in order to 
detect possible defects - which makes them appear red regardless of what colour they 
are; he adds that so-and-so told him. They continue to disagree, and you have no 
reason to trust one rather than the other. In such a case, you surely have a defeater for 
your initial belief that the widgets you saw were red, due to the live possibility that 
they are irradiated with light that simply makes them appear red. However, it seems 
you would be warranted in believing that if the widgets aren't being irradiated with 
light that makes them appear red, then the widgets I saw were red. In these examples, 
24 The widgets example was introduced into the literature on epistemic defeaters by John Pollock 
(Plantinga }993, p.230). 
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it seems that you are warranted in believing conditional claims even though you are 
not warranted in believing straightforward claims about the entities in question. 
However, it seems to me that these examples are importantly different from 
the atheistic moral sceptic's situation. For in the widget example, although you are 
not warranted in believing that the widgets are red - that belief is defeated - you have 
a host of undefeated beliefs that support the conditional. Importantly, you have the 
belief that when entities appear red to you, they usually are; this belief is not called 
into question by the presence of the hypothesis that the widgets are not red. Similarly 
in the other example: even if you are not warranted in believing that the small furry 
thing you saw was a cat, nevertheless you are warranted in believing that you arc 
usually good at recognising cats. You still have warranted beliefs about what cats 
look like, and warranted beliefs about human behaviour and motivations which 
support the claim that it is very unlikely that there be appearances as if of cats 
without such appearances being veridical. Although in the particular case you think it 
a live possibility that somebody is generating misleading appearances as if of cats 
(by creating their robot cats), you are warranted in believing that such activity is 
nevertheless unlikely in general. You are warranted in believing that whether or not 
mechanical cats have been created in the neighbourhood, it is very unlikely that 
many other people are up to the same sort of thing. 
As I see it, the atheistic moral sceptic does not have similar warranted beliefs 
to support the conditional claim. Given the live possibility of the streamlined 
evolutionary story, she is not warranted in believing that there are any moral facts. 
She is not warranted in believing that she is generally good at detecting moral facts. 
Unlike the above examples, which involve scepticism about a subset of one's beliefs 
about a certain type of object or property (scepticism about some of one's beliefs 
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about red things, and scepticism about some of one's beliefs about cats), all of the 
atheistic moral sceptic's moral beliefs, past and present, are called into question. So 
the atheistic moral sceptic cannot be warranted in believing that she is generally 
reliable, or more reliable than the theodicist, when it comes to detecting moral facts. 
Furthennore, unlike how things stand with our beliefs about cats - who leave behind 
fur, dead mice, waste, etc -, our conception of moral facts does not give us reason to 
think that they will leave behind a certain causal pattern or something that we could 
detect without relying on the appearance of the entity in question (moral truth); it 
seems that we can't be warranted in believing conditional moral claims without being 
warranted in holding actual straightforward moral beliefs. 
Because the argument for atheistic moral scepticism is not an everyday 
example of epistemic defeat but is a kind of global scepticism (global with respect to 
moral belief), it is difficult to find real-world analogies to it. Furthennore, due to how 
ingrained and habitual moral belief is, it may be difficult to imaginatively put 
ourselves in the shoes of someone who really doubts all their moral beliefs to see 
what we would be confident about (certainly I find this difficult). Indeed, I suspect 
that if one thinks that upon embracing moral scepticism they would be warranted in 
believing conditional claims of the fonn if there are moral facts. then they are thus-
and-so (where thus-and-so contradicts the claims of the theodicist), this is only 
because they have not actually embraced moral scepticism. They believe that they 
would be warranted in believing the conditional claim because they actually believe 
lots of straightforward moral claims and find it difficult to really imagine not 
believing those claims. However, for the reasons I have given, I suggest that atheistic 
moral sceptics cannot reasonably endorse the conditional claim. 
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So I suggest that the strategy of going conditional does not work for the 
atheistic moral sceptic. She cannot be warranted in rejecting the moral claims that 
figure in theodicists' theodicies as false. 
The second way atheistic moral sceptics may hope to sidestep the argument 
of the previous section is by advancing the idea that the argument from evil does not 
really depend upon the application of moral concepts at all. Instead, the argument 
could be reformulated as the argument from lack of love. According to the theist's 
beliefs, or perhaps a theistic tradition, God is all-loving. But the suffering we find in 
the world calls the existence of such a God into question, since we would expect a 
loving God to create a world with much less suffering (or lacking suffering of the 
kinds, distribution, etc, we find). Since the atheistic moral sceptic's beliefs about 
what love involves are warranted even if her moral beliefs aren't, she can draw on 
them to run a powerful argument just like the argument from evil. 
However, I think such a strategy is unlikely to work. The first problem is that 
God is said by theists and theistic traditions to be loving in a sense that is not 
unrelated to, or independent of, moral considerations. The concept of love that 
figures in theistic traditions plausibly involves the concept of what is good for 
someone (Carson 2007, p.366): if you love someone, you desire and try to promote 
their good, what is in their interests (which isn't simply what they desire). To the 
extent that it is difficult to separate this notion of what is good for someone from 
moral considerations - e.g., it is good for someone to live a moral life and to be 
treated in a morally right way - it seems that moral sceptics will plausibly have to be 
sceptics about the notion of what is good for someone as well and will not be able to 
reject the claims of theodicists on this score. 
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In addition, even if atheistic moral sceptics are sceptical about moral claims, 
theists claim that God acts from love and from moral considerations. So even if the 
atheistic moral sceptic claims that God is not loving if (say) He allows a certain 
instance of suffering to occur, the theist can claim that He has - or may well have -
morally good reasons which also need to be taken into account and which alter the 
picture. The extra infonnation about morality may be important to the assessment of 
whether God acts or has acted in ways that are consistent with Him being loving, 
even if the atheistic moral sceptic can have no warranted beliefs about it. This can 
certainly be the case with human actions. For example, if I learn that a man who is a 
strong swimmer and doesn't fear water didn't jump into a river to save his wife, I 
may consider this to call into question his love for her. But if a moral reason is 
introduced into the equation - for example, he didn't jump into the water to save his 
wife because a group of children were in need of his rescue for their lives to be saved 
- then the previous verdict that he appeared not to have much love for his wife is 
undennined. According to mainstream theists, God acts out of love and for moral 
reasons, including reasons that appeal to justice and deserved punishment and other 
considerations that one might not immediately think of as loving. Atheistic moral 
sceptics cannot reasonably ignore such theistic claims, otherwise they will attack a 
straw man understanding of God's motivations that theists do not actually endorse. 
But in that case, the argument from lack of love will fail because atheists will not be 
able to contest theodicists' claims that an all-loving and good God might 
nevertheless allow suffering for such-and-such moral reasons. 
In summary, I conclude that there is reason to think that atheistic moral 
sceptics will be unable to continue to endorse the argument from evil either by going 
conditional or by running the argument from lack of love; it seems that the argument 
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of the previous section stands. Given the number of atheists that endorse the 
argument from evil, this is a significant consequence of the fact that they have reason 
to accept moral scepticism. 
9. Moral scepticism and "Unholy Scripture" arguments 
I have suggested that even if they embrace moral fictionalism, atheists will 
not be able to accept the argument from evil or to think that it poses a severe problem 
for theism. The context of that argument is the philosophy classroom and real honest-
truth seeking inquiry into the nature of the world - atheists presumably don't want to 
just pretend to endorse the argument from evil - and, having accepted moral 
scepticism, atheists cannot reject as false the claim that theodicists' theodicies 
provide reasons that would justify God in allowing the world's evils. It seems to me 
that a similar conclusion holds with respect to another argument, or set of arguments, 
that many past and present atheists have endorsed, which I term If Unholy Scripture" 
arguments. 25 According to this kind of argument, a purported divine revelation, such 
as the Bible, contains moral claims and moral teaching that is false and so the 
purported revelation should be rejected as either a good depository of moral truth, or 
as a revelation from God, or both. (Sometimes it is simply stated or suggested that 
the purported revelation contains false moral teaching and others are left to draw the 
further conclusions themselves; such conclusions nevertheless seem to be implied.) 
The false moral teaching might consist in commanding things that are actually bad or 
wrong, or describing someone's actions (e.g., God's) contained therein as good when 
actually they are bad. In the remainder of this chapter, I will only consider "Unholy 
Scripture" arguments which have as their conclusion that the Bible is not a divine 
25 After the title of Gerd Li.idemann's book (1997) on "the dark side of the Bible". 
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revelation, although such arguments are also pressed against other purported 
revelations. 
Sometimes it isn't obvious whether the proponent of an "Unholy Scripture" 
argument is pressing the argument that the Bible isn't divine revelation, or whether 
they are making the case that it contains defective moral teaching but intending to 
leave open the possibility that it is nevertheless divine revelation (albeit flawed 
divine revelation). However, "Unholy Scripture" arguments seem to be generally 
aimed against the doctrines of scripture held by traditional Jews and Christians, 
according to which the Bible is a divine revelation and (not coincidentally) does not 
contain moral teaching that is in error. They are generally advanced in support of the 
claim that atheists have good reason to reject the Bible as not being a divine 
revelation, and often in support of the claim that theists have good reason to do 
likewise. 
How important are "Unholy Scripture" arguments to atheists? Some atheists 
may consider them relatively unimportant, thinking that there are no remotely 
plausible grounds for taking a purported divine revelation such as the Bible to 
actually be such, since - surely - scholarship has shown the Bible to be historically 
unsound or inconsistent quite apart from any errors in its moral teachings. However, 
those who advocate this view (e.g., Kitcher 2007, pp.134-140) appear unaware of the 
fact that the historical reliability and theological consistency of the Bible are in fact 
still defended at a high academic level, 26 and philosophers have developed 
cumulative case arguments for the rationality of believing in the proposition that the 
Bible is a divine revelation (e.g., Swinburne 2007; see also Menssen and Sullivan 
26 For example, Kenneth Kitchen, Professor Emeritus of Egyptology at the University of Liverpool. 
has recently written a massive defence of the historical reliability of the Old Testament (Kitchen 
2003); see also Provan, Long and Longman (2003) and Howard and Grisanti (2003). There have also 
been recent defences of the historical reliability of the New Testament gospels (Eddy and Boyd 2007; 
Blomberg 2008). All critically interact with scholarship arguing for the opposite view. 
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2007). I am not here claiming or arguing that such a case succeeds, but I do suggest 
that the fact that there is still scholarly defence of the historical reliability and 
consistency of the Bible, and of the reasonableness of believing that it is a divine 
revelation, means that those who want to be warranted in believing that it isn't, or 
warranted in believing that traditional Jews and Christians are unreasonable in 
believing it to be so, may have a significant stake in the success of "Unholy 
Scripture" arguments. 
At any rate, "Unholy Scripture" arguments have been very popular among 
those who reject the Bible as divine revelation. They go back at least as far as the 15\ 
century AD (the Jewish historian Josephus wrote to rebut some in his Against Apion, 
book 2). They enjoyed prominence during the Enlightenment, being expounded by 
the English deists and spread abroad by freethinkers such as Thomas Paine and 
Robert Ingersoll. Today such arguments are standard fare in books or on websites 
promoting atheism or criticising theism. They also appear in the works of atheistic 
philosophers. Recent examples can be found in work by philosophers Elizabeth 
Anderson (2007), Louise Antony (2009), Simon Blackburn (2003), Raymond 
Bradley (1999), David Brink (2007), Evan Fales (2007). John Mackie (1982). 
Michael Martin (1991; 2002), Erik Wielenberg (2005) and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong 
(2009). They can also be found in the work of some Biblical scholars, such as Gerd 
LUdemann (1997), and in more popular anti-theistic writings such as those by George 
Smith (1989), Richard Dawkins (2006) and Christopher Hitchens (2008). Here I will 
provide two examples from the writings of philosophers. The first one is from John 
Mackie: 
"If there were not only a benevolent god but also a reliable revelation of his 
will, then we might be able to get from it expert moral advice about difficult 
issues, where we could not discover for ourselves what are the best policies. 
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But there is no such reliable revelation. Even a theist must see that the 
purported revelations, such as the Bible and the Koran, condemn themselves 
by enshrining rules which we must reject as narrow, outdated, or barbarous" 
(1982, pp.256-257). 
The second is from Elizabeth Anderson, who explicitly says that false moral 
teaching in the Bible undercuts any evidence that it otherwise could provide for the 
existence of God, holding that, "if we take the evidence for theism with utmost 
seriousness, we will find ourselves committed to the proposition that the most 
heinous acts are permitted. Since we know that these acts are not morally permitted, 
we must therefore doubt the evidence for theism" (2007, p.217). In addition, many of 
the Bible's moral teachings "must be categorically rejected as false and depraved 
moral teachings" (p.222). Anderson considers such false moral teaching to be clear 
evidence against any form of Jewish or Christian theism that has a traditional view of 
the Bible. 
It needs to be acknowledged that "Unholy Scripture" arguments are often 
unsound due to resting on a false belief about what the Bible teaches, and in fact all 
of the authors mentioned above evince some severe misunderstandings on that 
score.27 Furthermore, it needs to be said that there is sometimes a misunderstanding 
of what the traditional Bible-as-divine-revelation position claims about the Bible's 
moral teachings. As philosopher Paul Copan points out, it is often "assume[ d) that 
the ANE [ancient Near East] categories embedded within the Mosaic Law are the 
Bible's moral pinnacle. They are, instead, a springboard anticipating further 
development - or, perhaps more accurately - pointing us back toward the loftier 
moral ideals of [texts that] affirm the image of God in each person, lifelong 
monogamous marriage, and God's concern for the nations" (2008, p.16). As Copan 
27 For engagement with texts that are often misunderstood and drawn on in "Unholy Scripture" 
arguments, see Kaiser (1991), Kaiser et aI. (1996), Wenham (1994), Wright (2004) and Copan (2008; 
2009). 
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draws attention to, the theological claim is not necessarily that all the moral 
commands are the best possible or that they would all be good or right today or in 
any society whatever. Criticism of many commandments, to be to the point, needs to 
take the form of arguing that they were mistaken and morally unjustified in the 
ancient Near Eastern context and society in which they originated and for which they 
were intended. 
Nevertheless, it must also be acknowledged that not all "Unholy Scripture" 
arguments rest upon such misunderstandings. In other cases, their proponents do 
accurately understand what the traditional Bible-as-divine-revelation view teaches 
morally and find fault with it. Naturally, it could be that the proponents of such 
arguments are mistaken in their moral beliefs; after all, there are others who disagree 
with them (such as theists who accept the Bible) and we find philosophers arguing 
for the reasonableness of the Bible's (and the Church's) moral teaching that others 
allege to be morally problematic (e.g., Swinburne 2007, pp.289-332). However, to 
the extent that the proponent of an "Unholy Scripture" argument considers her 
judgement to be warranted, she will consider herself warranted in believing that the 
Bible is not a divine revelation or a good moral guide on the basis of moral error in it. 
And to the extent that she considers Bible-believers' moral judgements to be 
unwarranted, she will consider those who accept the Bible to be unreasonable 
because of the Bible's moral error. 
"Unholy Scripture" arguments are arguments that are presented in the context 
of real truth-seeking inquiry into the nature of the world, and have conclusions the 
truth of which atheists care about; atheists want to really endorse such arguments and 
to be warranted in doing so, not to pretend that they endorse them and that they are 
warranted in doing so. Therefore, if atheists should accept moral scepticism (as I 
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have argued), then even ifmoral fictionalism is a viable strategy for atheists (and I 
have argued it isn't), it seems atheists will not be able to accept or offer such 
arguments. The atheist might not have reason to think that her moral belief which 
disagrees with the Bible is false, but she does have reason to consider it unwarranted, 
and so it seems that atheistic moral sceptics will have to give up "Unholy Scripture" 
arguments. 
It would potentially still be open to atheists to advance "Unholy Scripture" 
arguments that follow a strategy similar to that Mackie adopted in pressing the 
argument from evil - arguing that the Bible contains moral teachings that are 
contradictory and that therefore part of it (some of its moral teachings) provides 
reason to reject other parts of it (other of its moral teachings). Likewise, atheists 
could perhaps argue that theists who accept the Bible as a divine revelation or a 
depository of moral truth are unreasonable in their doing so because it contains moral 
teachings that conflict with the moral beliefs of those theists. And it should be noted 
that many who criticise the Bible's moral teachings do indeed often argue that they 
are contradictory. However, while the debate over this cannot be entered into here, I 
think that all of the examples of this that I have seen fail because their proponents 
misunderstand what the Bible's moral teachings are.28 And the fact that many Bible-
believing theists are well-aware of such charges of moral contradiction but aren't 
convinced should at least make one doubtful that such a strategy will succeed. 
Finally, it seems to me that, for the same reasons that were discussed in the 
previous section, other strategies to try and nevertheless still advance "Unholy 
Scripture" arguments such as "going conditional" and running "the argument from 
lack oflove" (or, we might call it, the "Unloving Scripture" argument) will fail. 
28 Again, see the sources referenced in the previous footnote. 
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10. Conclusion 
I have argued that moral fictionalism will not be a viable strategy for atheists 
to adopt after accepting moral scepticism and considering their moral beliefs to be 
unwarranted. In that case, atheists will have to stop accepting and making moral 
claims, with all the costs and upheaval that entails. Even if I am wrong about that, 
however, and moral fictionalism is viable, it appears that atheists will still face the 
costs of being unable to rationally endorse the argument from evil and "Unholy 
Scripture" arguments. Furthermore, to the extent that atheists consider their atheism 
to be warranted on the basis of such arguments, their grounds for their atheism may 
be undermined. If atheists have reason to accept moral scepticism, and if such an 
acceptance brings these consequences in its wake, then that is surely significant. 
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